HEC MONTRÉAL

The Marketing of Terrorism: A Distorted Metaphor

by

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Abstract

This paper aims to examine how the press appropriated and reconstructed a discourse drawn from the marketing scientific literature; the discourse imputing marketing to terrorism. To study the public conceptualization of the marketing of terrorism discourse, we will first follow an enhanced automated content analysis model to catalogue all the relevant articles that appeared in the press since 9/11. Subsequently, we will individually examine each selected article to evaluate how the discourse is depicted and in which manner it is similar, or divergent, from the marketing of terrorism discourse in the marketing literature. Our findings indicate that the marketing of terrorism discourse borrowed by the press representatives is generally poorly illustrated. Since the press does not define properly the constructs of this contemporary terrorism narrative, the marketing of terrorism should not qualify as a discourse per se. It functions more as a superficial statement expressed to compel the readers. The journalists' attribution of the terrorists' successes to the marketing domain translates a desire to revitalize and rejuvenate a subject, all too often grim. This study aspires to enlighten the marketing practitioners on how the press erroneously portrays the discipline and how this distortion will affect society's regards on marketing.

Key words: Marketing, Terrorism, Propaganda, Branding

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Foreword

Intéressée par les facteurs qui motivent les actes terroristes et les terribles contrecoups qui en découlent, c'est avec engouement que j'ai entrepris ma recherche sur le marketing du terrorisme. Le terrorisme m'a toujours déconcertée par son anthologie de la peur et particulièrement par son anthologie de la haine; une haine qui divise, une haine qui justifie des actes condamnables, une haine qui s'installe si pernicieusement dans l'éthos d'une société, qu'elle en devient héréditaire. Peut-être est-ce utopiste, mais j'ose espérer que cette haine est remédiable en tout lieu où la terreur asservit les populations.

Sans prétendre que mon mémoire apporte la solution, je suis d'avis que plus la communauté internationale canalise ses efforts sur des recherches s'interrogeant les fondements du terrorisme, plus elle s'outille dans le développement d'un discours antiterroriste articulé et persuasif. Comme l'acte constitutif de l'UNESCO le proclame: « Les guerres prenant naissance dans l'esprit des hommes, c'est dans l'esprit des hommes que doivent être élevées les défenses de la paix ».

J'avais à peine entamé la rédaction de mon mémoire que j'imaginais le dénouement de la mission que je m'étais volontairement octroyée, sans me soucier du parcours que j'allais initier. J'étais loin de me douter que le mémoire deviendrait une épreuve, et plus encore, une leçon d'humilité.

Après avoir travaillé plus de deux ans sur ce mémoire explorant la relation entre le marketing et le terrorisme, je peux affirmer que mon parcours académique s'est avéré parsemé d'entraves. La rédaction de ce dernier m'a drainée émotivement, et j'avoue avoir parfois envisagé abandonner le tout, mais je suis fière d'avoir persévéré. Même si le parcours prit plus de temps et d'efforts qu'escompté, je ne regrette aucunement d'avoir choisi la maîtrise avec cheminement mémoire puisque l'expérience a été révélatrice sur ma nature profonde.

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Je tiens à remercier Yany Grégoire et Renaud Legoux qui ont bien gentiment accepté de lire mon mémoire.

Je tiens à remercier ma mère, qui est un programme Antidote ambulant. Tu m'as épaulé toutes ces années, et je t'en suis éternellement redevable. Mon père, qui m'a sommé maintes et maintes fois de changer de sujet. Plus tu t'entêtes, plus tu me motives. Elizabeth Leguy, ma correctrice d'anglais qui a su m'aider dans un laps de temps précipité. Maître Ludo, Future Maître Camille et tout mon entourage, qui me supportaient au quotidien. Je vais enfin pouvoir célébrer avec vous la fin, ou plutôt le début, d'une étape importante de ma vie. Ma grand-mère Clémence que je vais rejoindre sous peu. Et je tiens à faire une mention spéciale à ma grand-mère Georgette, qui est décédée juste avant la remise de mon mémoire. La fin de ce projet sera toujours accompagnée d'une douceur amère.

Introduction

A new discourse has emerged in the marketing literature, the discourse imputing marketing to terrorism. This recent marketing narrative, pledged by a number of experts (O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009, 2014; Bhui and Ibrahim 2003; Mozes and Weimann 2010; Baines et al. 2010), examines how armed groups model our contemporary marketing rhetoric in the hope of pursuing their terroristic objectives. While the discourse's theoretical conceptualization is still anchoring itself in the marketing academic field, since the rise of The Islamic State, a fundamentalist terrorist group, various media professionals have rapidly appropriated this recent narrative (Napoleoni 2015; Mustafa 2015; Taylor et al. 2016).

According to the press, the number of young foreign recruits who voluntarily enroll in terrorist military camps and fight for IS' behalf sprout remarkably because of their ability to mimic a modernistic marketing discourse. Nowadays, news consumers are exposed to titles like "ISIS beat al-Qaida with its marketing plan" (Goldberg 2015), "Here are the disturbing reasons ISIS marketing is so effective" (Selby 2016) or "The Key to Countering ISIS? Understanding Its Marketing Effectiveness" (Lamberton 2015). This marketing and terrorism juxtaposition incidentally catalyzes a new terrorism paradigm in the public sphere; the marketing of terrorism.

"Traditional media possess a long-standing gatekeeper role in determining what constitutes legitimate public discourse" (Humphreys and Thompson 2014, 883). It means that once a journalistic discourse emerged, it has the capability to be replicated and integrated in the public discourse. While the appropriation of the marketing of terrorism scientific discourse was apprehensible, its current appearance in the public sphere can be alarming. Indeed, the emergence of the press' discourse, which attributes to the marketing field the successes of terrorist organizations, can be problematic. If the journalists exploit carelessly the marketing of terrorism, in other words, if the journalists' rendition of the marketing of terrorism is not properly decrypted for the public, the public is likely to adopt a distorted discourse.

The press's appropriation of marketing of terrorism is doubly alarming because it can erroneously stigmatize the field. Society ascribes to marketing many fallacious intentions (Rotfeld 2005) and accuses it of enslaving individuals by perniciously embarking them on a modern and subtle form of propaganda (Packard 1956, Baudrillard 1968/1996). While the increasing occurrence of the marketing of terrorism statements, like the ones presented before, can shed light on a compelling neoteric approach, it can also accentuate and fortify the public's prevalent misinterpretations. If the press materializes without diligence the correlation of a practical discipline with a politicized and controversial project, it can, and certainly will, exude an amalgam of unfavorable prejudices against the marketing domain.

Therefore, the aim of this article is to explore how the press revamps a terroristic narrative based on the marketing concepts. In other words, the objective of our paper lies in the general understanding of how the press construct and conceptualize the marketing of terrorism. Is the conceptualization adequately articulated, or on the contrary, is the marketing of terrorism spelled out in a lax fashion? In a wider spectrum, our paper will explore what contemporary marketing evokes in our society.

In order to meet our research objective, we must append a synthesis exercise to concretely set out the marketing and terrorism characteristics and limitations present in the literature. Firstly, we will present and clarify the theoretical foundations of the terrorism concept. It appears essential in this research to affix a rigorous exercise about terrorism since this complex and multidimensional phenomenon is not deeply embodied in the marketing field. Secondly, we will abandon the general concept of terrorism to focus especially on how the terrorism concept inscribes itself in the marketing literature. While not being an intensively covered subject in the marketing field, terrorism remains an integral component of the marketing lexicon. It is fundamental to understand how marketing academics integrated terrorism in their scientific studies in order to distinguish if the press's appropriation follows a similar or divergent discourse. Thirdly, we will cover the propaganda issue since it is interconnected, if not interdependent, to the terrorism discourse. While the marketing of terrorism does not automatically

involve the propaganda concept, we have the obligation to clarify the theoretical difference between the two because, more often than not, propaganda is wrongfully attached to the marketing field.

After having defined the often-obscure beacons of propaganda, marketing and terrorism, we must present the underlying reasons that led us elect an enhanced automated content analysis model as our chosen methodology. This model was developed in Ashlee Humphreys' publications, a researcher who dedicates her expertise on how the press shapes the public's opinion (Humphreys 2010A, 2010B, 2014; Humphreys and Thompson 2014). It must be noted that while our enhanced automated content analysis model was heavily inspired by Humphreys' works, we had to perform several alterations on the model she proposed because of the nature of our research. The methodology section will also chronicle the research stages meticulously undertaken throughout our study. Since our objective is to determine in which manner the press presents the marketing of terrorism, as our first step, we reviewed two press-related databases, Eureka and Factiva, and monitored all the pertinent articles published after 9/11 that referred to the marketing of terrorism. Then, as our second and last step, we practiced an in-depth analysis on each of the articles we carefully selected.

Finally, our last section will concentrate on the computation and on the analysis of all the collected data. The results will respond to our research objective by decoding in which manner the public sphere conceptualizes the

marketing of terrorism. The results will be followed by a discussion that demystifies, or attempts to demystify, what contemporary marketing evokes in our society. While the primary focus of our paper concentrates on the establishment of a journalistic discourse, we cannot disregard how society's cultural preconceptions crucially affect the press. Journalists are for the most part non-marketers; they, as much as any marketing amateur, are subject to accept and believe the general perceptions of marketing.

We believe that this research will contribute to the scientific community, as it will garnish the collection of articles linking marketing and terrorism. Most articles on marketing and terrorism interpret, with different semiotic analysis, the messages produced by terrorist organizations. Until today, no articles have focused on the manner the press assigns the holistic nature of marketing to the terrorist communicative successes. Furthermore, no articles have focused on the specific cognitive structures that help shape the public's opinion on marketing.

Article

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to examine how the press appropriated and reconstructed a discourse drawn from the marketing scientific literature; the discourse imputing marketing to terrorism. To study the public conceptualization of the marketing of terrorism discourse, we will first follow an enhanced automated content analysis model to catalogue all the relevant articles that appeared in the press since 9/11. Subsequently, we will individually examine each selected article to evaluate how the discourse is depicted and in which manner it is similar, or divergent, from the marketing of terrorism discourse in the marketing literature. Our findings indicate that the marketing of terrorism discourse borrowed by the press representatives is generally poorly illustrated. Since the press does not define properly the constructs of this contemporary terrorism narrative, the marketing of terrorism should not qualify as a discourse per se. It functions more as a superficial statement expressed to compel the readers. The journalists' attribution of the terrorists' successes to the marketing domain translates a desire to revitalize and rejuvenate a subject, all too often grim. This study aspires to enlighten the marketing practitioners on how the press erroneously portrays the discipline and how this distortion will affect society's regards on marketing.

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ARTICLE'S INTRODUCTION

A new discourse has emerged in the marketing literature, the discourse imputing marketing to terrorism. This recent marketing narrative, pledged by a number of experts (O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009, 2014; Bhui and Ibrahim 2003; Mozes and Weimann 2010; Baines et al. 2010), examines how armed groups model our contemporary marketing rhetoric in the hope of pursuing their terroristic objectives. While the discourse's theoretical conceptualization is still anchoring itself in the marketing academic field, since the rise of The Islamic State, a fundamentalist terrorist group, various media professionals have rapidly appropriated this recent narrative (Napoleoni 2015; Mustafa 2015; Taylor et al. 2016). This marketing and terrorism juxtaposition incidentally catalyzes a new terrorism paradigm in the public sphere; the marketing of terrorism.

"Traditional media possess a long-standing gatekeeper role in determining what constitutes legitimate public discourse" (Humphreys and Thompson 2014, 883). It means that once a journalistic discourse emerged, it has the capability to be replicated and integrated in the public discourse. The emergence of the press' discourse, which attributes to the marketing field the successes of terrorist organizations, can be problematic if the journalists exploit the marketing of terrorism carelessly. Indeed, if the journalists' rendition of the marketing of terrorism is not properly decrypted for the public, it is likely that the public will adopt a distorted discourse. If without diligence the press presents a new discourse materializing the correlation of a practical discipline with a politicized and

controversial project, it can, and certainly will, exude an amalgam of unfavorable prejudices against the marketing domain.

Therefore, the aim of this article is to explore how the press revamps a terroristic narrative based on the marketing concepts. The objective of our paper lies in the general understanding of how the press construct and conceptualize the marketing of terrorism. Is the conceptualization adequately articulated, or on the contrary, is the marketing of terrorism spelled out in a lax fashion? In a wider spectrum, our paper will explore what contemporary marketing evokes in our society.

Our chosen methodology was inspired by Ashlee Humphreys' enhanced automated content analysis model; a researcher who dedicates her expertise on how the press shapes the public's opinion (Humphreys 2010A, 2010B, 2014; Humphreys and Thompson 2014). The results retrieved after the enhanced automated content analysis model's manipulation will respond to our primary interest; how the press conceptualize the marketing of terrorism.

We believe that this research will contribute to the scientific community, as it will garnish the collection of articles linking marketing and terrorism. Most articles on marketing and terrorism interpret, with different semiotic analysis, the messages produced by terrorist organizations. Until today, no articles have focused on the manner the press assigns the holistic nature of marketing to the terrorist communicative successes. Furthermore, no articles have focused on the specific cognitive structures that help shape the public's opinion on marketing.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section seeks to clarify the concept of terrorism. Being a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, it is fundamental to devote our review to its scientific characterization. The first part of our literature review will identify the central terrorism constructs. The second part will study how the terrorism discourse inscribes itself in the marketing literature. The third part will overview the propaganda element. Although our primordial objective concentrates on the marketing of terrorism, we cannot elaborate on the discourse without referring to the propaganda concept.

Terrorism

In itself, terrorism is a phenomenon difficult to define. By its multifaceted nature, it is laborious to find a theoretical unity in the vast academic literature. Schmid (2004) demonstrates in an article the definitional problem that a term like terrorism occasions to the scientific community. Despite this semantic obscurity, many specialists agree that terrorism is a strategic and political device that aims to erect, by fear and violence, a new political system (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler 2004). These devices, deemed necessary by dissident organizations, are carefully crafted in order to, firstly, weaken the governing body and, secondly, if possible, to overthrow it (Laqueur 2011). James M. Lutz and Brenda J. Lutz's book, *Terrorism: Origins and Evolution,* define terrorism as follows:

> Terrorism involves political objectives and goals. It relies on violence or the threat of violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence involves an organization and not isolated individuals. […] Terrorism is violence that is designed to create power in situations in which power has previously been lacking. (2005, 7)

As the name suggests it, terrorism creates a regime where terror reigns supreme and forces a sovereign establishment to bow to a rebel groups' demands (Camus 2007). By their brutal and visual scenery, they intend to disrupt society's collective imaginary and to install an unbearable surrounding paranoia. For instance, 15 years after Al-Qaeda's aggression on the World Trade Center in 2001, Americans still live in a climate of tension and terror (Gallup 2016); proving how efficiently the terror strategy can alienate and frighten sustainably an entire society.

The evocation of the term terrorism often rhymes with the threat of liberal values and democratic foundations (Eubank and Weinberg 2010). In reality, there are many forms of terrorism (international, domestic, ethnic, religious, cyber-terrorism, narco-terrorism, etc.) that are not necessarily affiliated to the fight against democratic values and that does not necessarily intend to dethrone the systems governed by liberal values (Laqueur 2011). For instance, terrorist actions may also be desperate acts of an oppressed political party seeking their liberal independence. We only have to take the Irish Republican Army as an example (Richards 2001; Britannica 2016). Despite the plurality of the terrorism array, a study demonstrated that religious fundamentalist terrorism dominates among the terrorist practices

(Blomberg, Khusrav and Todd 2011). In 2014, 74 per cent of all the worldwide deaths accountable from terrorist actions came from only five Islamist militias; i.e. five fundamentalist religious militias (IEP 2015). As a result of this active terrorist international phenomenon, the media often give the impression that terrorism rhymes with Islam. Terrorism does not axiomatically originate from Islamic beliefs. As it was previously demonstrated, semantically, the word terrorism is not restricted to one ideology or one religion. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the term incorporates numerous notions, the fundamentalist Islamic terrorism will be the focal point of our literature review and our research, since its worldwide recognition and popularity possess a manifest effect on the journalistic discourse (Antunez and Tellidis 2013).

