

# HEC MONTRÉAL

## Arctic Geo-Politics:

A Study of the Effects of Hydrocarbon Resources on the policy stance of  
Arctic stakeholders

by

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## Abstract

*The paper proposes to study Arctic policies, by taking a step back and analyzing, through the concepts of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism, the narratives that states employ. After which, it seeks to link those policy stances with hydrocarbon resources through quantitative methods in order to discern whether a relationship exists. Our study has reached a mixed conclusion, whereby countries with more hydrocarbon resources tend to have a unilateral stance. However, relying solely on hydrocarbon resources provides imperfect predictions, showing that more factors are required to predict and understand the foreign policy stances of Arctic stakeholders.*

Key words: Arctic, Hydrocarbon, Oil, Gas, Natural Resources, Foreign Policy.

## Résumé

*Cet article propose d'étudier avec recul les politiques de l'Arctique en analysant les rhétoriques employées par les états à travers les concepts d'unilatéralisme, de bilatéralisme et de multilatéralisme. Il en viendra ensuite de lier ces positions avec les ressources d'hydrocarbure par méthode quantitative dans le but de discerner s'il existe ou non un lien. Notre étude arrivera à une conclusion mitigée, selon lesquels les pays possédant le plus d'hydrocarbure auraient une position unilatérale. Cependant, seulement compter sur ces ressources fournit des prédictions imparfaites, montrant qu'il y a plusieurs facteurs requis pour prévoir et comprendre les politiques étrangères des parties prenantes de l'Arctique*

Mots-clés: Arctique, Hydrocarbure, Pétrole, Gaz, Ressources Naturelles, Politique Etrangère.

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## Abbreviations

UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Seas
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
bbo	Billion barrels of oil
tcf	Trillion cubic feet (of gas)
IMO	International Maritime Organization
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
USGS	United States Geological Survey
CARA	Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
AMAP	Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
WTI	West Texas Intermediate
RAIPON	Russian Association for Peoples of the North

## 1.1.Introduction

As the polar ice caps melt, claims abound of regional and global powers converging to secure their interests in the geo-strategic and resource-rich region of the Arctic. According to the 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA) made by the US Geological Survey (USGS), it is estimated that the Arctic holds about 30% of the world's undiscovered gas and 13% of the world's undiscovered oil, making it the last untapped major oil and gas deposit in the world. In addition, the Arctic is home to new fisheries, mineral wealth, and important commercial routes that make the region attractive. This attraction has been inflamed over the years. In 2007, a Russian scientific expedition planted the Russian flag on the North pole sea floor, a region believed to hold important oil and gas reserves, in a move that a number saw as a unilateral statement (Borgerson, 2008). In December 2013, Canada claimed the North Pole as belonging to its continental shelf, along with whatever resources it may hold (CBC news, 09 December 2013). The present-day crisis in Ukraine has also had some repercussions on the Arctic, with the Canadian representative in the Arctic Council, federal Environment Minister Leona Aglukkaq declaring that Canada will use the council to voice its opposition to Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea (CBC news.ca, April 19 2015). North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) commander stated very recently that the Arctic has experienced the most Russian air force activity for decades (CTV news.com, April 19 2015). The Arctic has experienced a gradual increase in international attention due to climate changes, as well as the discovery of new resources and the accessibility of geo-strategic passages.

Although the Arctic Council was established as an international forum to promote cooperation among the eight Arctic countries, its mandate while broad in theory is primarily limited to environmental protection and economic development, while being strictly unrelated to security matters and the ownership of resources (Koivurova, 2007). Indeed, the Arctic Council is a forum for discussion and not a decision making body, capable of making binding decisions as an independent organization. So while the Arctic is not an institutional void, for international law such as the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) cover the region and are binding with regards to claims of extended continental shelves and thus the ownership of

resources, circumpolar states remain the principal decision making entities within its boundaries. In such a context, states choose to adopt different policy stances, from a unilateral stance emphasizing sovereignty, to one focused on bilateral cooperation and regionalism while limiting international institutions to the subnational level, to finally a multilateral globalism promoting the expansion Arctic institutions in both scope and membership.