Terrorists' factions appeal to several tactics in order to compel governments to submit to their wishes (Lutz and Lutz 2005). These tactics, exacerbated by the use of violence, are premeditatedly conceived to propagate an atmosphere of panic. Whether it is bombing tactics, targeted assassinations, suicide attacks or vehicle-based attacks, a vast spectrum of stratagems is available to terrorists in order to commit civilian atrocities (Dershowitz 2002). For example, in the case of a political assassination, the group planning the attack will choose the candidate who best represents the symbol of the politics they plan to destabilize. Whether a president, a minister, a dictator or a king, a candidate is never selected randomly and his premeditated elimination seeks to promptly impose to the reigning government a

ministerial reshuffle. That being said, terrorists do not usually wish to attack political symbols, difficult to reach (Gueniffey 2003).

Indeed, terrorism is frequently distinguished by non-selection, or rather flexibility, in the choice of the victims. By suicide bombings or by raid attacks, terrorists mostly assault ordinary citizens who are not directly linked to politics. For them, it is not relevant to determine who will perish during the attacks; these are only specifics. For them, what matters is the broader perspective. What is important is to attack a symbol; a symbol of a free ordinary man, a man who enjoys the benefits related to the rule of law. This casualty nondiscrimination illustrates the foundation of the contemporary terrorism strategy. It is distinguished by the deliberate and rational decision to apply gratuitous violence on an "innocent" society to pressure the political party in power and impose its will. It is essential that individuals must unfairly pay the mistakes of their political representatives (Gueniffey 2003).

To transgress the moralistic precepts and deprive societies of their right of liberty, terrorists need a geographical site to carry out their attacks. The symbolic selection of the location is just as important as the symbolic selection of the victims. Al-Qaeda did not destroy on an impulse the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with hijacked planes; they carefully targeted the hive of capitalism and the Department of Defense's headquarters because both architectural constructions epitomize the American imperialism (Matusitz 2014). Striking the United States on their own soil did not have for sole purpose to frighten the American population; it was also

intended to disrupt the United States' invincibility status. The aggression implicitly sent out the message that even at home, Americans were not safe.

To underline how codified and somewhat allegorical the terrorism notion is, Mr Tuman, a San Francisco State University professor specialized in the symbolism of terrorism, declared in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* "Terrorism is not just about blowing something up. What's important is the message being sent" (2002, A12). In other words, what is important is the symbolic the targets represent. In the end, regardless if the attack does or does not go according to plan, regardless if terrorists need several attempts to carry out their mission, as long as they hit a target that embodies their enemy, they will reach their principal objective. "Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once—you will have to be lucky always" (The Economist 2005, 12). This statement issued by a member of the IRA reiterates how flexible and adaptable terrorists' targets are and how symbolism takes precedence over everything else.

Often considered as an instrument of last resort by some political resistance groups, terrorism is wrongly reckoned as a contemporary phenomenon. However, since the end of the twentieth century, and more specifically, since the cessation of the cold war, terrorism has embodied the preferred formula used by extremist insurgents. Indeed, Western countries in the last decades incrementally became experimental theaters for terrorist perpetrators (Laqueur 2011). For Christina Archetti, this modern arising is correlated to the predominant reporting of terroristic events in the mass media. Terrorists' intent is to produce dramatic spectacles because they are

well aware that these types of actions monopolize news coverage. "Terrorism is communication and, as such, it is really aimed at the people watching" (Archetti 2013, 2). The more spectacular the attack, the more news coverage the attack will gain in the press. The more news coverage the attack will gain in the press, the more the terrorist groups will plan spectacular attacks. Thus, by diffusing terrorist attacks, the press serves the interest of terrorist groups and perpetrates the vicious circle initiated by those same political insurgents. "The terrorist act itself is subordinate to the communications goal and exists primarily as a dramaturgic narrative device rather than an end in itself" (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014, 183).

Terrorism in the marketing literature

A priori, marketing seems to exert an indissoluble osmosis with corporate management (Brunswick 2014). This presupposition induces that the terrorism concept is quite estranged, if ever inapplicable, to the discipline. Yet, the marketing term is no longer limited to its simple administrative definition. On the contrary, there is a myriad of approaches on how marketers define their respective field (Kotler and Levy 1969; Luck 1969; McDaniel 1982; AMA 2013), which implies that not only the nomenclature nowadays refers to the transactional exchange process, it currently encompasses and analyzes avenues that are closely related to research in psychology, anthropology, and politics, to name a few (Ardnt 1978).

This academic trespassing, undoubtedly permitted terrorism to enter the marketing realm.

Thus, how does the terrorism theory insert itself in the marketing academic community? How do the marketing theoreticians discuss and translate terrorism in the marketing allegory?

O'Shaughnessy and Baines (2009), two of the most prolific authors in the marketing of terrorism, aim above all to set the beacon for a new form of political marketing: terrorism. They have established that the ideological survival of terrorist organizations observes the same rules as the ideological survival of legitimate democratic parties; it lies in the transmission and propagation of its political mentality (Baines et al. 2010). Without altering the reprehensible aspect of terrorism, this vision incites readers to neglect their preconceptions of this barbaric doctrine and to regard terrorism as an action with a highly symbolic communication, as a radical message with a primal objective to persuade (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2009).

In the marketing of terrorism discourse, persuasion acts as a core element since it displays constructs that can be attributed to the marketing department. For some researchers, both concepts "seek to enlist the consumer in beliefs and actions that are complicit with the intentions of the provider of information" (Bhui and Ibrahim 2013, 224). It indicates that the purpose of a terrorist and a marketer are substantially similar, since each one aims to attract a consumer by selling, or rather, promulgating

their "product". It is certain that in the case of a terrorist organization, the product offered is not a tangible one. Yet, theoretically, by adhering to a deeper holistic conception of marketing, radical ideologies can function and be designated as products.

 While it seems that because of their persuasive nature, terrorism and marketing appear complementary, if not entwined, O'Shaughnessy and Baines provide a nuance in which they delimit the parameters on how terrorism positions itself in the marketing domain.

> While orthodox marketing ideology resides in the notion of customer focus, in the case of terrorism we have a different issue; the motives, the understandings of the producer are if anything more significant than their impact on the consumer, reversing the normative truths of marketing. It is the message that they are selling, the positioning that we should seek to understand. So the focus must be on a producer as well as on the consumer. (2009, 228-229)

Marketers ordinarily participate in a bidirectional exchange. They embark in a constant dialogue with their targeted audience because one of their principal objectives is to respond to the consumers' needs and desires. If their needs are not met, marketers can adjust their philosophy. Terrorists, in opposition, detain an immutable ideology. The main interest of terrorist organizations does not lie in the indulgence of a civil population's needs, it lies in the desire to influence and convince sympathizers of the validity of their political struggle.

If terrorist ideologies can be perceived as products, terrorist attacks, as horrific as they may be, can serve as promotional campaigns. These terroristic campaigns are physical and graphic tools of extreme persuasion with the initial goal to (1) inflect governments or individuals to their political ideals by terrorizing the civil population and (2) recruit and retain new members (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014). These political operations are not only powerful through the concrete physicality of the terrorist act itself, these campaigns draw their force by gaining control over our media ramifications who negligently spread and constantly redistribute these acts, dramatically increasing the echo of an "innocuous" act on a global scale.

Terrorists' organizations do not exclusively rely on terrorist attacks for their promotion tactics, they have adopted a vast network of information and communication technologies to discharge their philosophy. Before the advent of new media, most terrorist organizations held complex and opaque networks of recruitment and planning. If the ultimate goal of an individual was to become a terrorist, he had to invest time and effort to permeate, often difficultly, terrorist cells (Aoun 2014; Bhui and Ibrahim 2013). Nowadays, thanks to the Internet, organizations are no longer limited to promulgate their indoctrinating speeches by traditional and local means, such as places of worship. With their knowledge and their use of the new media, they manage to charm in no time the imagination of aspiring jihadists and convince them effortlessly to adhere to their insurgent movement (Bhui and Ibrahim 2013). Moreover:

> The use of the Internet for politics particularly by transnational movements and organizations can be attributed to the fact that the Internet transcends geographical and can reach potential audiences beyond a defined territory. (Bhui and Ibrahim 2013, 218)

The growing ability of terrorist groups to cleverly manipulate communicative tactics not only played an important part in the increasing presence of terrorism, it helped certain of these organizations gain international recognition for their newsworthy "prowess". For example, this mass media instrumentalization helped Al-Qaeda (AQ) to be reckoned as an effective positioning strategist. Not only has AQ been an entity that wreaks terror through active and continuous communication acts, it has shown innovation in creating campaigns while adopting and exploiting contemporary visual codes. AQ's success is attributed to the group leaders' deliberate decision to position themselves vis-à-vis other terrorist entities by creating distinct visual contents and repeating a narrative exhibiting the West as the perpetual aggressor of pious Muslims and glorifying death by armed struggle (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014).

Some articles annex terrorism and marketing by relying on semiotic and propagandist methods of analysis. Those studies start on the premise that even if the marketing teachings do not primarily allude to the terrorism discourse due to the absence of the traditional marketing reciprocal focus, it "can at least be said to exist in a metaphoric sense, the ubiquitous marketing mix of product, place, price, promotion in terrorist political marketing/propaganda" (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014, 239). Other researches have a more systematic approach on the subject.

Instead of transposing terrorism as a marketing figure of speech, Mozes and Weimann analyzes Hamas' online presence, a Palestinian terrorist organization, with an e-marketing conceptual framework built for commercial purposes. They have determined that "when Hamas builds an array of sites in the Internet, it complies with the same rules that the Western business world follows" (2010, 211). In other words, terrorists, while not necessarily having the educational scientific knowledge and product-based orientation strategies, have acquired a marketing insight that rivals profit-making websites.

Although the publications invoked previously concentrate predominantly on how the political marketing subculture welcomes the complex and nebulous terrorism rhetoric, it is important to mention that the concept of propaganda always serves as a complementary subject to the edification of the marketing of terrorism. The distinction between marketing and propaganda is not always obvious, which makes this sub-discipline open to several interpretations. As we can demonstrate in the following citations, marketing and propaganda are frequently intently associated: "we argue that terrorism is a genre of symbolic communication; a deviant new form of political marketing/propaganda" (O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009, 227), "given these commercial parallels, we can talk of the use of marketing/propaganda methods by terrorist groups" (Baines et al. 2010, 479), " this sort of knowledge about marketing and communications can be applied to the terrorist organization and related online marketing and propaganda" (Bhui and Ibrahim 2013, 225). In even

one article there is a complete chapter titled *Propaganda, psychological operations and marketing* (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014).

Following those observations, it seems legitimate to interchange the terms propaganda and marketing. Propaganda, just like marketing, targets an audience and compels them into adopting a new product or a new idea. However, limiting these concepts to an elementary interpretation can be treacherous. According to O'Shaughnessy, "if we use them vaguely or interchangeably, we become desensitized to important phenomena in the environment" (O'Shaughnessy 1996). We cannot escape the fact that there is a stigma attached to the term propaganda. Therefore, scholars and non-scholars need to be prudent when they pair up propaganda and marketing since the connotation can pejoratively tint the field of marketing.

This subsequent excerpt summarily reveals how propaganda dissociates itself from marketing:

> These reasons led Hamas to launch its websites and channel funds and resources to these online platforms of propaganda and incitement. As demonstrated by this study, Hamas's online presence is following the patterns and innovations originating from the West, which makes e-marketing conceptualizations and models quite useful in analyzing the organization's communications. (Mozes and Weimann 2010, 224)

In aggregate terms, propaganda generates substance and content, while marketing controls the form and the medium. In other words, terrorists operate marketing techniques to indoctrinate a population with their propagandist material.

Propaganda

From a semantic point of view, the term propaganda derives from its Latin root propagare meaning "to propagate, to spread like a liquid" (D'Almeida 2002). The expression propaganda, introduced in the seventeenth century by the papacy, meant, in its beginnings, one of the ministries of the Catholic Church whose mission was to reconquer the faithful who had abandoned their beliefs. Gradually, the term departed from its religious connotation to designate any propagation of beliefs and convictions. Having no longer its ecclesiastical character, propaganda becomes a viable form of communication for all entities, whether commercial, political, religious, etc. Propaganda is therefore seen as a strategic device for selling "a commodity, an idea, or a man, not on the basis of merit but emotional and suggestive appeals which strike a sympathetic chord in the imagination of the public" (Vallance 1951, 35).

With the definition given previously, we can report that the concept of propaganda can easily conceal itself behind the concept of advertising (Anderson 1999). The main objective of advertising, as the main objective of propaganda, lies in the desire to conform individuals to embrace precise behaviors. That being said, even though

propaganda can be used in several societal spheres, the term serves more to denominate the communicative actions of the political elite. In short, we could argue that propaganda is to politics, what advertising is to commerce (D'Almeida 2002).

In the early twentieth century, propaganda was seen by many as ineluctable. It was the operational link uniting two generally heterogeneous social classes: the masses and the elite. Propaganda was, and is, a necessary evil in order to ensure the society's proper functioning. This vision predominated since the elite assumed that the mass, often without decent education, did not have the resources to make informed choices. In support of this view, Edward Barneys, the father of modern public relations, argues that "modern propaganda is a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea or group" (Barneys 1922/2016, 16-17). It must be said that the practice of propaganda was as much accepted by the political elite than by the masses. Similarly, the great democratic governments, such as France and the United States, had openly conferred to some of their ministries to create "propaganda services". However, confessing to use propaganda proved to be increasingly rare after the Second World War (D'Almeida 2002).

Although the actual definition of propaganda does not imply any pejorative tendency (D'Almeida 2002), we cannot omit that the contemporary use of this term is more closely linked to the definition of black propaganda; the intentional circulation of false information in order to manipulate the population according to the propagandist objectives. This societal shortcut was formed because this

expression still refers to the strategic propaganda of Nazi minister Joseph Goebbels, which deliberately led to the organized massacre of millions of people during the Second World War; one of the greatest atrocities committed to date (Flood 2006).

> Ideas find people to spread them. The more an idea spreads and reaches all areas of life, the more it becomes a worldview. If an organization becomes the bearer of a worldview, its ultimate goal is the government, which is the bearer of the whole nation. Propaganda reaches its goal if its worldview takes practical form by gaining control of the state. In the beginning is the idea, which is taken up by propaganda and transformed into an organization that seeks to win the state. The task of propaganda is to spread knowledge. The speaker mentioned the notorious word "drummer," which "they" in their goodness and mercy apply to us. The essential characteristic of propaganda is effectiveness. The best propaganda is that which is most effective. It is good if I persuade three million people to believe in a political theory, but it is even better if those three million are ready to give their lives for the idea. (Goebbels 1927, 30)

Propaganda must be seen as an infallible tool to convince the population of the ideological legitimacy of a political entity. Although Goebbels's vision of propaganda is rational and Cartesian, several theorists, who witnessed the spectacular rise of Nazism in Europe, engaged in a harsh discourse on the use of this communication system. According to Jacques Ellul, propaganda is "a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization" (1965/1973, 61). According to Flood, the researchers Jowett and O'Donnell also argued that propaganda is "the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions,

manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (2006, 515).

By using the word manipulation, we denote that propaganda is henceforth perceived as the Machiavellian intention of an individual or a group to influence an innocent population in order to govern. The use of propaganda is thus a criticism of a political entity that perniciously controls information. This allegorical specificity has obliged political actors to replace the term propaganda by "information services" or "public relations" (Chomsky 1991/2004). The expressions are equivalent, but at least, the new phrases do not yet carry the obscure mark that defiles propaganda. Indeed, even if propaganda is mischievous only "when its authors consciously and deliberately disseminate what they know to be lies, or when they aim at effects which they know to be prejudicial to the common good" (Barneys 1922/2016, 14-15), the term now resonates with enslavement, disinformation and manipulation. Rare are those who use the expression in order to glorify a political entity.

Propaganda and terrorism. Since propaganda and terrorism goals are to influence the attitudes and perceptions of an audience, readers can assume that both concepts are interchangeable. This presupposition would be inaccurate. "At its most extreme, propaganda is terrorism and terrorism is a form of propaganda activity" (O'Shaughnessy 1996, 61). Both concepts must be seen as communicative tools. However, terrorism, in contrast to propaganda, structures itself by propagating fear

literally throughout brutal deeds. In fact, terrorism is often summoned as "propaganda of the deed" (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2009). Propaganda of the deed (or propaganda by the deed), while being historically associated to the 19th-century anarchists, refers to any distinct political action that intends to disrupt order and ignite a revolution. (Fleming 1980). Although it can be non-violent, qualifying a political action by this expression often holds a violent innuendo. Set by subversive movements, the deed in question acts as an example for all the future endeavors. It becomes the epicenter of a struggle. Carlo Pisacane, the Italian revolutionary who pioneered this propaganda conceptualization, considered that ideas arise from deeds and not the other way around (Borgeson and Valeri 2009); stating that society will believe a political entity solely if it takes concrete actions. In other words, terrorism would be the literal application of propaganda. Terrorism is just the means necessary to an end; if words became useless, one might as well make the actions speak.

Propaganda and marketing. Having no solid theoretical consensus within the scientific community (Vallance 1951), the essence of the word propaganda is still vague. Yet, from a holistic point of view, the concept often invokes the notion of promotions of ideas (Anderson 1999). To propagate, there must be two actors, the propagandist, the one who creates and plans the propaganda campaigns, and the target audience, all the individuals whose behavior the propagandist seeks to change.

A good propagandist must organize effective communication campaigns in order to influence the attitudes and perceptions of the targeted audience (McGarry 1958).

Following this observation, it seems legitimate to be able to interchange the terms propaganda and marketing. Just like propaganda, marketing also tries to convince a targeted audience to adopt a new product, a new idea. However, combining propaganda and marketing without moderation can be dangerous. First of all, we cannot escape the fact that the term propaganda has a negative connotation. Therefore, pairing up propaganda and marketing can pejoratively tincture the field of marketing. According to O'Shaughnessy, "if we use them vaguely or interchangeably [propaganda and marketing], we become desensitized to an important phenomenon in the environment" (O'Shaughnessy 1996, 66). Second of all, besides the stigma the affiliation can generate, marketing should not be permuted with propaganda since there are few fundamental points that dissociate propaganda from marketing.

The propaganda content is usually immutable. Propagandists will not pervert the basic ideological principles erected by their entity regardless of whom the message is addressed to. Propagandists can change the way they deliver a message, but they will never modify it since their main focus resides in their own interests. Marketers, unlike propagandists, concentrate primarily on the consumers' desires. Marketers seek to respond most appropriately to the desires of the target audiences. They are interested in "win-win" scenarios. It is important for marketers to encourage people to adopt an idea, but if the customers do not follow, they will change their message.

Moreover, marketers will change the core essence of a product/idea to match the ones of the targeted segments if the need arises. (O'Shaughnessy 1996; Anderson 1999)

Propaganda has mainly a unilateral flow of information, i.e. information flows from the propagandist to the public. In general, the propagandists have one great objective; convince people of the validity of an idea, no matter the means. In marketing, the flow of information is continuous. Since the marketing objectives are "attract / convert / retain and reinforce" (O'Shaughnessy 1996, 59), the marketing entity considers that promotion first involves the mutual exchange of information. "Marketing aims for a mutual understanding, where through negotiation, sharing information, listening and explaining, both sides [marketers and the public] accomplish their goals, which may change or evolve during the process" (Anderson 1999, 26).

Propagandists slither their content perniciously into the mass media. By heavily diversifying their entry in the different media's available, they maximize their reach of obtaining a large audience and spreading their message (O'Shaughnessy 1996). Not only will the propagandists employ manipulative tactics already well established, they will also adopt new forms of media. Leni Riefenstahl, the designated cinematographer of the Nazi regime, is a good example of how propaganda mixed with creativity broke the traditional communicative barriers (Flood 2006; Scott 2013). Nowadays, propagandists vehemently use the social media since the costs to produce and distribute information are almost inexistent. In

addition to the low expenses, "the rise of cyberspace has transformed both the meaning and opportunity for propaganda. Anyone can be a propagandist with, possibly, an ocean of influence at their command if a message goes viral" (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014, 9). In the end, propaganda, like many other practices and industries, has also been democratized.

METHODOLOGY

Firstly, this following section will establish the subjacent reasons that encouraged us to pursue this scientific study. Comprehending the external factors that led us to our problematic will give us insight in how our research inscribes itself in the contemporary political culture. Secondly, it will outline the historical context that surrounds our study's two most recurring terrorist groups, Al-Qaeda and The Islamic State. Apposing a thorough description of both organizations will further help the reader position how terrorism disrupts the international chessboard. Finally, this section will dissect all the steps undertaken that helped us conceive and implement an exhaustive enhanced automated content analysis model on our collected data.

Context

Since the release to the international community on the 19th August 2014 of the scathing images of the American journalist James Wright Foley's beheading (Callimachi 2014), the Islamic State (IS) is subject to several weekly news articles from the written and televised press (Rechi 2014). The media coverage on the actions of one of the most redoubtable enemies to be eliminated by the international coalition is still highly palpable in 2016, since the organization holds its own column section in different nationwide newspapers' websites like *Le Monde* (Le Monde 2016) or the *Daily Mail* (Daily Mail 2016). To understand even more the magnitude of IS's media coverage, we found out that the term was one of the most searched terms in the Google database for two consecutive years (Google Trends 2014, 2015).

This informational ubiquity encourages us to ask ourselves what the underlying reasons leading to the mediatisation are, perhaps excessive mediatisation, of the actions perpetrated by IS. It appears surprising that in a world where more and more radical religious groups are emerging and engage in acts of nameless monstrosity, a terrorist entity seems to prevail over its other terrorist counterparts. Indeed, several other terrorist organizations are as barbaric and as dangerous as IS, we have only to think of Boko Haram, which in the name of Islam is allowing itself to spread fear and terror in Nigeria, or the Al-Nosra Front, which is wreaking havoc in Syria (IEP 2014).

First and foremost, IS notoriety can be explained through its socio-political contexts. The radical group is the first terrorist group since Al-Qaeda to claim "spectacularly" violent attacks targeting various Western countries; we can remember the events of November 13, 2015 in Paris (The Guardian 2015). These attacks make IS's media omnipresence systematic since Western interests have been desecrated.

IS's media presence can also be attributed to its ability to produce, distribute and promote themselves with innovative and effective propaganda campaigns (Armitage 2015) in the hopes of scaring nations considered as enemies and recruiting new members (Rose 2014; Hanne and Flichy 2014).

As a matter of fact, IS is not only differentiating itself from the other terrorist entities by executing explosive intrusions in Western territories, they also demarcate themselves by remodeling their offshore terror campaigns and by galvanizing their recruitment methods, recruitment methods that can appeal even to native Westerners (Bergen et al. 2016). Barrett denoted a novelty in the way they distribute their terror campaigns. He stated that leaving the propagation of its extremist message to social media platform users permits IS to gain maximal control. As counterintuitive as this method can be, IS success is accredited to its crowd-sourcing strategy (2014). Before the advent of new media, it was difficult to access the terror campaigns produced by terrorist entities such as photos and videos of executions. Today, they can easily be found on sharing websites.

> Never the everyday life of an Islamist armed organization
> had been made so visible, never the average Internet user

had been able to access the messages—always translated into five or six languages—of a Jihadist group; but mostly, the enormous novelty, never it had been possible to penetrate to this point in the daily life of these mujahideen, free like any other connected person to confide their states of souls, to relate their joys and sorrows. And to access this information, there was nothing simpler in the world. Simply subscribe to their accounts on social networks. (Rechi 2014)

We can attest the effectiveness of the redesigned enrollment system by the approximate number of foreign fighters involved in the Syrian/Iraqi struggle. In the space of a year, the number of combatants who flew to the conflictual region reached more than 20,000, the largest foreign mobilization recorded in Muslim countries since World War II (Neumann 2015). It goes without saying that most of those fighters were enrolled in IS's ranks (TSG 2015).

As we demonstrated it beforehand, analysts suggest that "IS success are partly related to its media expertise, which serves as a relay to the recruitment of its members and its terror campaigns against its opponents" (Hanne and Flichy 2014, 76). Yet, we encountered some journalistic analyses that went beyond this postulate. Not only the journalists expressed that one central component for IS's fame is materialized by the organization's creativity, quality and effectiveness of its propaganda campaigns on the web (Laurent 2014), they also suggested and/or stated that marketing is inherent to IS's fame. They concluded that the rise of religious terrorism was intentionally inspired by marketing strategies.

Loretta Napoleoni, author of *The Islamic State: multinational violence*, said on the platform *64 minutes* "Yes, marketing is a highly developed communication, it's very modern and it works very well. And that is why the Islamic State is popular" (2015). Amanda Rogers, a postdoctoral fellow established at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, interested in the art and propaganda produced in the Islamic world, claims in an interview in *The Walrus* magazine that "the group's strategy calls to mind a corporate marketing manual. It uses proven formulas, sticks to what gets attention employs a variety of platforms, and exchanges strategies to sustain audience interest" (Mustafa 2015). *Chatham House*, ordinarily known as *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, a British think tank whose mission is to secure a more equitable and thriving world by performing nonpartisan researches, carried out a seminar entitled *ISIS: Marketing Terror*. The chairperson leading the panel declared at the beginning of the discussion "Marketing Terror is important, because we do not know the details yet, but it's highly likely that some, if not all of them [the terrorists] were influenced by a particular ISIS propaganda machine" (Taylor et al. 2016).

Surely, with these examples, we can deduce that the discourse utilizing marketing refers to the growing popularity of IS through modern technologies (Carter 2014). They assert that marketing acts as a catalyst in the emergence of the jihadist youth, partly because IS implemented a social media communication strategy. Yet, during this preliminary research, we realized that even if IS has attracted and promoted a substantial attention on the marketing and terrorism correlation, a few evidences

have explicitly addressed the narrative prior to the birth of IS. The 2012 Ted Talk,

Terrorism is a failed brand, moderated by Jason McCue, happens to be an adequate

example that the combination of the two concepts already existed:

> If we look at al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was essentially a product on a shelf in a souk somewhere which not many people had heard of. 9/11 launched it. It was its big marketing day, and it was packaged for the 21st century. They knew what they were doing. They were effectively [doing] something in this brand image of creating a brand which can be franchised around the world, where there's poverty, ignorance and injustice. (2012)

Historical Context

The following section concentrates on a brief geopolitical summary of the two most

important terrorist organizations mentioned in our study, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic

State.

Al-Qaeda. Even if Al-Qaeda's (AQ) origins remain nebulous, many analysts agree

that the terrorist organization emerged from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

While fighting against the communists, three supporters of the Afghan cause were

introduced; their names are Abdullah Azzam, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama

Bin Laden. Those three mujaheddin (volunteers that engaged in the holy war)

became the founding members of the terrorist group (Hellmich 2011; Filiu 2009).

During the firsts formative years, AQ established and perfected its vision; restore the Caliphate where the Muslims will reign supreme (caliphate means in Arabic "kingdom in perpetual expansion"). In order to implement their plan, the leaders intended to make jihad (holy war) global. Jihad already existed in war-torn Muslim countries. However, its promotion to a worldwide phenomenon is attributable to AQ's innovation. It articulates the narrative that each Muslim must combat the repressive Infidels (non-Muslims) wherever they may be. This global jihad, conceptualized as defense jihad, is supposed to be in response to the Western occupation of Islamic holy lands (Filiu 2009).

In 1992, AQ deploy their first attack by bombing the most luxurious hotel in Aden, Somalia. From then on, AQ inaugurates its global theater of terror, which will climax by the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Even if the entire Western culture symbolised the occupation force to demolish, the United States became the first real enemy to overcome. Indeed, the country epitomizes the Infidels' superpower.

> On the morning of 11 September 2001, Al-Qaeda demonstrated the magnitude of its threat and the sophistication of its methods by organizing and perpetrating the world's greatest terrorist outrage: for the first time in history, transnational teams, united in their belief that they were defending Islam, hijacked four planes to use as flying suicide bombs. Two were directed in the iconic Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, New York, one into the Pentagon, and the fourth crashed outside Pittsburgh after its passengers attempted to regain control of the plane. What happened next is, as they say, history. (Hellmich 2011, 1)

We cannot elaborate on AQ without referring to one of its founding leaders, Osama Bin Laden, one of the first personalities that publicly declared war on the United States. Often considered as the organization's communicative brain, he acted as AQ's charismatic figurehead. "The dramaturgy of his appearances was a significant source, his persuasive power and the tenacity of the movement he symbolised and led" (Baines and O'Shaughnessy 2014, 180). The War on Terror that ensued from 9/11, amplified his mystical status. Indeed, the United States' 10 years witch-hunt against Osama Bin Laden, has unwittingly knighted him as the visual portrayal of all terrorism (Bergen 2006).

As of today, the terrorist group is threatened to dissolve because the loss of its mediatised leader in 2011 has led to AQ's leadership decentralization. Not only have their internal struggles lessened the group's global impact, they have allowed the emergence of another terrorist entity; the Islamic State (Weiss and Hassan 2015).

Islamic State. The Islamic State (IS) is often defined as an extremist Salafist Islamic group. It must be said that before 2006, a time duly marked by the invasion of Iraq by the United States, the organization was attached to the Al-Qaeda group. However, the AQ movement established in Iraq distanced itself from its original formation, forming an entity in itself, the Islamic State of Iraq. After a long struggling for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, on June 27 2014, the group fulfilled its aspirations. IS granted itself the title of supreme custodian of the whole Arab-Muslim civilization, headed by none other than Aboubakar Al-Bagdadi. Since

that day, it has for simple objective to conquer more and more land and to apply the Muslim salafist precepts in the regions acquired by the organization (Napoleoni 2015).

IS, unlike other terrorist organizations, has managed to implement its ideology and practices by anchoring itself in hostile territory. The capture of several important cities in Iraq and Syria permitted the caliphate to build a vast organizational structure; mainly because of the diversity of resources available on its new acquired land. It must be mentioned that rarely in history, a sedentary terrorist group controlled with an expert hand such a geographically extensive territory.

Majorly financed by its own production of black gold, the decision-making structure of the caliphate is divided into seven main ministries; The army, justice, finance, intelligence, public administration, propaganda and military affairs. For the purposes of this work, we are particularly interested in the propaganda ministry. Knowing the functioning of this ministry is essential since it is the brain of all IS's communication logistics. Considered to be one of the biggest departments in terms of staff numbers, it actively employs more bureaucrats than the war ministry. This confirms to which extent the ministry of propaganda is vital to IS's leaders. The Ministry of Propaganda, in close collaboration with Al-Hayat, its in-house production center, has as main objectives to create and distribute creative propagandist content. As we mentioned earlier, terroristic campaigns aim to frighten enemies and influence new members. However, in IS's case, another element comes into action, theses campaigns also attempt to influence the civilians that live under

IS's jurisdiction since they have a political as well as territorial hegemony (Laurent, 2015).

One of the singularities of the organization stems from the plurality of names IS has worn during its life span; Da'esh (is the acronym in Arabic of ad-dawla al-islāmiyya, which translates literally in Islamic State), ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham), ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). Like an effort to rebrand, the denomination of the organization is an important aspect in their campaign of terror (Irshaid 2015). In our study, we will use the term Islamic State since it is usually the most popular appellation in the English idiom. We are conscious that this term's usage can be confusing. Accepting to denominate these insurgents by the qualifier of Islamic State can induce that we recognize the presence of the caliphate as a governing and administrative state. We must report that while we utilize this appellative, we do not qualify them as a legitimate state. From a semantic point of view, we are aware that IS's original meaning is deceitful. Perhaps one day there will be a real Islamic state recognized by the international community, but that day has not come.