## **1.2 The Question and contributions.**

The question we will be attempting to answer is as follows: *How much can we rely on hydrocarbon factors to explain the adoption of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral foreign policy stances?*

We are interested in determining if oil and gas related factors visibly impact and influence a country's stance with regards to the Arctic. To answer this question, we will investigate the impact of the presence of Arctic oil and gas reserves as well as undiscovered technically recoverable resources on the Arctic policy of the eight members of the Arctic Council, them being the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Russia, as well as on the Arctic policy of China, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union, and their evolution, over a period starting from the establishment of the Arctic council in 1996 until present times. We will resort to primarily official government documents and statements as well as a review of scholarly studies.

The Arctic is a complex region and system, and it is difficult to accurately gauge the policies of its stakeholders, as they often times appear contradictory, too general, or amenable to misinterpretation or exaggeration. Instead of delving into the specifics of foreign policy behaviors or comprehensive Arctic strategies, we propose to take a step back and look at the ideas and perceptions behind foreign policy and strategy. Nicholas Kitchen (2010), a neoclassical IR theorist, argues that states' ideas and perception of the world shapes or influences their foreign policy. We are thus interested in looking at the perceptions that states hold towards the Arctic, the narrative and rhetoric that their foreign policies and Arctic strategies are guided by. We are quintessentially interested in foreign policy stances, ranging from unilateralism to bilateralism

and multilateralism, and not actions and policies per se, and to see whether a relation exists between the adoption of a certain stance and hydrocarbon resources.

In doing so, we hope to contribute to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it would allow us to take a step back and study narratives<sup>1</sup>, which would in our opinion provide a framework or a lens through which we can understand and contextualize specific policies or actions taken by states, complimenting the existing literature. Looking at the Arctic through unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism, as foreign policy stances would be a novel way to "get back to the basics" and study the guiding principles and rhetoric behind each state. Secondly, by comparing and contrasting the foreign policy stances of Arctic stakeholders, we would be able to look at the Arctic as a whole, a system. There exists in the literature many analyses on states' Arctic policies, but they seldom do so with all states in tandem, rather focusing mostly on individual states. By studying the Arctic as a system, and comparing and contrasting foreign policy stances of stakeholders, we hope to provide a framework that would be more comprehensive, and able to be expanded upon to provide more holistic and systemic analyzes of the circumpolar region.

Another area in which we hope to contribute, is the mixed approach of qualitatively interpreting narratives, and linking those narratives with quantitative analysis of data and material determinants, to discern the existence or not of any possible correlations. The Arctic literature has had both qualitative and quantitative analyses, but rarely did it have studies trying to investigate possible linkages or correlations. It would be interesting to see whether foreign policy stances and narratives are influenced by hydrocarbon resources, and if so how. As the Arctic drew more interest and attention, media sensationalism has occurred, specifically claims about a new "Great Game" or race occurring between great powers to claim resources as the ice cap melts (Borgerson, 2009). Investigating any links between foreign policy stances and hydrocarbon resources would help to either support or disprove those claims.

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<sup>1</sup> By "narrative", we mean "the stories participants are disposed to tell about policy situations" as defined by Frank Fischer and John Forrester (1993). It is in essence the language, discourse, and arguments employed by states in the policy-making process, which Fischer and Forrester, among others, believe to be a useful tool with which to analyze policies. Our study of narrative however will not be based on "narrative inquiry", which is an in-depth qualitative methodology, but rather it would be based on direct interpretation of official documents.



In essence, we hope to analyze and interpret official documents and statements of every Arctic state in order to qualify it as one of either three stances, and to then use statistical methods to discern any possible correlation between hydrocarbon resources and the adoption of a particular stance.