Data

Humphreys' enhanced automated content analysis model. To evaluate to which extent the symbiosis of two words, theoretically secluded, became an emerging expression in the public sphere and to understand how the press community

articulate the marketing of terrorism, we decided to conduct a content analysis inspired by Ashlee Humphreys' works (Humphreys 2010A, 2010B, 2014; Humphreys and Thompson 2014). Reputed for her introduction in the marketing field of an enhanced automated content analysis model, she dedicates part of her studies to the theorization and structuration of the media's influence on the consumers' perceptions and beliefs. She examines how the press subject framing critically affects the social and cultural legitimacy of a discourse. It must be noted that while she commenced her researches on the press discourse, in recent years, her focus shifted on the content published through social media.

Since the press plays an important part in modeling the public's political opinion (Hennessy 1970; Lippmann 1922/1934; McCombs 2004), applying the content analysis to our research is primordial. "News media discourse play a critical role in shaping public discourse by presenting culturally legitimated frameworks for understanding events" (Humphreys and Thompson 2014, 882). This analysis will firstly allow us to observe how the public sphere constructs and depicts this embryonic marketing rhetoric and, secondly, examine how the concept exhibited in the press concurs and/or diverges from its academic rendering. If the marketing of terrorism is not substantially circumscribed by the media, a false representation of the concept will systematically anchor itself in the society's cultural branding of terrorism, and, the facto, of marketing.

As Humphreys stated in one of her research studies, the utility of an enhanced "automated content analysis enables researchers to supplement qualitative analysis

of archival data with quantitative counts that assess the changes in prevalence of sociocognitive concepts over time" (Humphreys 2010, 3). In other words, this type of analysis permits to analyze the content and subtract qualitative insights from an immense pool of data, without having to apply an in-depth analysis on each selected article.

Similarities with Humphreys' studies. Like in her *Branding Disaster: Reestablishing Trust through the Ideological Containment of Systemic Risk Anxieties* study (2014), our content analysis focuses on all the media publications available in the news articles electronic database Factiva. It is to note that even if the majority of the classified examples provide from traditional media, i.e. newspapers, television, press releases, etc., the press-related database allows the searcher to access more unconventional sources, i.e. social media.

In order to collect qualitative data out of a colossal number of publications, Humphreys observed the occurrence of a specific term or concept in the database. Thus, by following Humphreys' footsteps, we searched, in the database, all the English, French and Spanish[1] articles that contain the formula "marketing and terror*" in the headlines, the lead paragraph and/or the body of text. The asterisk signifies that the databases take into account all the words that have terror as root. We could have chosen a simpler formula "marketing and terrorism", however we

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[1] The languages in which the reasearcher is proficient.

did not want to omit the words terror and terrorists, as weightily important as terrorism. As for our time period, we gathered all the news from 11th September 2001 to 31th December 2016. The 2001 World Trade Center attacks mark our debut period since it is the contemporary terroristic event that visually engraved the Western imaginary. "The most powerful and violent performance of the modern theater of terror was the September 11, 2001, attack on American targets" (Weimann 2008, 71). After the entry of all the parameters in both databases, we retrieved more than 70 000 articles.

To maintain a strict objectivity and avoid controversy, we designated in our research a terrorist group when it meets all the criteria of the definition adopted in Article 83.01 of the Criminal Code of the Government of Canada. To classify any faction in the list of terrorist groups, it must commit an act that adheres to three key criteria. The act in question, committed in Canada or abroad, will be an act of violence for political, religious or ideological reasons, has the ultimate purpose of intimidating a government or a population or compel them to ask or to refrain from acts. An act is termed violent when it causes serious injury or causes the death of individuals, when it jeopardizes the health, safety or the life of all or part of the population, when it causes substantial damage or when it seriously disrupts or paralyzes services or installations in public or private systems (Canada's Criminal Code 2016).

Dissimilarities with Humphreys' studies. While we were heavily influenced by Humphrey's modus operandi, we needed to adjust her enhanced automated content analysis in order to fit our requirements. To evaluate the evolution and the

conceptualization of the marketing of terrorism, we had to perform two considerable alterations on the model Humphreys proposed.

The first alteration was the addition of a second press-related database. To push the analysis further, we decided not to rely only on Factiva, but to rely also on Eureka; which was proven to be a viable and robust database in several scientific studies that seek press publications (Bannerman 2011; Daoust 2014). We executed our research in both databases because they possess different pools of media news coverage, which will improve and maximize our search yields. Like in Factiva, Eureka provides publications from traditional media and social media.

The second alteration was the application of an in-depth content analysis on all the articles that we selected. With her enhanced automated content analysis model, Humphreys never practices in-depth analysis since she deals with an excessively imposing database. She determines how the press frame a discourse by examining the frequency at which two words and/or concepts happen. Because our problematic requires to establish how the marketing of terrorism is reported by the press, we are bound to apply an in-depth content analysis on all the data we collected.

As we stated previously, we retrieved more than 70 000 articles. Even if these numbers conform to the ones in Humphreys' publications, these results were, for our type of research, too overwhelming; especially when our second objective was to conduct an in-depth content analysis of all the recorded articles. We needed to find an approach that minimised as much as possible the article numbers while

remaining faithful to Humphreys' vision. For this reason, we added one criterion to our formula in order to reduce the article samples: "marketing w/10 terror*". Our new formula implies that the databases will provide all the articles that have the word marketing and terror* within 10 words or less from each other. Our objective to reduce our sample was obtained since we retrieved 2011 articles with this formula.

After the selection of our sample, we had to manually filter all the articles that were pertinent to our research. As we stated earlier, the aim of our research is to understand how the marketing of terrorism is depicted in the media, yet, not all the articles that contain marketing and terror* refer to the issue we are exploring. We had to exclude all the articles that 1) indicate the businesses' marketing struggles after terrorist attacks 2) invoke the marketing devices and technology helping the profiling of terrorist 3) accuse marketers to terrorise consumers 4) announce how terrorism becomes a marketing obstacle on the tourism industry 5) relate Georges Bush's war on terror was a marketing stratagem to retaliate to terrorism 6) inadvertently found marketing and terrorism at 10 words from each other with no intrinsic connection whatsoever. After we had removed all the non-relevant publications, we were left with a total of 207 articles (106 articles from Factiva, 71 articles from Eureka and 30 articles that appeared in both databases), which equates to 10% of our primary selection sample.

Limits. We acknowledge that our study contains certain limitations. The most important one is our sample selection. This study was limited by the discriminatory formula we applied. More than 97% of the articles were set aside because the term marketing and the term terror* were not within ten words of each other. Indeed, we passed from 70 000 articles to 2011 articles. This numeral difference could greatly impact the quantitative results in our findings section. Factiva and Eureka's opacity on their modes of operation is another limitation. While both databases claim that they retrieve their publications from traditional and social media, we do not know to which extent and in which proportions the media publications are being censused. Without this information, we are aware that it is problematic to generalize certain of our results to the entirety of the marketing of terrorism rhetoric. Another limitation comes from the fact that our search was limited to the French, English and Spanish publications. While we proved that the marketing of terrorism has an international scope, our automatic disregard to the articles that were written in other foreign languages may affect the findings presented further in our paper.

FINDINGS

In order to present a cohesive and exhaustive presentation of our findings, we decided to divide our results into six sections. In the firsts four sections, we will analyze the context in which the marketing of terrorism surfaced. The first section records the textual presence and evolution of this emerging concept. The second

section addresses the question of where, tangibly and geographically, this analogy was materialized in the public sphere. The third section focuses on the people who appropriated and transmitted this argument. The fourth section announces the terrorist organisations that have entered the marketing realm and that have been branded as marketing practitioners. In the fifth section, we will examine in which manner the marketing of terrorism is portrayed in the press. In order to do so, we will dissect the marketing of terrorism into five distinct narratives. Finally, in our last section, we will focus on the place the propaganda term takes in the marketing of terrorism.

When did the marketing of terrorism emerge?

Chronological evolution of the marketing of terrorism. As we can observe in Table 1, the marketing of terrorism concept appears to be quite steady for the first 10 years, varying from 0 to 10 articles per year.

[Insert Table 1]

Starting from 2011, we notice a perceptible growth, which culminates in an eruptive peak in 2015. This notable shift in 2011 makes us wonder; is there a specific reason why the public discourse started to describe more frequently the terroristic actions by the marketing prism? After analysing all the publications released in 2011, we realised that there is no textual recurrent explanation that can be assertively

attributed to the new paradigm of the marketing of terrorism theory. Indeed, the authors applied the concept to several terrorist entities, passing from Al-Qaeda to LTTE to Anders Behring Breivik. However, the absence of an explicit justification in the articles does not entice that the new rhetoric appeared accidentally. Historically, 2011 marks the burgeoning of the Arab Spring, and collaterally, the appearance of the Syrian civil war. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2015), these conflicts outbreaks established new trends in the worldwide terrorism dynamic.

[Insert Table 2]

Since terror became and still becomes a major preoccupation in the media (Table 2), it seems coherent that the conceptualization of marketing of terrorism flourishes simultaneously to the media terror discourse.

The 2015 peak. Throughout our selected period of 15 years, no year has been as prolific in the marketing of terrorism as 2015 (Table 1). 59 out of 207 publications, which equal to almost the third of all our article sample collection, were written during this period. It is a substantial amount considering that in 2016, the second year with the most released articles, finished with half of 2015's amount, which corresponds to 31 articles. This sudden interest in the concept entails that an event in 2015 compelled writers to adopt the marketing of terrorism speech. By analysing our sample, we uncovered a historic event; the emergence of the Islamic State (IS).

Is it accurate to assume that the episodic popularity of the marketing of terrorism concept is complementary to IS's growth? In other words, did IS unexpectedly incite the press discourse or is it just a mere coincidence? With 50 of the 59 articles released that year deliberately affiliating the marketing domain to the actions committed by IS, it is safe to say that IS played a critical role in the embodiment of the rhetoric. In fact, since its existence in June 2014 and, moreover, since James Foley's beheading in August 2014, the Caliphate started to affect the marketing of terrorism immediately. Moreover, the constant reprisals and terrorist attacks vindicated by the group, making it the deadliest terrorist organisation in 2015 (IEP 2015), undeniably helped the new discourse gain momentum.

Where did the marketing of terrorism appear?

Type of medium. While Factiva and Eureka provide insight on how the marketing of terrorism is delivered in the traditional and untraditional media, it also gives us the opportunity to examine throughout which medium the rhetoric develops. Thus, by dividing all the articles through Eureka's detailed classification, we uncovered that the newspapers, with a little less than 40% of all the articles (Table 3), are the principal type of medium where the correlation appears. The predominance of newspapers in our sampled data adds a certain credibility, since for news consumers, newspapers are the most reliable medium.

[Insert Table 3]

A Flanagin and Metzger study shows that Internet news are as trustworthy as the news obtained via media like television, radio, and magazines, but they are not as credible as the information retrieved from newspapers (2000). Overall, 82% of all our articles come from conventional media: newspapers, online press, press releases, television, radio, news wires and magazines. Whereas a minor 18% comes from social media, comprised by blogs (33 articles) and social networks (3 articles). While the results show that the press is the most popular medium in which the marketing of terrorism appears, we are not certain that it is representative of the reality. Indeed, since our databases do not reveal the proportions with which their databanks are designed, it is difficult to accredit the marketing of terrorism for being principally a press discourse. For example, if the databases census more systematically the press than the social media, it is rational for our research to replicate the same conclusion.

Geographical repartition. The presence of the marketing of terrorism is as international as it gets, passing from Sri Lanka to Argentina while doing a layover in Switzerland. Indeed, with almost 30 countries referring to the relation, the concept salutes itself with its international nature. Despite its universal quality, in our sample, the rhetoric seems to attract deeper sympathy from specific countries. As portrayed in Table 4, the USA, with 33% of all the articles, is the country where most publications about the marketing of terrorism come from.

[Insert Table 4]

France, the follow-up country, covers 14%. If we combine the 97 articles of both of these countries, we retrieve almost half of all our data; which means that our sample implies that the narrative is predominantly a westernized argument. To support the occidental affirmation even further, 74% of the countries using this analogy occur in North America and in Europe. Even if intuitively the argument looks robust and logical, we have to take it with modesty because we might have obliterated several foreign articles, having used only French, English and Spanish written news publications.

Who adopted the marketing of terrorism?

Sources. After brushing a general portrait of the type of medium where the argument takes place, it is interesting to deepen the subject and focus on the people who engaged in the delivery of this rising idea. We collected all the data relative to the article classification and we recorded 150 different sources. While the source compiling the most articles is the French online press *Atlantico*, with the publication of 6 of our articles, the majority of the sources appear only once. This diversification illustrates that no source was prevalent from one another. It is the same with the authors/journalists who wrote the articles. The quasi majority of the displayed authors are encountered only once. This disparate provenance from the sources and the authors show how deployable the concept can be.

This source analysis does not reveal much adequate information. It only advises us that a diverse pool of individuals uses the narrative. Hence, to complement this section, we executed another phase. Instead of simply settling for the authors' references that the databases provide, we browsed the texts of all the articles to examine if the author originally fabricated the association or if the author's association was inspired by the ideas of other individuals. After the completion of our second phase, we realised that in 43% of the articles, the author associates marketing and terrorism without referring to any other source; in other words, the narrative presents itself as the author's own authentic conclusion. This means that in 117 articles, 57%, the authors are citing, rehashing or loosely interpreting the sayings of other people.

Cited sources. Table 5 categorizes the type of source authors exploit throughout the 117 articles. We denoted five types of sources; the experts (54%, 63 articles), the academics (17%, 20 articles), the politicians (22%, 26 articles), the terrorist (1%, 1 article) and the journalists (6%, 7 articles).

[Insert Table 5]

The "expert" label is assigned to renowned individuals who possess an important degree of expertise in their specialized fields. Their domain varies from terror expert, to security expert, to marketing expert, to Islam expert, etc. Academics, in comparison, are active theoreticians, who based their research in the vulgarisation

of their practice. Undoubtedly, academics are experts too, however we separated them because, unlike the other experts, the academics are affiliated to a university and consecrate their career to the pursuit of knowledge by presenting academically endorsed publications. The politicians' category refers to the people working in the political sphere, meaning international political figures, ONG spokespersons, etc. As for the journalist group, the name indicates the provenance of the sources; it comes from other journalists' statements. Not to forget, there is a special category that only contains one entry, the terrorist. We decided to isolate this source since it is a peculiar, if not a surprising, source. "The other day, I saw a one-legged cat on Facebook that had twice as many followers as Boko Haram," said Boko Haram's head of marketing." (129)[2] The article, in which the source is cited, not only associates marketing with terrorism, it bluntly states that terrorist groups, in this case Boko Haram, actively hog the business title in their terroristic strategies.

Cited sources related to the marketing field. Since the premise of our study is about the marketing of terrorism, it would be expected that the sources cited originate from people specializing in the marketing sector; the reality looms otherwise. We observe that the clear majority of the references, which equates to 86%, are sources that are not affiliated to the marketing practice. This leaves a meagre 14% of articles that refer to actual marketing connoisseurs and practitioners. With this information, if

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[2] For the complete reference, search for (129) in the Appendix B : Data Collection Index.

we add the articles that have no sources (90 articles) to the articles that have sources unrelated to the marketing field (101 articles), it sums up to 92% the number of articles that employs the marketing of terrorism without supporting the analogy with a marketing specialist. It shows that marketing is a valued term widely exploited by people from different background expertise.

Popular cited sources. While the diversity of the cited sources is extensive, many of these sources appear repetitively in the articles. Here is a brief portrait of the most cited sources.