### **1.3. Structure**

To answer our proposed question, we will adopt the following structure. We will at first describe the Arctic, in geographic, economic, and political terms, where we elucidate on the economic and geo-strategic factors at play, the main state actors involved in the Arctic, as well as the main sources of Arctic governance. Following that, we will define our theoretical framework, providing definitions of the core concepts of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism that we derive from several sources from the literature. We will also look at the two schools of thought present in academia, that describe the Arctic either as a region marked by stability and cooperation or as a region marked by growing tensions and power politics.

We will then rely on this divide, as well as rhetoric present in the media to present the hypotheses that we wish to test, namely the impact of hydrocarbon resources on the adoption of unilateralism as a foreign policy stance. After which, we will explain our qualitative and quantitative approach, where we aim to first analyze and interpret official state documents in order to qualify each state's foreign policy stance, and then to analyze the impact of oil and gas resources on the adoption of said policies. Furthermore, through post estimation and predicted probabilities, we will see how accurate our predictions can be if we rely solely on oil and gas related factors.

Subsequently, we will analyze and interpret the results that we get through interpreting official documents and through statistical methods, after which we will list several limitations present in our study, as well as propose new avenues of research before concluding.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. The Arctic




Figure 1. The Arctic. Sources: AMAP Assessment report Arctic pollution issues, AMAP 1998, Arctic pollution issues: A state of the Arctic environment report, AMAP 1997, Conservation of Arctic flora and fauna, CAFF 2001

The Arctic is not an evident region to define, due to the numerous, often times contradictory, definitions given to it. Tamnes and Offerdal write, in the introduction to *Geopolitics and Security of the Arctic* (2014: pp. 3-6), that the Arctic has had three ways to define it. The first is through geography, where the Arctic could be seen as confined to the

Arctic circle which is its most common geographic definition (as illustrated in map 1), or seen as including sub-arctic areas, as the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) defines it<sup>2</sup>. The second way to define the Arctic is through functionality, where regions possessing Arctic-like conditions situated near the Arctic Circle are considered part of the Arctic<sup>3</sup>. The third way to define the Arctic is through narratives, the main one being the recent political narrative of a "Circumpolar Arctic", which is best exemplified and perpetuated by the Arctic Council<sup>4</sup>. In the context of this study, we will rely on the political definition of the Arctic, as a circumpolar region including eight states, five of which are littoral and who are referred to as the Arctic Five.




Figure 2. Arctic Ice Sea extent. Source: National Snow and Ice Data Center, Boulder Co, August 2013

<sup>2</sup> Another geographic definition is all the areas north of the 10° isotherm for July, as shown on figure 1.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, the 2000 USGS included the East Siberian Basin as part of the Arctic, even though it is south of the Arctic Circle. This is because in practical terms, the area has very similar conditions, namely being covered in ice most of the year.

<sup>4</sup> Other narratives include the Arctic as the homeland of indigenous peoples, or the European or North American Arctic grounded primarily in the history of polar expeditions.

As figure 2 demonstrates, climate change has had a profound impact on the Arctic, as its ice sea extent drops from year to year, especially in summer. Indeed, according to the National snow and ice data center, the Arctic's sea ice maximum in the year of 2015 is the lowest on record (NSIDC, March 2015).

## **2.2. Economic and Geo-political Factors**

The Arctic circle possesses a number of significant resources, important for both economic and geo-strategic reasons, which we will explore in this section. These resources are being discovered as the ice on the ocean melts

The Arctic Ocean is home to large fisheries, which have been exploited for quite some time. Indeed in 2002, the amount of caught wild fish in the Arctic constituted around 10% of the world catch of fish (Lindholt, 2006). With climate change and Arctic melt accelerating over the past few years, new fishing grounds are being revealed, particularly salmon and coalfish stocks (Carman, 2009). The economic implications of intensified, or minimally regulated fishing, would be significant, as would be the environmental implications as well as the livelihood of indigenous peoples in the North. In addition to large fisheries, the region is home to the boreal forests, or Taiga, which are the largest natural forests in the world, hitherto mostly untouched because of harsh climate conditions. With global warming however, full Arctic wood exploitation is a possibility in the future (Lindholt, 2006). This would also carry important economic, environmental, and human repercussions that further add to the weight of the region. Moreover, a variety of mineral resources, such as mineral fuels, iron minerals, non-ferrous minerals, precious metal ores (such as gold), and industrial minerals (such as diamonds) exist within the confines of the region (Crawford & co, 2008). The vast majority of mineral resources are located in the Russian Arctic (Lindholt, 2006). There is also a vast supply of fresh water, estimated to being around 1/5th of the world's water supply (Heidi Bruce, 2012).

Another economic and geo-strategic implication of the incremental melting of the Arctic is the opening up of two prospective commercial trade routes, the Northern Sea Route which passes from the Bering strait, alongside Siberia to Western Europe, and the Northwest passage, which

passes from the Bering strait, and through the Canadian archipelago to the rest of North America. The Northern Sea Route, which is estimated to be more viable in the immediate future than its western counterpart, could save up on a lot of shipping time and fuel, which would correspond to billions over an entire year (Jakobson, 2010). In fact, the Northern Sea Route between Europe and East Asia is 40 percent shorter through the Arctic than through the Suez Canal (Conley & Co, 2013). Indeed, these trade routes would be strong competitors against the Suez and Panama canals (Blunden, 2012), with the Northern Sea route estimated to save \$60–\$120 billion per year for China (Rainwater, 2013). The economic, political, geo-strategic, and security implication of these developments are significant, with both Russia and Canada claiming that the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, respectively, pass through their internal waters. It is a claim that has not been shared by the UN or other Arctic nations, especially the USA (Conley & Co, 2013; Huebert, 2011). With Arctic melting, the possibility of Arctic shipping all year round is a distinct possibility in the near future, which would carry important implications. For now however, only commercial shipping during summer in the North Sea Route is being considered.




Figure 3. Arctic passages. Source: Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009

While far from being the only factor that makes the Arctic attractive to states, its hydrocarbon reserves represent perhaps its most enticing prospect (Claes et al., 2014). Unlike the region's other resources, most of the undiscovered oil and gas are located offshore. Indeed, the US Geological Survey estimates that 83% of undiscovered petroleum reserves are expected to occur in offshore areas (USGS, 2008). However, even when located offshore, they mostly lie in areas that are undisputed and clearly under the sovereignty and management of the state in question (Claes et al., 2014).

The US Geological Survey remains the primary source for data on petroleum resources in the Arctic, specifically its undiscovered reserves, which it has assessed in its *Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal* (CARA). The methodology of the USGS relies on using a geology based probabilistic methodology, where the mean estimates for each province are summed up for the total amount of undiscovered reserves. The survey focuses on assessing undiscovered technically recoverable oil and gas, which is to be distinguished from undiscovered economically viable reserves (USGS, 2008). Unfortunately, assessments of the latter remain limited and not uniform, so our study will be limited to primarily the Arctic's reserves of undiscovered technically recoverable resources.

The US Geological Survey in 2008 estimated that the Arctic holds around 30% of the world's undiscovered gas reserves. Lindholt (2011) argues that the importance of gas will dissipate after 2050 due to cheaper alternatives. While that is a distinct probability, we will use data pertaining to gas as we believe it to be important for the near future. The vast majority of undiscovered gas in the Arctic is located in Russia (at 70%), while Alaska holds the second largest share at 14% (Lindholt et al., 2011; Arctic Subgroup of the Resource & Supply Task Group, 2011).