Table 6. Most popular cited sources

Source	Description	Number of articles in which the source's sayings appear
Salam Fayyad	Palestinian political figure	13
John Miller	NYPD commissioner on counter-terrorism	10
Simon Wisenthal Center	Center whose mission is dedicated to the commemoration of the Shoah	8
Raphaël Liogier	Philosophe	5
Nazir Azfal	English Chief Crown Prosecutor	5
Gabriel Weimann	Scholar who wrote *The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas*	4

Even though it appeared solely once, there is an honourable mention of the article that refers to the pope of marketing, Philip Kotler.

Which terrorist organizations employ marketing?

Marketing terrorism is a recognized yet general concept. This observation entails that the rhetoric can materialize in the press without the obligation to identify to any existing terrorist organizations. However, the majority of the articles, 75% of them (155 articles), used the narrative as a way to describe the strategy of specific terror groups. Only 25% (152 articles) articulate the idea of marketing terrorism without acknowledging any entity in particular or any recognized terrorist groups. From the 75% of the articles of our sampled data, we were able to detect several recurring organisations. The most relevant ones are; Islamic State (IS), Al-Qaeda (AQ), Mohammed Merah, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Islamist Terrorists, Boko Haram, the Talibans. Notice that, the narrative refers not only to rebel groups, but it also incorporates the idea that infamous individuals also adopt the marketing dogma.

It is to mention that some articles cited the Nazi regime, the Mexican cartels and others denounced organisations, but we voluntarily did not integrate them in our analysis since they are not recognized as terrorist organisations.

ISIS and AQ dominance. As we mentioned in our *2015 peak* section, IS' international presence acted as a catalyst in the public materialization of the marketing of terrorism, but more importantly, IS has shown to be a central component in the establishment of the terroristic narrative, as 41%of all the articles (87 articles) selected refer to IS' marketing. Our findings also show AQ has a considerable impact since 26% of the articles (53 articles) introduce the notion of marketing terrorism by alluding to this organisation. In many articles, the authors attribute the marketing to more than one entity, however, if we look at the articles that exclusively refer to IS or AQ, we come up with 43% (88 articles). This percentage indicates that a little less than half of the data collected focus exclusively their narrative around one of the two main terroristic entities, moreover, two Islamic entities. The relation between marketing and Islamic terrorist groups is even more striking when we realise that Islamic Jihad essentially executes the marketing of terrorism. 140 out of the 155 articles (90%) that mention specific groups, mention groups related to the Islamic Jihad.

How is the marketing of terrorism portrayed?

As we stated in the first part of our analysis, marketing and terrorism are effectively becoming emerging subjects in the public sphere. Indeed, our results presented previously clearly show the apparition and the accession of an embryonic journalistic discourse. Considering that the academic sphere engaged in this original

dialogue, it was just a matter of time before our democratized media partake in the discussion. Yet, while our data demonstrate the materialization of this new terroristic narrative trend, our earlier manipulations do not reveal in which manner the public sphere introduces the marketing of terrorism. This explanatory absence motivated us to apply an in-depth content analysis on each of our sampled articles in order to survey the core essence of the journalistic discourse and finally understand how the journalists view the marketing field.

We also executed this in-depth content analysis to observe if the concept sketched in the press reflects its academic rendering. Our analyses attempt to examine if the press' writers justify the juxtaposition of both concepts by decoding the notion for neophytes or, on the contrary, if they are simply creating a new expression by combining two contemporary terms. It goes without saying that the latter could eventually become problematic, since the public, having no other informational resources, can mythologize a new rhetoric based on some missing, if ever erroneous, explanations.

Before entering an extensive content analysis, we will first take a look at where in the text the word marketing is used. Marketing is found exclusively in the title in 5 articles, exclusively in the body of text in 188 articles and in both in 14 articles. This shows that the term marketing is not just used as a hook to attract readers, but altogether is a word with apparently textual significance.

So, how is the marketing of terrorism presented in the text? In 122 articles (59%), the authors explain thoroughly the logic underneath the concept or give a hasty indication. Strictly speaking, whether the press participates in an exhaustive and meticulous demonstration or whether they declare a simple statement, in each of these articles, the writer clarifies their employment of the expression. Naturally, since the authors are not providing explicit definitions, we simplified the preponderance of rationales by dividing all the data into four leading themes present in the marketing terminology. Each section illustrates a distinctive type of marketing of terrorism narrative; *Terrorism is a marketing tool*, *Terrorism is communicating*, *Terrorism is selling*, *Terrorism is branding*. As we stated before, marketing has several connotations, therefore it is without surprise that a plurality of narratives arises.

For the remaining 85 articles (41%), the authors omit to disclose the reasons that led to the juxtaposition of marketing and terrorism. In these articles, the authors pitch the term without any further explanation and any other references to the marketing domain. Since the disregard of the authors to justify the association is in itself revealing, we added the theme *Marketing is a one-word punch line* to our marketing of terrorism narrative.

Terrorism is a marketing tool. To attain their marketing objectives, marketers must execute techniques and operate tools in conjunction with their marketing needs.

Essentially, marketers are defined as such because they practice the art of marketing. While the term marketer refers mostly to its traditional definition, it comprises any entity that partakes in marketing activities, even terrorists.

The following excerpt, drawn from *The News-Gazette*, shows how marketers can emerge from non-conventional areas. By interviewing a terrorist, moreover a terrorist whose task is to manage social media content, an established marketing tactic, the author demonstrates how integrated marketing is to the terrorists' activities. In a sense, he indisputably indicates that terrorist groups became new-age marketers.

> Social media management is proving to be one of the terrorist group's most formidable adversaries in modern warfare. "Allah, grant me clear and reliable analytics," bellowed the Islamic State's chief social media adviser. "I need to know what's bringing in the most clicks—the kidnappings, the beheadings? It's hard to design a targeted marketing campaign in the 21st century without reliable feedback." (129)

While this author provides concrete evidence, the other articles that are categorized in the marketing of terrorism claim that terrorists execute marketing plans without presenting persuasive proof. Having an actual confirmation from an insider source, like the one presented previously, seems benign for the authors. For them, it does not seem relevant if terrorists admit to practicing marketing. The fact is that they use marketing. For example, in the next quote, taken from the *Al-Jazeera Blog* in 2014, we read: "Televised beheadings, which have been explained away as a means of intimidation of enemies and a marketing tool to gather new recruits, has a much

more complex history and rationale." (108) Per se, the citation does not literally prove that terrorists have clear marketing objectives. However, it proposes to the readers to look beyond the horrifying symbols embodied by the act of beheading and to consider these barbaric deeds as marketing tools. This formulation insinuates that terrorists' organizations pursue marketing aspirations by using marketing tools and techniques to achieve their goals.

In the same manner, the next example postulates that terrorist entities appropriate marketing practices. "The Internet's become a key strategic asset for terrorists, supremacists and skinheads—it's the most powerful marketing tool ever created, and it's become a weapon of choice." (19) This citation, disclosing the sayings of the Simon Wiesenthal Center's spokesperson, articulates that the Internet is a marketing tool. While it does not directly acknowledge that terrorists possess a marketing department, referring to the Internet as a marketing tool certainly implies that marketing is an integral element of terrorists' missions. The Internet holds many functions, and specifying one small detail, denotes a deliberate attempt on behalf of the writer to demonstrate that, indeed, terrorists do marketing.

Although the last example's conclusion is straightforward and implicitly accuses terrorists to use marketing, some publications are more moderate in their marketing of terrorism. Instead of bestowing hypothetical intentions onto terrorists, authors will solely disclose that terrorists borrow marketing tools and techniques. Borrowing marketing insights do not suggest that terrorists practice marketing; it only says that modern-day marketing inspires contemporary terrorism.

"Recruitment online has followed the path of marketing in general the past decade, with terrorists moving to "narrowcasting" to highly targeted audiences from general appeals to sympathetic groups, Weimann said." (23). By writing the term "followed", the journalist notes that the recruitment techniques are heavily influenced by the narrowcasting marketing practice. Yet, detecting this similarity does not automatically insinuate that terrorist groups do marketing. Here is another quotation that puts both concepts in relation without correlating them; "Yet CRM's tentacles are spreading much further than just the marketing industry, with everyone from local authorities to terrorist-busting organisations adopting the technique." (2). As we understand it, CRM was developed for marketing purposes, but its practice goes far beyond the marketing realm; indulging in the idea that marketing techniques are not reserved and restricted to the marketing domain. It is not because a certain technique belongs to the marketing field that its usage by non-marketers makes it marketing.

The articles referring to *Terrorism is a marketing tool*, specify which marketing tactic the terrorists operate. If they do not specify the tactic, they use the expression "marketing tool" or "marketing technique" to ascribe to the marketing field a generic concept. With the examples cited previously, we discovered that terrorists exploit the beheadings, the Internet, narrowcasting and social media management in order to achieve their marketing strategies. However, these are not the only marketing tools and techniques mentioned in our collected data. Not all the articles identify the marketing tools and techniques that terrorists use; nevertheless the

majority provide an explicit justification. Throughout our sample, we retrieved 8 different marketing tools (Internet, social media, media, attacks, beheadings, war, prison, deaths) and 10 distinct marketing techniques (narrowcasting, e-marketing, positioning, social media management, multi-level marketing, customer relationship management, merger, name change, future pacing, crowdfunding). This diversity leads to two dichotomic conclusions. Either the terrorists utilize an impressive array of marketing techniques and tools. Or the writers attribute aleatory marketing to terrorism. The fact that they do not have any consensuses on which marketing activities terrorists adopt and the fact that everything appears to be a valid marketing tool and technique makes the latter more probable.

Here are some other examples that sustain the *Terrorism is a marketing tool* narrative:

Table 7. Examples from the *Terrorism is a marketing tool* narrative

Source	Quote
(173)	"Social Media used as a marketing tool for terrorists."
(150)	"Social media expert Nicole Matejic said IS had turned social media marketing techniques into a terror weapon. "They are using the same content marketing strategy to push out their abhorrent imagery and content and recruit information as, say, Mercedes uses to sell a car.""

(56)	"As Osama bin Laden watched his terrorist organization get picked apart, he lamented in his final writings that al—Qaida was suffering from a marketing problem. His group was killing too many Muslims and that was bad for business. The West was winning the public relations fight."

Terrorism is communicating. Communication focuses on the act of transmitting information, and, as we evoked previously in our literature review, terrorism is all about communication. The actions perpetrated by terrorists have one objective, communicate their political demands through terror. While the communicative factor has for a long time been part of the terrorism narrative, what is contemporary is to combine communication with marketing, as if both concepts were interdependent.

> Terrorist attacks targeting tourist activity in the Maghreb region are not a new phenomenon. What is new, on the other hand, is the "sought after" management communication function by the different brands of international Islamist terrorists. By a true marketing-terrorist, the Aqmi, Daech and other jihadist subsidiaries are able to increase the impact of their acts, already high profile, by targeting tourism and tourists. (133, *translation*)

It is interesting to see in the previous example, published in 2015 by the French journal *Liberté*, that the author attributes the communicative factor to a fairly recent time. Terrorism has always been a communicative medium; there is nothing new about it. So, why did the author consider that it was novel to correlate

communication with terrorism? He surely wanted to dissociate the term communication with its classical definition. Traditionally, communication translates the desire to share information, to convey a message with no ulterior motive. It does not implicate that the entity engaging in the communicative process tries to shape the perception of the person receiving the information. By adding the word marketing, the author implies that the act of communicating serves for further purposes. Of course, we cannot be sure if both words are permutable, notwithstanding, the complementarity of the terms gives an insight on how the author perceives the marketing domain.

Terrorists communicate because they want something from the public. It describes the act of encouraging individuals to buy a product or an idea. If the journalist had left out the word marketing, the text would not have conveyed the promoting factor. It is almost as if he intentionally tried to attach the advertising component to the communication factor. Advertising is about promoting and to promote, we need to communicate our intentions.

The advertising element is not only present in the last example; it is predominant in the marketing of terrorism. In many publications, the journalists recall how interconnected to terrorists' activities the advertising factor is. Altogether, they perceive terrorist campaigns as elaborate marketing/advertising stunts. To support this claim, here is an excerpt published in a Swiss newspaper "This [the bellicose, terrorist and mortal acts] makes them a formidable marketing, a gigantic

advertisement, free of charge" *translation* (22). Drawing the same conclusion, here is an excerpt from an official Pakistani news wires.

> These attacks are not only about killing innocent civilians but are marketing efforts to sew fear. When terrorists strike a tourism center, they receive the large amounts of publicity they seek causing not only damage to life and property, but creating a long—term negative economic impact on a society. (187)

There is even an English newspaper that not only implies how terrorists' activities can be portrayed as advertising, it implies how terrorists became new-age strategist advertisers. In the journal, we can read: "He [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a terrorist] had a flair for marketing, advertising, said Evan Kohlmann, a private anti-terror consultant who helped investigators track him." (29) As if Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was the lethal version of William Bernbach, a 60's advertising icon considered to be the original Don Draper.

While we presented how the ad rhetoric has been annexed to the terrorist narrative, our previous examples did not clarify how the terrorists communicate, or rather advertise, their demands. With the help of mass media, terrorists are not limited to the scope of their own voice. On the contrary, they have the entire world within reach to spill out their extreme ideologies. They can and, as it will later be demonstrated, they will employ several media and techniques to send a clear message to their target groups. For example, this quotation from the *Cordobà Online* asserts that IS exploits visual imagery to promulgate fear. "The Islamic State began its marketing of terror last summer with the broadcasting of videos of

journalists' and Western hostages' beheadings." (145, *translation*). Another

example from the journal *Le Matin* notes how terrorists exploit social networks to

their advantage. "In the same way as citizens and corporate marketing departments,

terrorists have now realized the benefits of social networks, explains Olivier

Glassey, a specialist in these tools at the University of Lausanne." (95, *translation*).

Some journalists will even acknowledge both media in their rendition of the

marketing of terrorism:

> It makes clever use of marketing and social networks to
> communicate with its supporters, and rains terror upon the
> world through strategic terror attacks or through YouTube,
> as recently seen in ISIS's release of horrific videos depicting
> the beheadings of its victims. (146)

What we can understand from those extracts is that the only thing terrorists aspire

to is to be mediatised, regardless of the means. Internet, TV, social networks, etc.,

there's a vast array of media available. For terrorists, every method is relevant.

According to journalists, what is astonishing is that terrorists not only borrow mass

media tools, they will mimic the consumerist western argument, in other terms, the

marketing reasoning, to lure future terrorists in their ranks. Not only terrorists

advertise their content, they advertise it in a way that the majority of the public can

decode the references. John Miller's, the NYPD counter-terrorism commissioner's,

statements transcribed by the *Associated Press* articulated:

> When you look at the level of sophistication, the amount of
> slickness applied to their video production, the amount of
> thought that goes into creating a narrative," he said, "They're

> doing the same kind of thing as we've seen in commercial publishing or in the ad industry. (104)

Indeed, the appropriation of the Western rhetoric is highly palpable through the subtle, or sometimes explicit, endorsement of pop-culture references. Journalists discerned inspirations drawn from Monty Python, Hollywood movies, Grand Theft Auto and more. As an example, here is an extract from the transcript of the *ABC News: Nightline*. It presents how IS developed the ability to produce content in synchronicity with our media-driven epoch.

> This is Madison Avenue meets documentary filmmaking meets news channel with PR sensibilities and a marketing value. They are using sort of Western tools and techniques and appropriating them for their purposes against the West. (140)

To a certain extent, this passage calls the lectors to recognize how our mass media culture is so embedded in our habits and customs that terrorists are forced to maleate their extreme ideologies, more often than not in complete opposition to the liberal capitalistic system, in order for target groups to find their ideas appealing.