With regards to oil, 13% of the world's undiscovered oil lies beneath the Arctic seabed, according to the US geological survey of 2008. It is estimated that the importance of Arctic oil will be maintained after 2050 if oil prices increase, as a general trend (Lindholt et al., 2011). However, the USGS' assessment is limited to technically recoverable resources, and an economic analysis and assessment would be required to ascertain how much of it is actually economically viable in the present or short future. With technological developments and the possibility of a continuation of the trend of increased oil prices as was the case for the past decade, Arctic oil is thought to become viable for exploitation within the next decade. Russia holds the majority of

proven oil reserves, however it is North America that holds the largest share of undiscovered reserves, primarily Alaska (Arctic Subgroup of the Resource & Supply Task Group, 2011). One limitation of the US geological Survey is that it does not assess the North Pole region, which is claimed in part or entirely by Canada, Russia, the USA, and Denmark as being part of their extended continent shelf, a claim which if approved by the UN and UNCLOS, would grant the country in question access and ownership of whatever resources that lie there. It is unclear if the North Pole holds any petroleum resources, as measurement in this area remains difficult.

While it is important to not underestimate the potential of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic, it is also important to not overstate them. Since the USGS assesses technically recoverable potential reserves and not whether they are economically viable or not, it is very possible for a substantial part of these undiscovered resources, if not most of them, to be economically unviable and too expensive to recover. The share of Arctic discovered oil reserves in the world's conventional total discovered oil reserves amounts to only 3.8%, while discovered gas reserves in the Arctic represent 19.1% of the world's discovered conventional gas resources (Claes et al., 2014; see table 1). While these numbers are not insignificant, and the Arctic's share of hydrocarbon resources might be further enhanced if the undiscovered resources are economically viable, it is crucial to not overestimate the relative weight of Arctic hydrocarbon resources. The importance of the Arctic as a non-OPEC hydrocarbon supplier, in particular when it comes to oil, will depend largely on oil prices increasing systematically (Lindholt et al., 2011)

	Arctic	World	Arctic Share
Undiscovered oil (bbo)	90	732	12.3
Discovered oil (bbo)	60	1.579	3.8
Undiscovered gas (tcf)	1669	5196	32.1
Discovered gas (tcf)	1615	8453	19.1

Table 1. Arctic share of world conventional oil and gas resources. Source: Claes et al. (2014), based on USGS (2000, 2011) and Spencer et al. (2011).

These combined factors make the Arctic an attractive region, with potentially a critical impact on the environment if the doors open to full exploitation. This possibility, borne out of an increase in commodity and oil prices as well as technological improvements, has mobilized environmental organizations, chief of which is Greenpeace, to try to keep the petroleum exploitation of the Arctic from taking place. Furthermore, the Arctic though sparsely inhabited,

is still home to about 4 million people, an important number of which are indigenous peoples (Lindholt, 2008). Several organizations have emerged from among these indigenous nations to lobby for their rights and future in an area where major powers are converging and potential resource exploitation is looming. This has spurred activism on the part of organizations representing indigenous peoples, such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the Russian Association for Peoples of the North (RAIPON), to seek representation and a say in the future of the region.

### **2.3. Arctic Governance**

In order to understand the Arctic region's political dynamics, we will need to look at the institutions in place that define Arctic governance. The region's complexity has spurred many initiatives and organizations for this role, a number of which like the Nordic Council or the Northern Dimension are limited to a number of Arctic states and not the entirety of the Arctic Circle. Other inter-governmental institutions or agreements, such as Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), focus on specific domains pertaining to the Arctic, in this case the environment. Our study will focus more on the two primary institutions for circumpolar governance, which are the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council, as they encompass the entirety of the Arctic.

UNCLOS is one of the most adhered to conventions in the world, with 165 signatories, established in 1994. All Arctic countries have ratified it, except the United States. The Reagan administration refused to ratify it due to its provision regulating the exploitation of resources in the sea-bed. Currently, US ratification of the convention is blocked in the Senate, out of concern that it infringes on US sovereignty. It defines the rights and responsibilities of states with regards to their maritime territories. Most importantly vis-a-vis the Arctic, it defined the parameters of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 200 nautical miles beyond internal waters, which provides the rights of a state to full and exclusive exploitation and usage of whatever resources are present in these zones. In addition, a country can claim ownership to resources lying beyond their EEZ if they are not in another country's EEZ and internal waters, and if these areas are an extension of their own continental shelf. Indeed, UNCLOS is the only legally and conventionally acceptable



means through which a country can claim a seabed as part of its EEZ or continental shelf. The USA not ratifying it means it cannot submit its claims vis-à-vis the Arctic (Petkunaite, 2011).

UNCLOS is particularly important concerning claims to the North Pole, specifically on the part of Russia, Canada, and Denmark. These states claim that parts of the North Pole or its entirety are part of their continental shelf, and as such under their sovereignty, claims which they have submitted to UNCLOS.

Indeed, the North Pole potentially represents the biggest source of tension, due to the legal ambiguity with regards to its ownership (Borgerson, 2008). In 2001, Russia submitted claim over the North Pole, nearly half of the Arctic Ocean, including the important Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev Ridge. It was asked to revise its claim and provide evidence to the UN (Hoel, 2014). Since the North Pole goes beyond the 200 nautical miles of any Arctic state, legitimizing a claim over the area required evidence that it is part of the country's continental shelf, evidence that a country needs to submit 10 years after ratifying UNCLOS. In 2007, the scientific expedition sent to provide that evidence planted the Russian flag on the North Pole sea floor, on the Lomonosov ridge, causing controversy and outrage specifically from Canada. A few days later, Russian bombers flew close to Canadian aerospace, in what seems to be an aggressive message (Borgerson, 2008). In December 2013, Canada in its turn submitted a claim over the North Pole as well. Both Russian and Canadian claims overlap with Denmark's claim, which it submitted in 2014 (Hoel, 2014). It is believed that the North Pole is rich in gas and oil resources. Furthermore, in the case of more Arctic melt, the area would potentially be home to lucrative fisheries (Lindholt, 2006).

The Arctic Council on the other hand was officially established in Ottawa, in 1996. It is an international forum that rallies the eight Arctic countries: USA, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. It is important to emphasize that the Arctic council is not an international organization, in the sense that no legally binding agreements are set by it as an independent body and it has very limited capacities for decision making (Oran Young, 2009). Indeed, it cannot even be described as an international regime, according to Oran Young. Rather it is a forum of discussion, with a decision making process that requires unanimity and is exclusive to Arctic member-states (Ottawa Declaration, 1996). It operates outside the boundaries of international law and could be described as a source of "soft-law" or

conventions (Koivurova, 2007). Its mandate is broad in theory, but in practice it currently focuses on environmental issues and economic development. Nevertheless, discussions in the council have not led to a unified regional sustainable development strategy (Crawford & co, 2008). Interestingly, the USA was adamant that the Arctic Council does not deal with security and military issues, and has opposed attempts to expand it meaningfully (Huebert, 2009; USA, 2009). It also does not directly deal with territorial disputes and claims (Koivurova, 2007). As such, the Arctic Council is not a forum where matters pertaining to sovereignty, ownership of resources, or security are dealt with or discussed. However, through a variety of programs, and projects that have brought issues to political attention, such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment or the Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment (Hoel, 2014). The Arctic Council facilitated the reaching of 2 legally binding agreements, one being the 2011 search and rescue agreement and the other being the 2013 oil spill response agreement, although both agreements only "represent the lowest common denominator on which states could agree." (Hoel, 2014: p.63).

In addition to bringing the eight Arctic states to the table, it also allows for other countries, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and non-governmental organizations to join as permanent observers. They can participate in discussion, but do not participate in the decision making process (Young, 2012). China, Japan, and South Korea have been recently admitted as permanent observers, while the EU's bid to join has been blocked by Canada, on the account of its seal ban. Nevertheless, seven permanent observer countries are part of the EU, including France, Germany, and the UK.