Here are some other examples that sustain the *Terrorism is communicating* narrative:

Table 8. Examples from the *Terrorism is communicating* narrative

Source	Quote
(112)	"Les "islamistes 2.0" ont une approche de la communication véritablement globale, à l'instar des nazis et d'autres totalitarismes, férus de propagande scientifiquement étudiée. Ils ont ainsi leur propre société de production vidéo, leurs webmasters, des cellules "marketing", etc..."
(55)	"The standard caricature of bin Laden places him in a cave, stroking his untrimmed beard, plotting to drag the world backward in time. But a better way to understand his significance might be as a singular and peculiar talent in asymmetric communication and marketing strategies. His career as a terrorist signalled changes in the structure of dissent, violent and otherwise, in the Arab and Muslim worlds, particularly involving the role of transnational media. He grasped the disruptive potential of border-hopping technologies even before many Western media executives and Arab dictators did."
(168)	"El Califato centra su propaganda en los jóvenes y se inspira en superproducciones de Hollywood; Los gobiernos se movilizan para neutralizar el márketing del terrorismo yihadista en internet. El Estado Islámico (EI) ha desarrollado un aparato propagandístico que se inspira en las técnicas narrativas de las superproducciones de Hollywood. Pero a diferencia de la fábrica de sueños americana, que genera ficciones para entretener a su público, el material audiovisual yihadista se produce para reclutar combatientes y para cometer atentados. Y está teniendo éxito. Estos asesinos saben cómo mover las cámaras y cómo actuar frente a ellas. Calcando los gestos y actitudes de los protagonistas del celuloide de acción, se convierten en referentes para jóvenes predispuestos a admirarlos."

Terrorism is selling. Selling is a significant sector of the marketing domain. While both terminologies convey a distinct meaning, they are often used as synonyms in the marketing of terrorism. For instance, we have the quotation from the blog American *ASPI Strategist*. In his introduction, the blogger declares, "It's hard to fathom how the extremist's sales pitch works when we continue to hear reports of Daesh atrocities against innocent civilians […]" (124). Later in the text, he surmises: "Their marketing campaign might be successful to date but joining has dire consequences with approximately 8,000 extremists killed to date". Both expressions designate IS's skill to sell an idea to a targeted audience which proposes that, after all, sales pitch and marketing campaigns are substitutes for one another.

The cognitive shortcut between marketing and selling is also apparent in the following extract published by *The Wall Street Journal* in 2006:

> Another AP dispatch reports on al Qaeda's "marketing efforts": With the demise of charismatic terror leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida will be looking for a new sales approach in its worldwide fundraising campaigns. Al-Zarqawi had become a key part of al-Qaida's marketing: He was a terror operator who stole headlines with jarring, gruesome attacks carried out by a network of foreign and Iraqi fighters. (25)

Does the "sales approach" formula mean that AQ sells concrete goods to fund their activities? Or, does it mean that to finance their organization they need to sell their cause and convince people, preferably rich ones, to donate? To an educated eye, both formulations suggest being equivalent. If we review the text closely, nowhere in the article it mentions AQ as a merchandise provider. The article focuses on an important

symbol in the jihadi culture, Al-Zarqawi, by revealing how a "respected warrior" became a promoting argument for AQ's cause. The "sales approach" indicates how the celebrity endorsement is exploited as a key component to AQ's propagation of their view, subtly admitting its affiliation to a more holistic vision of marketing.

While in this example the terrorists' authority is used as a unique selling point, their marketing power is not limited to their aptitude to seduce new supporters and to retain already loyal advocates. Tierce parties exploit their influence for selling actual products, showing that nowadays we can commodify anything, even terror. This *New York Times* publication says "Street traders in Indonesia know Osama bin Laden's marketing potential. Above, T-shirts with the terrorist's face on sale in Jakarta." (3) This excerpt does not signify that Osama's Bin Laden is beneficiating from these sales; it shows that he became such an important part of our pop culture scenery, that his figure transcends his own persona. Indeed, Bin Laden dictated the way future generations visualize terrorists by creating a codified image easily recognizable.

In the marketing of terrorism, terrorists are often perceived as marketers of ideas. Indeed, in order to survive, terrorist organizations are obliged to promote their ideas. Logistically, a man planning alone his terrorist attacks would not have the resources to actively maintain a campaign of terror. However, even if the majority of the articles describes the terrorists' capabilities to disperse their doctrine, some articles attribute the marketing concept to the terrorists' capabilities to promote tangible goods, thus, implying the literal side of the rhetoric and, for once, not its allegorical nature. Certainly, a terrorist entity's existence depends on their ability to attract

newcomers, but it also depends on their ability to financially sustain the organization. To terrorize, you need resources and to acquire resources, you need money. Much like actual enterprises, terrorists employ marketing in order to sell products. Naturally, their products are not considered conventional. Thanks to their black market heavily meddling, their funding comes from illegal sources. They participate in the trade of oil, sex slaves, historical artefacts, etc. Here is a citation from the Russian news wire *Itar-Tass* alleging that terrorists are marketers of goods "[…] the Islamic State (terrorist organization outlawed in Russia) with proceeds from the illegal marketing of oil stolen from Syrian and Iraqi oil fields" (174).

Here are some other examples that sustain the *Terrorism is selling* narrative:

Table 9. Examples from the *Terrorism is selling* narrative

Source	Quote
(65)	"[…] the insurgents had stepped up their attacks because they were desperate or that the attack was carried out as a marketing campaign to attract funding from terrorist groups in the Middle East."
(91)	"Free Gaza marketing custom books memorializing terrorists."
(184)	"ISIS has had to constantly innovate its sex slave trade marketing. Facebook has been quick to react to terrorists' use its pages. At the same time, the militants also have become more agile, leaping quickly from one social-media platform to another and opening new accounts as soon as older ones are shut down."

Terrorism is branding. Branding is about communicating the core values of a product/organization. Branding is about embodying a culture. Branding is about creating a unique identity. Branding is about forging favourably the perceptions of the targeted population. Branding is about differentiating itself from the competition (AMA 1995; Aaker 1996, O'Shaughnessy 2009). Now exchange the word branding for terrorism. Terrorism is about communicating the core values of a product/organization. Terrorism is about embodying a culture. Terrorism is about creating a unique identity. Terrorism is about forging favourably the perceptions of the targeted population. Terrorism is about differentiating itself from the competition. With this permutation, we realize how intrinsically metaphorical the branding argument can act for the terrorist narrative. In other words, it appears that branding, as much as terrorism, is the action of designing an entity's genetic code and transmitting this genetic code to an audience.

Thus, in which manner do the authors associate branding and terrorism?

Journalists perceive terrorist groups as legitimate brands; admittedly unorthodox brands, but altogether legitimate brands. With this rationale, it is coherent that they apply marketing techniques to serve their objectives and market fear. The association relies on the basis that brands need to utilize marketing in order to communicate their message to the consumers; since marketing is a tactic to help a brand reach a market.

> With numerous active groups around the world (several of them having a similar ideology and the same goals),

'branding' and 'marketing' become important elements of the terrorist group's overall strategy. Getting credited for an attack is almost as important as the attack itself. The rocket attack against Sderot by IJMP was a terrorist attack, but it was also an act of visual communication designed to brand the identity of the group, communicate what it stands for and what its capabilities are, and create an 'experience' between the individuals and the organization. (Beifuss and Trivini Bellini 2013, 10)

This passage, seized from a book titled *Branding Terror: The Logotypes and Iconography of Insurgent Groups and Terrorist Organizations*, constructs its premise on the notion that over time, terrorists' organizations cultivate brand identities to trigger a symbolic imagery in the public eye. While the book is not part of our collected data, we gave ourselves the flexibility to integrate it in our findings section since one article (97) concentrates the entirety of its exposé on the review of this branding analysis book.

In our selection, the authors do not display the argument as thoroughly as the precedent citation. In fact, recognizing terrorist organizations as brands of terror seems like a well-known fact. Sometimes, the author will specify to the readers that the association of terrorism and branding is a bold and new perspective, but the majority of the articles make the statement without further consideration. Qualifying terrorist groups as brands sounds as common as defining Nike or Apple. To display how socially acceptable this association became, we will highlight the comments expressed by French business professors in 2012 to the newspapers *Le Figaro* "Al-Qaeda is a brand. A global brand, more importantly. Since the 11ᵗʰ September 2001, Al-Qaeda has become the Coca-Cola of terrorism" (78, *translation*). The following

example, coming from the *Associated Press*, also demonstrates that the juxtaposition of branding and terrorism has entered the contemporary vernacular "Authorities also say the group has shown a determination to promote its brutal brand of jihad through an Internet marketing campaign that could incite homegrown terror" (105).

Once the association between brand and terrorism has been established, adding to the equation the concept of marketing sounds coherent, even necessary. A brand requires to carry out marketing efforts for its own survival. Thus, if we conceive terrorist entities as brands, the logical continuity would be to charge them of using marketing. This quote from the magazine *Power Politics*, demonstrates how intertwined branding and marketing are: "It [terrorism] has to be viewed and assessed both as a battle of ideas as well as the syndication and marketing of Islamist brands of terror, which aims at killing and silencing people into submission" (151).

We demonstrated how branding, and by extent marketing, became a unifying principle in the popular terrorism lexicon. To represent how strong the association has anchored itself, we have an extract from Anderson Cooper cable news show from July 2007.

> GRANGE: […] But, look, they have a great brand. They have a great tagline. They're wonderful in the virtual arena. And they know how to market what they want to do. And they're going to do that somewhere in this world—there's no doubt in my mind—in multiple places. And, so, we're going to have to take them on somewhere. Whether we like Iraq or not, it's there. It was created. It's caused a lot more to come to the plate. But, I mean, we're going to have to do it.

COOPER: Marketing terror. It is a brave new world. (30)

At first, the panelist Brig. Gen. (Ret.) David L. Grange, an ex-military agent, delivers to the audience the distinctiveness of Iraqi jihadists; how they managed to demarcate themselves and build a brand. This description offers nothing new to other previous examples. What is interesting about this passage is that it is not the commentator who combines marketing with the branding concept; it is the host. It seems that his conclusion is aimed to translate Grange's reasoning into understandable, simpler terms. "Marketing terror" is a striking recapitulation of a touchy subject, a conclusion that will engrave and perhaps shape the minds of the audience.

Here are some other examples that sustain the *Terrorism is branding* narrative:

Table 10. Examples from the *Terrorism is branding* narrative

Source	Quote
(41)	"David Livingstone, a security expert at Chatham House, Britain's premier think-tank on international affairs, said recently he doesn't believe removing bin Laden from the equation will have much effect because al-Qaida has become a brand name. The al-Qaida product of Islamic terrorism is now so well established it will survive with or without bin Laden."

(59)	"Amazing, but Osama bin Ladens writings show that Al-Qaeda had a marketingproblem. A branding problem, in fact. Surprised? A letter found in his Pakistani compound expresses his concern that the groups original name, Al-Qaeda Al-Jihad, (The Base of Holy War) was widely known as the abbreviated Al-Qaeda, which omitted the reference to holy war."
(180)	"The declaration of allegiance to Islamic State (IS) by some groups in this region is more about adopting a notorious brand name by their warlords than any real ideological synergy with the pan Islamism of Daesh."

Marketing is a one-word punch line. The one-word punch line category refers to the 41% of the articles that use, or give the impression to use, marketing and terrorism carelessly. We consider the exploitation of the term reckless since the journalists do not explain or give a clue on how the marketing argument can be attached to terrorism. Marketing is marketing; as simple as that. The complexity of the discipline has escaped some articles journalists' spectrum. The marketing of terrorism seems like two words that inadvertently stumbled upon each other. It could have been "the business of terrorism". Or even more obvious, it could have been "the market of terrorism"; the lack of meaning conveyed by the text would have the same result.

Here is an excerpt of the article appeared in March 2012 *Stop using Palestinian cause to justify terror: Fayyad* that shows how, in the terrorist narrative, the purpose of marketing can appear trivial. "It is time for these criminals to stop marketing their

terrorist acts in the name of Palestine and stop pretending to stand up for the rights of Palestinian children who only ask for a decent life" (68). As you can see, it is not the author who came up with the idea of combining marketing and terrorism; it is the literal transcript of the Palestinian premier Salam Fayyad rhetoric. However, it was the author who intentionally quoted this specific part of the speech. He did not choose to paraphrase it; he transcribed it word for word, which suggests that the author accords a significant importance to the idea of marketing terrorism. This author's textual inclination seems contagious considering that this specific saying was recovered 13 times in our article collection between the period of March 2012 and April 2012. In quote or in paraphrasing, the entirety of the authors who referred to Mr. Fayyad's statement thought it was pertinent to keep the intended message without deepening the subject. Furthermore, we observe that the expression is constantly used in the articles as the premise for a compelling introduction or for a vibrant conclusion. Surely, the decision to print the "marketing their terrorist acts" was compelling on account of depicting an evocative image, a poignant testimony to the reality Palestinians endure. But what does it imply exactly? What can we understand from the statement "marketing their terrorist acts"? If we deconstruct it literally, marketing refers to the action of putting something into market; a market being a place favouring the exchange of goods. Does it suggest that the terrorists' attacks are used as an exchange token? We believe that it is not the idea envisioned by the minister. We rather conclude that his declaration is condemning terrorists for exploiting attacks in the name of social causes, in this case, the Palestinian one. In

other words, he is stating that terrorists are carrying out attacks in order to promote their beliefs and their terrorist entity. Terrorist acts are perceived as simple public relations campaigns.

Another example where the use of marketing is not well disclosed is in *The Judge Rules No Publicity Stunt for Norway Shooter Today* article published in 2011. "A judge in Norway has spared the world from a "marketing" stunt by wet-suited Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik" (58) The publication entails that the terrorist would have taken his court hearing as a marketing stunt, paralleling that appearing to court is not only a legal process but also an intended marketing ploy. Like in the previous article, we could presume that in this publication marketing appears to be a synonym of PR. If the court hearing had been public, the terrorist would have obtained a platform to announce his motives freely and objectives so that he could influence others to mimic his heinous actions. Furthermore, we can note something atypical in this brief text: the word marketing is hanging between quotation marks. Stressing that the author is not even sure if the employment of the term is correct, or that he does not fully assume his analogy.

Another representation of the one-word punch line rhetoric is displayed in the following passage from the article *The Doctrine of Necessity for the state of emergency*. "They never changed—They earned money and still are marketing the ultimate objectives of terrorism by slandering the Government and making derogatory remarks about the Government." (61) Like the other passages, this example does not help the reader grasp the intricacy of the marketing of terrorism

argument. Despite this, yet again, anticipated and non-conclusive outcome, what is interesting in this example is that the sentence underlined is retrieved 6 more times in its original form. In opposition to the Salam Fayyad example, this saying is never put forward as a quotation. The sentence always appears as creative choice from the author. Another notable difference is that in Mr. Fayyad's articles, his statement was in sync with the current events. They were describing the actions of a particular terrorist attack and the articles had only a one-month gap. As for the articles mentioning the statement concerning the LTTE organization, they never refer to a specific event. The time frame of these publications goes from June 2009 to August 2011. Furthermore, all the articles were published from by Sri Lankan newspapers, The Daily News and the Sunday Observer, which signifies that the newspapers recycle, if not plagiarize, their own material. One thing is clear, even if the articles do not contain the same general intent, the editors of these newspapers, though it was primordial to keep the marketing of terrorism, demonstrating once again that the idiom mark the imagination.

Another article hovering summarily about the marketing and terrorism linkage is seen on the recorded material of the 31th January 2013 edition of *The Situation Room*, CNN's live news broadcast hosted by the established anchor Wolf Blitzer.

> BLITZER: […] does he have the capability for a huge attack, as opposed to something more modest?
>
> ROGERS: Well, there's always a little marketing in their efforts. And the whole idea of terror is to create chaos and fear in large scale. So some of that you have to take with a grain of salt. However, in their mind, and we have to

understand this, the taking of the gas facility in Eastern Algeria was a huge success for them. It got them recruits. And they knew that this was not going to end well for them, but that wasn't their purpose. It was a strategic change to go from taking people for ransom money to making a political statement about French—France being in Mali. That's a—that is a scary and concerning change. That was a huge success. It breeds more success for them. That's why you see this marketing, this new bravado, this new brazenness, coming out of North Africa. (85)

In this segment of the transcript, we clearly remark Mike Rogers, ex-chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and sought out TV commentator on the national security issues (Rogers, 2017), endowing to terrorists the practice of marketing operations. His claims, which appeared to more than 410 000 American viewers (Screener TV, 2017), ensure that terrorists are executing attacks in order to install a climate of fear among citizens and to recruit additional soldiers, hence, we sense that the term marketing is a fancy approach to avoid adopting the word promoting. It is even more evident in this scenario that marketing lost its substance when we focus on the sentence "that's why you see this marketing, this new bravado, this new brazenness". The usage of marketing techniques by terrorists strike as being fairly recent. Yet, when we look at what Rogers describes as marketing, we do not see how innovative and novel it is. Terrorists by characterization have always carried out attacks and recruited people, therefore, why does the marketing play a new important role in the terrorist dynamic? Once again, using the term has not a very clear-cut implication.

Here are some other examples that sustain the *Marketing is a one-word punch line* narrative:

Table 11. Examples from the *Marketing is a one-word punch line* narrative

Source	Quote
(204)	"This is dangerous and a move against the safety and security of the land and its people. By their big words they are marketing terror among the younger population."
(191)	"Il y a deux phénomènes parallèles qui sont apparus dans les années 2000, qui peuvent certes être poreux mais qui restent distincts: les fondamentalistes spiritualistes, qui prônent un retour aux racines de l'islam, qui font face à des «ninjas de l'islam» souhaitant devenir des héros antisociaux, brandissant «Allah akbar !» comme slogan de guerre. Ils sont visés par le marketing de Daech, dont les leaders sont, eux, effectivement, de vrais stratèges islamistes."
(134)	"GAZETTE: Does religion give it a patina of righteousness or defuse any accusations that this is a mere power grab? STERN: I think religion is often a patina or marketing strategy for terrorists to accomplish more worldly goals."

The place of propaganda in the marketing of terrorism

In the publications, do the authors use the term propaganda, and if so, in which manner? After analysis, we have realized that a meager 25% of the articles contain the word propaganda. Since propaganda is an integral part of the terrorism discourse, we were surprised that its presence is not more significant.

[Insert Table 12]

It is interesting to see that the term propaganda has always been a notable component of the marketing of terrorism. According to the results, the propaganda term roughly follows the same evolution as the marketing of terrorism. Despite this observation, the synchronicity between both of these concepts cannot be concluded due to the scarcity of the collected data.

Throughout our analysis, we denoted five ways the term propaganda appeared in the marketing of terrorism.

Propaganda and marketing have no relation. In this section, journalists do not establish or demonstrate the proximity of both concepts, both metaphorically and literally. Even though journalists wrote both terms in the articles, the concepts are not put in relation. Propaganda observes a syntactic distance to the marketing of terrorism rhetoric. As an example, here is an extract from Maryland State News

Services. The press released the comments of Peter Forster, "associate dean for online and professional education and information technology, and a senior lecturer in security and risk analysis (SRA) at Penn State's College of Information Sciences and Technology (IST)", on how the international community should combat the change in the paradigm of contemporary terrorism. He first stated:

> I think with ISIS, we've seen a change of terrorist tactics," Forster said. "They're very sophisticated in their marketing, and they use their online marketing very effectively. (107)

Then 4 paragraphs later he stated:

> It regularly organizes hashtag campaigns on Twitter, encouraging tweets on popular hashtags and utilizing software applications that enable ISIS propaganda to be distributed to its supporters' accounts. On Aug. 19, a propaganda video showing the beheading of Foley, a photojournalist who had been working as a freelance war correspondent when he was captured in Syria in 2012, was posted on YouTube. ISIS claimed that the killing had been carried out in revenge for the U.S. bombing of ISIS targets. (107)

Marketing appears twice, but only at the beginning of the publication, while propaganda is mentioned 5 times evenly throughout the text. In other words, the publication starts with the word marketing, and then, the concept evaporates itself and gives way to the concept of propaganda. It could be said that both words have been permutated. However, we do not think it is the case, since neither term is adjacent to one another; they have 4 paragraphs of discrepancy.

Another example that does not acknowledge the interrelationship between propaganda and marketing is shown in the *Financial Times* Newspapers. We read:

> But in the past three weeks events on the ground have conspired to send a different message, allowing Hizbollah to gain the upper hand in a propaganda war that is playing out by satellite to the Muslim world. (26)

Then 5 paragraphs later, we learn:

> People trying to access al-Manar's website yesterday received instead a report sent by Israel about the "Marketing of terrorism: Hizbollah's use of the Al-Manar TV station to spread incitement and hatred across the globe. (26)

Once again it demonstrates how propaganda does not serve to comprehend the marketing of terrorism.

It is important to note that we are not declaring that there is absolutely no connection between the two concepts, we just say that because of their textual distance, it seems that the journalists' purpose was not to combine both terms and put them in relation. Propaganda is one thing and marketing is another, they just happened to appear in the same article.

The expression "Propaganda and marketing". In this section, journalists establish or demonstrate how both concepts are entwined. In some publications, we even came across the expression "propaganda and marketing". It is as if the two concepts

went hand in hand; as if they were complementary to each other like research and development or Mac N' Cheese.

> Twitter's incredible marketing potential netted it 1.8 billion dollars from its IPO. Yet today, it has still done virtually nothing to stop it from becoming terrorist's marketing and propaganda weapon of choice. This technology provides the perfect global online fit for ISIS' expanding global reach. (100)

Another excerpt this time published in 2008 by the *Thai News Service* declares:

> Hayden told The Washington Post newspaper that al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden is losing the ability to exploit the U.S.-led war in Iraq to recruit more members. A CIA study two years ago concluded the war had become a propaganda and marketing tool for the terrorist group. (36)

Linking propaganda and marketing does not determine they act as synonyms, on the contrary, the conjunction "and" stress out that both concepts are distinct from each other. How exactly are they distinct? Unfortunately, the journalists in this category never provide explanations. Which implies that the lector cannot decipher in this expression what the respective distinctions between both concepts are, he has to interpret it with his own knowledge, if luckily he has any.

The only thing that is clear is, even though in the minds of the journalists, propaganda and marketing are two unique concepts, these two concepts are deeply

interrelated to each other. It almost translates that you cannot do marketing without propaganda and vice-versa.

Propaganda is a synonym for marketing. Propaganda, in some publications, is being used as a synonym for the term marketing. As simple as that! No necessity for journalists to explain. Marketing is propaganda and propaganda is marketing. As proof, *The Guardian* article published in April 2015 mentioned: "The propaganda the terrorists put out is akin to marketing, and too many of our teenagers are falling for the image" (136). By having used the word akin, the author denotes how similar, perhaps interchangeable, both concepts are. In the section above, *The expression "Propaganda and marketing",* each concept has its own singularity. They stay unique even though they are complementary. In this section, the concepts are so tangled together that their individuality has lost its substance. In other words, propaganda is not complementary to marketing; propaganda can act as marketing and inversely.

Another clear example where propaganda and marketing act as synonyms is shown in the following passage of the *Law Enforcement Technology* magazine:

> This individual had been working with various government agencies and stressed the importance of the World Wide Web as an obvious marketing tool and its direct correlation to terror. […] Despite the debate among experts if the internet can actually be used to coordinate terrorist attacks, the reality is that the internet is perhaps one of the most

> powerful recruitment and propaganda tools for terrorist
> organizations. (88)

Having described the Internet as a marketing tool and later on as a propaganda tool, the author implicitly advises the reader to unite both concepts. Maybe the journalist did not necessarily try to associate both terms. Maybe he wanted to say that the World Wide Web is a marketing tool as well as a propaganda tool. However, he did not clarify the issue. In the end, whether the journalist intentionally wanted to juxtapose both concepts or not is not relevant. The result will remain the same: while reading this passage, we inadvertently sense that propaganda and marketing are two words that describe the same matter.

Moreover, in the following transcript of Fox News' *The Big Story With John Gibson*, aired on the 22th April, 2005, we denote how, for some individuals, propaganda is heavily integrated to the marketing domain. To the question, "What do the terrorists hope to accomplish by releasing videos like this?", the senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, Dana Robert Dillon responds: "Well, Judge, I think you hit the nail on the head. It's propaganda. This is a marketing tool for the terrorists" (18). Ms. Dillon not only peers both notions, she declares that propaganda is a marketing tool. According to her, propaganda is an integral component of the marketing strategies. As if it was a legitimate technique employed by marketing practitioners.

Propaganda is archaic, marketing is contemporary. If propaganda had a son, it would be marketing. Marketing could be considered as the next propaganda stage of evolution. In her article published by the Spanish newspaper *Informacion*, Marta Martin Llaguno recognizes how the marketing of terrorism was inspired by the Nazi propaganda. "The strategy of marketing terrorism resembles the psychological warfare of German Nazism, which laid the foundations of modern propaganda and gave rise to scientific studies on communication" (149, *translation*). She does not imply, she affirms that propaganda and marketing resemble each other. It seems that this associative statement should be added in our last section, *Propaganda is a synonym for marketing*, however, we think there is an extra element that separates this quotation from the ones present in the last section. Her reference to the Nazi regime brings temporality to the propaganda notion. Propaganda back then installed the foundations of psychological warfare. As of today, it is the marketing domain that continues to feed this psychological warfare. In a way, marketing has bypassed overthrown and taken the lead over propaganda. The analogy insinuates that the Nazi propaganda is somewhat responsible for the marketing of terrorism. In other words, marketing is the new form of propaganda.

In the *Deseret News'* article, Chandra Johnson interviews Rabbi Abraham Cooper, associate dean from the Simon Wiesenthal Center and director of the Digital Terrorism and Hate Project, on the manner the international community should fight IS's use of social media. Throughout the text, Rabbi Abraham Cooper notes the ability of the terrorist group to market their ideology. "Part of ISIS' seductive

attraction is an idea they tell you in marketing 101: Push one idea" or, "Twitter

remains the "online marketing weapon of choice" for terrorists" are examples on

how he describes the present issue. Abraham Cooper, never refers to propaganda.

Nonetheless, at one point in the article, the interviewer asks the Rabbi:

> What's the difference between the way ISIS uses social
> media and the way other groups have used wartime
> propaganda in the past? What makes social media unique
> here? (179)

The allusion to the past transmits the information that propaganda is an ancient

instrument. Moreover, with the interviewee's response, it intensifies how distinctive

the marketing of terrorism is from propaganda. He says: "The difference is that

they're able to reach out globally to recruit young men and women to join them."

With his reply, propaganda feels like an out-dated concept used before our over

mediatized world. It shows that the marketing of IS, while being heavily inspired by

propaganda, is, at least in the mind of Abraham Cooper, different from any previous

propaganda.

In addition to finding propaganda fairly old, some journalists will depict propaganda

as a bucolic device, in opposition to marketing, which is seen as a well-sophisticated

technique. "The aim should not be propaganda or war messaging but a more

sophisticated communication technique that defuses the marketing of terror as

martyrdom or freedom-fighting" (176). The article requests the global community

to urgently coordinate their efforts into finding a counterterrorist communicative

strategy. It underlines that it should not be a propaganda or war messaging, it

suggests developing a more intricate manoeuvre, that is in immediate response to the communicative strategies elaborated by IS. This citation presents how propaganda is not equipped enough to counteract the marketing of terror. They hint that to combat the marketing of terrorism, you need a discourse as well advance, i.e. you need the marketing of counterterrorism.

Propaganda is the content, marketing is the medium. In the precedent section *The expression "Propaganda and marketing"*, we denoted that the journalists were aware of the semantic difference between propaganda and marketing. However, the publications did not provide enough insight to grasp the distinctive characteristics of both concepts. In this section, the authors go beyond the statement "propaganda and marketing". They offer an appropriate rationale to the expression. Indeed, certain members of the press will briefly indicate the literal contrast between propaganda and marketing. The *BBC* monitoring the Middle East political issues, presented a text composed by Abd-al-Jabbar Abd-Mustafa al-Nu'ami, professor at Mosul University. The professor wrote:

> […] has been greatly affected by the Goebbels doctrine during World War II when this latter introduced a propaganda principle based on the concept: "Lie and lie until people believe you".
>
> If Goebbels somewhat succeeded in marketing this principle during the war between European forces aspiring to expand, dominate and control […] (5)

With this passage, we distinguish two things. Propaganda acts as the content that is being delivered, while marketing, on the other hand, acts as the medium that helps publicize the propagandist content. By stating that Goebbels marketed his principle and elaborated a propaganda scheme, the journalist conveys the message that marketing is merely a tool. Marketing is being used in its most literal sense to "put it on the market".

On the same note, we read in the Wikileak Forum: "In terms of "marketing" its propaganda, the terrorist organization Daesh is one of the best: they use social networks to "recruit", broadcast images and messages or information about their attacks" (171). The blogger, like the journalist in the other example, describes the action of distributing something. Marketing, for once, is exempt from all negative connotations since there is nothing tendentious in the act of distributing. Moreover, by using the quotation marks, the author underlines that it is not marketing that enslaves the recruits but propaganda.

Needless to say that even though this type of reasoning is the closest one to the marketing literature, it is not often found in our sample collection. In fact, we are not even sure that the authors literarily meant to convey that specific idea. Indeed, nowhere in the publications an author explicitly describes propaganda as the content and marketing as the medium. It is our semiotic interpretation as an experienced marketer. Maybe someone who has no knowledge of marketing will assume that both concepts are equivalent.

DISCUSSION

Hence, what conclusion can we retrieve from all this data? How is the marketing of terrorism portrayed in the press? And more precisely, how is the marketing of terrorism transmitted by non-marketers?

We have discovered that the marketing of terrorism is a doubly fragmented narrative. It is fragmented because the expression is reprised by a vast range of independent sources, meaning that no influential sources triggered the narrative's emergence. It is also fragmented because the expression is inconsistent throughout the entirety of the journalistic discourse. There is no journalistic cohesion when it comes to the marketing of terrorism; the rhetoric is used as the journalists see fit.

In the scientific publications, researchers take the time to construct and lay out the principles and the fundamentals of the marketing of terrorism discourse. They first explain what marketing evokes in its general aspect and then express how the term applies to terrorist groups. In order to accentuate how terrorism inscribes itself in the marketing field, the publications are generally filled with words that have a strong marketing connotation, such as positioning and branding (O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009, 2014; Bhui and Ibrahim 2003; Mozes and Weimann 2010; Baines et al. 2010). Journalists, on the other hand, rarely explain the principles related to the narrative. The marketing of terrorism serves as an obvious postulate. It does not require clarification or marketing idioms to understand the concept.

The journalists engaging in the terrorism discourse employ the marketing nomenclature because marketing is a word with a great deal of promise, but apparently few implications. It is such a vast domain, that it can encapsulate many views; opposing to the word business, which in most of the cases implies a capitalistic value. The term is seen as a synonym for selling, promoting, distributing, branding, etc. not only for commerce purposes but also for non-profit organizations, people, and ideas. As we have seen in our literature review, the field has expended, due mainly to Kotler and Levy's work, beyond for-profit parties and integrated the concept of "marketing ideas", predominant in the marketing of terrorism (1969). "As a terror organization, the product being sold is an extreme ideology that is expressed through acts of terror that are almost completely planned, organized, and executed offline, in the real world" (Mozes and Weimann 2010, 223).

This myriad of connotations gives the impression to the journalists that they are exempt of any abuse. As a consequence of its apparent harmlessness, marketing became a standard business word that journalists tend to misuse or misinterpret. Most of the authors dealing with the marketing of terrorism do not fully endorse and grasp the complexity of their own references. As we saw previously, 41% of the articles mentioned marketing without further explanation. It is no surprise here, if we say that the rhetoric in these publications were trivial and insufficient. What is unanticipated is that for the remaining 59%, we realized the rhetoric is still not illustrated properly. Even if they clarify the association by alluding to other notions ("terrorist groups are brands", "terrorist groups use marketing tools", etc.), for the

great majority of the articles, the marketing of terrorism remains a statement deprived of theoretical accuracy. Overall, less than 10% of the articles thoroughly justified the dynamic force between these two concepts.

In some cases, the journalists will not just bluntly state that terrorist factions exploit marketing schemes, they will even go so far as to describe the terroristic rationale by metaphorically borrowing the lexical attached to the marketing field. The terrorism dialect has been so well integrated by the marketing/business terminology that comparing terrorist groups to international companies appears banal. Product, franchise, niche, start-up, etc. are now terms to symbolise the logistics and strategies of modern political communication undertaken by terrorist organizations.

Our results show that marketing is becoming the new trendy, accessible and, let us be honest, inaccurate, form to describe propaganda. The fact that terrorist groups contemporary rhetoric relies on propaganda videos, such as decapitation videos that are tinted with a dramatic force and an aesthetic concern worthy of a blockbuster, and an active presence of jihadists on the social networks, such as Facebook or Twitter, must contribute to the attribution by the journalists of the terrorist communicative restructuring to the use of marketing and its techniques.

It is probable for some journalists that the marketing of terrorism was just a candid approach to juxtapose two words; grammatically speaking, marketing is the gerund form of the verb to market. However, the fact that they combine the concepts without referring anywhere else in the article to the commerce idioms or to the

marketing theory feels like the conjunction is merely an exercise of style. This hypothesis seems highly probable when we look at the evolution of the discourse and notice that it boomed in 2014 with the presence of the Islamic State.

The marketing of terrorism becomes two words that act as a compelling hook, but it has no substance to back it up. Indeed, combining terrorism and marketing without further motive, is a blank allegation. The expression should be used responsibly. Reducing the quintessence of the term to a simple rendition would be derogatory to the discipline since most of the people who receive the information are not marketing savvy. Not emphasising on the complexity on the multifaceted function of a word like marketing, gives the readers the chance to extrapolate.

We cannot assert beyond any reasonable doubt that the authors are clueless when it comes to their marketing knowledge, but the fact that there is nothing else in the articles that helps the reader comprehend the reasons why terrorists beneficiate from marketing, makes it hard to believe that the reporters understand the intricate innuendos of their references. We are not stating that the authors should be prohibited to adopt this term in their news depictions of terroristic events. Neither, are we implying that these journalists were mischievous by attributing the success of terrorist groups to their marketing tactics. Notwithstanding, they put in the hands of the readers the power to decode their ideas, and if by misfortune the readers do not have the tools to interpret them, those same readers will eventually build distorted cognitive shortcuts about marketing and terrorism.

Why it is important that the press detains a coherent and substantial discourse? As announced by Walter Lippmann, the architect of the famous "manufacture of consent":

> The news is not a mirror of social conditions, but the report of an aspect that has obtruded itself. The news does not tell you how the seed is germinating in the ground, but it may tell you when the first sprout breaks through the surface. It may even tell you what somebody says is happening to the seed under ground (Lippmann 1922/1934, p.341).

He understood the power instated by the news in his influential *Public Opinion*. According to him, the ideas delivered by the news will slowly but surely germinate in the minds of the people receiving the information. It is irrelevant if the news articulates truthful ideas; if the ideas, accurate or not, are out in the open, it can be enough to captivate and influence an entire audience. The seed that has been planted in the public minds will affect, and certainly, shape the perceptions of those receiving the information. Thus, the fact that the marketing of terrorism is more often than not poorly defined can be critical for the marketing field, but more importantly for the public debate. The public risks after multiple exposures to the narrative, to mythologize the marketing domain with prejudice and forge erroneous opinions. In a way, reading the news will unfortunately make the public less informed on the marketing issue; which is the opposite of the expected result.

While we are deliberately criticizing the press' publications collected in our sample collection for their lack of precision, and preaching the importance for journalists to conserve a scientific rigor when it comes to the use of the marketing of terrorism,

we cannot truly blame the journalists for using the said expression since, theoretically speaking, combining marketing and terrorism is accurate.

For one, the scientific community has integrated and accepted the marketing of terrorism for quite a while, especially due to the works of O'Shaughnessy and Baines. These academics assert that the terrorist organizations' main interest is the desire to influence and convince a population of the validity of their political struggle through acts of symbolic communication. To speak in Kotlerian terms (1969), the product offered, is none other than the ideological doctrine of the terrorist party. And, in order to acquire more sympathizers, they must market this ideology.

> Although the concept of terrorism as marketing, terrorism as a language of symbolic communication, would not sustain an orthodox marketing analysis, not least because there is no two-day dialogue, there is no doubt that terrorists a) have target markets; b) use communications prodigiously to the extent that these matter now far more than the actual terror act itself; c) access channels of distribution; and d) have a market differentiation strategy. (O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009, 239)

Marketing is an organizational instrument that is neither moral nor immoral; it is, by its very nature, amoral. It has no moral boundaries and can, in absolute terms, be the reason for all types of behavior, whether they are fundamentally ethical or not. Indeed, it is not the intrinsic nature of marketing that makes its use virtuous, but rather the way people decide to implement it. Arbitrarily, marketing remains an area

where all means are plausible in order to convince a person to adhere to a product, brand or idea.

While marketing is usually a regulated practice exploited to sell conventional products, marketing can also be used in a deliberate or in a concealed manner to influence, persuade and manipulate individuals to consume any immoral product. And so, if the scientific community considers that marketing can handle all types of behavior, moral or not, or in other words, if the scientific community agrees that this administrative tool can condense the terrorism narrative in its realm, it is legitimate for anyone, including the press, to draw terrorists as marketing agents without having to explain their reasoning. Asserting that terrorists are doing marketing is exact. Of course, we do not think the press understand the metaphorical scope of their implication, but the fact remains that the marketing of terrorism discourse cannot be refuted since it is approved and researched in the academia.

For two, we cannot omit that the rhetoric sounds powerful. The "marketing of terrorism". There's a ring to it; the combination feels effective. The use of a contemporary vocabulary instead of a drab and heavy terminology energizes the discussion. Regardless if the individuals truly understand the meaning of the word, it is a word we all heard of. It is a word that is more relatable. It is a word that makes sense in our over-mediatised and consumerist era. It is a word that gets the message across. It is a word that entered our vernacular. "Although marketing has one definition and corpus of knowledge, there is a public and vernacular concept of

marketing, and especially the language of marketing, which has become a language of public and media discourse" (O'Shaughnessy and Baines 2009, 239).

And more importantly, it is a word that we are not afraid of; especially in opposition to the word propaganda. Propaganda has been recently attached to a recent, but nevertheless, gloomy period of history; a history that we are still not in peace with. Referring to propaganda forces us to carry the shame of what happened during the Nazi regime, it forces us to accept that no one is immune to brainwashing. Moreover, it forces us to regard our immobility when human tragedies occur.

The marketing terminology became indispensable to explain the terrorism narrative because of its contemporary, and let's add casual, aspect promotes the power of individuality, a power highly dignified in our liberal societies.

For instance, propagandees, the ones subject to propaganda material, wear the image of blind passive sheep that have been misled by a mischievous authority. As much as we want them to gain consciousness, they cannot help themselves as they are unaware of their condition. And since they are unaware of their state of indoctrination, they will continue believing extreme ideologies. If we say that terrorists use propaganda to promote their ideas, it will underline the difficulty, if not the inability, to combat ideas that have been insidiously inserted in the social ethos of the terrorists' partisans.

In contrast, if we say that terrorists use marketing to promote their ideas, it will indicate that the press concludes that the power, contrary to propaganda, is and stays

in the hand of the ideological consumers. Referring to marketing accentuates the freedom of choice of a terrorist sympathizer. It means that since you are a free individual, you have the right to be, to believe, to consume whatever you please. With propaganda you do not have a choice to believe, the belief is forced upon you; in marketing you do. If individuals can shop a variety of products, by analogy, it also means that they can shop a variety of beliefs. Their purchasing power turns into their believing power. If there is a flaw in a belief, onto the next, or so it seems. In a way, it is as if propaganda could not exist in our western societies. People are so intensely informed and interconnected that it seems improbable for ideologies to be imposed upon a public without their will. Consumers expect blatant honesty because if you fool them, as informed consumers they will know. They have, or more probably, they think they have all the answers at their dispositions. They do not think they can be misled as knowledgeable consumers.

Marketing is easily detectable by the consumers, whereas propaganda is hardly perceptible. Propaganda is latent, pernicious and out-dated, whereas marketing is straightforward, effective and a reflection of our times. If it's a marketing issue, it possibly suggests that there is a marketing solution. All things considered, it seems easier to develop counter arguments for a marketing rationale than for a propagandist one; it seems easier to fight a brand than to fight a deeply anchored set of values. If terrorism is in our collective imaginary about selling/promoting/distributing/etc. an idea; as in every exchange, if people buy, people can be refunded if the product does not please them.

For my part, what I wanted us to do was just to look at terrorism as though it was a global brand, say, Coca-Cola. Both are fairly bad for your health. If you look at it as a brand in those ways, what you'll come to realize is, it's a pretty flawed product […] The brand has an Achilles' heel. We've mentioned the health, but it needs consumers to buy into it. The consumers it needs are the terrorist constituency. They're the people who buy into the brand, support them, facilitate them, and they're the people we've got to reach out to. We've got to attack that brand in front of them. (McCue 2015)

In conclusion, there is no doubt that the authors fancy the marketing of terrorism. This preference is not only due to the polysemous nature of the term marketing; it is also due to how powerfully the term resonates in our society and how democratized it has become. The press appropriation of the term is a vivid example of how marketing does not belong to its practitioners anymore, if it ever belonged to them. Moreover, the press appropriation of the term demonstrates how marketing has recently metamorphosed into a colloquialism; an informal concept that everyone can more or less master.

Yet, a problem arises with this kind of popular narrative. It must be noted that allying marketing with a violent project like terrorism will tint unfavourably its already impaired image. The more the discourse is used without nuances, the more the dark side of marketing will inscribe itself in the collective psyche, making it harder to refute and to modify. Do not get us wrong; even though we implied earlier that propaganda detains a heavily negative semiotic force, it did not mean that the marketing domain is exempt from any negative stigma. On the contrary, marketing, like propaganda, is a term that is widely unfavourably perceived. It is infamously labelled as a domain with derogatory intentions. The difference is that marketing

has a bad reputation, just not as bad as its homologue. People are wary about marketing whereas people are frightened about propaganda, the latter appearing more dangerous.

Marketers should be concerned about the way external agents alter and unintentionally degrade the reputation of marketing. The existing labels attached to the word propaganda, a word previously broadly accepted, should be a warning signal for what is about to be cultivated if they do not restrain the improper use of the marketing of terrorism and if they do not clarify the parameters of this specific discourse. Beyond any doubt, marketers should make it their duty to demystify their domain for neophytes in order to prevent a false representation to install itself as the real truth. We must remember that the term propaganda solely needed WWII to carry the negative stigma it has today.

CONCLUSION'S ARTICLE

The speech imputing marketing to terrorists' communication practices, firstly reported and researched by marketing academics, promptly and substantially became a concept adopted by the press; especially now that the Islamic State is growing in popularity. While we do acknowledge the legitimacy, furthermore, the pertinence, for the mass media to transmit a discourse based on the ability of an

armed group to model a capitalistically inspired rhetoric, we were quite concerned on how the press delivers the marketing and terrorism argument.

Thus, in order to grasp and verify how journalists annexed the marketing notion to the narrative construction of a terrorist organization, we researched in two press-related databases all the publications that associated the terms marketing and terrorism. Then, we applied, on our sampled data, an enhanced automated content analysis followed by an in-depth content analysis.

Our results show that marketing is a term deeply misunderstood. As a result of this misunderstanding, marketing became a metaphor that translates a myriad of actions. From selling to advertising, passing over branding, etc.; marketing says everything and nothing at the same time. Marketing is the contemporary synecdoche that wrongfully summarizes all the communicational tools.

Moreover, our results show that by using the word marketing with negligence, the journalists unjustifiably use the marketing of terrorism. Merging a market-oriented tool such as marketing with a politicized project such as terrorism without developing on the nature of the correlation gives place to interpretation. Since the press is one of the most reliable media to shape perceptions and ideas among a society, journalists, by delivering an undeveloped message, may facilitate untrained and unknowledgeable individuals to form amalgams and shortcuts about terrorism, and mostly about marketing.

In conclusion, even if allying these two concepts may be logical and scientifically valid, non-marketers have unintentionally distorted the meaning of the emergent terrorism narrative. Linking marketing and terrorism vaguely, with the sole purpose of appearing trendy, will surely damage the already blackened reputation of marketing.

Conclusion

"We're in a new world. We're in a world in which the possibility of terrorism, married up with technology, could make us very, very sorry that we did not act" (Rice 2002). Without claiming that Condoleezza Rice's quote, drawn from the transcript of the Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, a CNN program that aired one year after the 9/11 attacks, proves itself to be prophetic, we can surely acknowledge that the claim made by the former 66th United States Secretary of State seems to portray a recent reality; an alarming reality partly provoked, according to the press, by the terrorist group's marketing savoir faire.

The speech imputing marketing to terrorists' communication practices, firstly reported and researched by marketing academics, promptly and substantially became a concept adopted by the press; especially now that the Islamic State is growing in popularity. While we do acknowledge the legitimacy, furthermore, the pertinence, for the mass media to transmit a discourse based on the ability of an armed group to model a capitalistically inspired rhetoric, we were quite concerned on how the press delivers the marketing and terrorism argument.

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It goes without saying that the manner in which the journalists rendered the marketing of terrorism was misguided. By using the word marketing with negligence, the journalists unjustifiably use the marketing of terrorism. Moreover, the fact that they attributed the terrorists' successes to their marketing savviness without providing any explanations or reasoning, gives the impression that marketing plays a diabolical role in the propagation of terrorist campaigns. Indeed, merging a market-oriented tool such as marketing with a politicized project such as terrorism without developing on the nature of the correlation gives place to interpretation.

Since the press is one of the most reliable media to shape perceptions and ideas among a society, journalists, by delivering an undeveloped message, may facilitate untrained and unknowledgeable individuals to form amalgams

and shortcuts about terrorism, and mostly about marketing. Even if the press is not guarantor of scientific veracity, their frequent coverage gives validity to their discourse.

In addition to the press's ability of letting a new discourse flourish and install itself in the public psyche, it must be reiterated that the public holds unfavorable assumptions towards marketing. Because of these prejudices, we are concerned that the association will sustain, if not amplify, marketing's negative stigma. "A large number of persons think of marketing as immoral or entirely self-seeking in its fundamental premises" (Kotler and Levy 1969, 15). This quotation is all the more important when we notice that the text from which it was extracted was published in 1969. If this excerpt outlines the general opinion towards marketing in 1969, how must the feeling be in 2017, especially when we link it to terrorism?

In conclusion, while our research aims to peruse a recent burgeoning phenomenon, this research ultimately tries to understand what contemporary marketing is and what it evokes in our society. Moreover, it tries to demonstrate why, in some cases, marketing functions in our contemporary era as a more etymologically accurate candidate to label the terrorists' activities than propaganda. Even if allying these two concepts may be logical and scientifically valid, non-marketers have unintentionally distorted the meaning of the emergent terrorism narrative; or so we think the distortion was unintended. Linking marketing and terrorism vaguely, with the

sole purpose of appearing trendy, will surely damage the already blackened reputation of marketing.

Notwithstanding our critical view on the manner the press portrays the marketing domain, we believe it is important to publicly deepen the connection between marketing and terrorism since we are certain that the narrative will allow other scholars and thinkers to find techniques to elaborate a counter-terrorism discourse and to develop solutions to minimize the influence of terrorist formations on their supporters.

Appendix A: Tables

Table 1. Chronological evolution of the marketing of terrorism concept since the World Trade Center Attacks in 2001

Table 2. Chronological evolution of the terror* concept in the media

Table 3. Type of medium where the marketing of terrorism appears

Table 4. Geographical provenance of the sources

Table 5. Categorization of the cited sources

Number of people related to marketing

Source : Factiva and Eureka (2017)

Table 12. Chronological evolution of the propaganda concept within the marketing of terrorism

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