Members of the Arctic Council	Permanent Observers
Canada USA Russia Denmark Norway <span style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 10px;">}</span> Arctic Five	Germany France United Kingdom Netherlands Poland Spain Italy Singapore India China Japan South Korea
Iceland Sweden Finland	

Table 2. Arctic council members and permanent observers (source: Arctic Council)

Discussions roam on the possibility of expanding the Arctic Council's mandate, with a number of proponents wanting the organization to become more political and for its mandate to encompass security questions. Transforming the Arctic Council into a more inclusive and more independent political body with the ability to participate in decision making and to set legally binding decisions would push it closer to being a multilateral organization. In its current limited role however, both in terms of decision-making and in terms of scope of membership and mandate, the Arctic Council is closer to being a subnational regional forum which facilitates bilateral decision making processes, as opposed to a multilateral organization such as the UN or the WTO. We will expand on this when we discuss in detail the definitions of multilateralism in the section elaborating our theoretical framework.

The main source of Arctic governance thus remains primarily decided by its member states on the basis of bilateral discussions and agreements, as there is no overarching legal or political structure (Borgerson, 2008; Hoel, 2014). Indeed, many sources of tension or dispute in the Arctic Circle have been discussed and on occasion solved, on a bilateral basis. In general, the Arctic is marked by successful negotiations and cooperation (Lasserre, 2011; Petkunaite, 2011).

The Hans Island, which is situated between Canada and Greenland, has been the subject of dispute between Canada and Denmark for a long time (Hoel, 2014). This is due to potential oil resources found underneath it as well as its position in the Kennedy Channel, a potential shipping lane in the general Northwest Passage (Kirchofer, 2008; Huebert, 2011). While the ownership of the island has yet to be determined, both countries have emphasized bilateral discussion and a

peaceful process in solving the dispute. Another example lies in the Barents sea. This area, rich in fishing grounds and undiscovered petroleum reserves, has been in dispute between Norway and Russia for 40 years (Kirchofer, 2008). However after successful bilateral discussions, the two countries signed a maritime delimitation agreement in 2010 (Hoel, 2014).

The aforementioned Northwest Passage also presents a case of disputes or tensions being managed on a bilateral level. Canada lays claim over the Northwest Passage through its archipelago, declaring it to be Canadian internal waters. UNCLOS is unclear about the status of Canadian archipelagos (Kirchofer, 2008). The USA however does not recognize this claim of sovereignty, claiming it to be in international waters (Hoel, 2014). That being said, the USA and Canada have reached an agreement with regards to the deployment and passage of American military vessels through these waters, with Canadian permission. A similar ambiguity lies in the state of the North Sea Route, with Russia claiming it as part of its internal waters while other countries view it as international waters and others still remain neutral (Conley et al., 2013).

Another, informal, forum was established during the Ilulissat Declaration made by the five Arctic littoral states - the USA, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia - where they renewed their commitment to observing UNCLOS in the settlement of disputes and claims (Crawford & co, 2008). Of significance however was the exclusion of the three other Arctic states: Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. Many, including the three aforementioned excluded countries, viewed the declaration as a reinforcement of the sovereignty of the five states, referred to as "the Arctic Five", in matters pertaining to the Arctic Ocean and as a sidelining of the Arctic Council (Iceland, 2012).

## 2.4. The Main Actors




Figure 4. Maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region (source: Durham University)

The Arctic, due to its complexity and the broad implications that climate change incur, is home to multiple actors ranging from international organizations, to NGOs and private companies. However, for the purposes of our paper, we are going to focus primarily on states, which are the main decision making actors in the circumpolar region. The main actors that we are going to study in this paper will be the eight Arctic states, which are the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia, from 1996 till 2014.

In addition to the 8 Arctic States, we will also look at non-Arctic states and polities who have an interest in the region (Oran Young, 2009). We will look at the EU as a whole, even though it was denied permanent observer status in the Council in 2013. We believe it is still pertinent to do so however considering seven permanent observers are members of the EU, in addition to Denmark, Sweden, and Finland being member states. The EU's interests in the Arctic are significant and while there is no common European foreign policy, there is more or less a shared direction and perspective with regards to the region among its member states that we believe it pertinent and useful to consider them all collectively (Maurer, 2012). We will also look at China's Arctic policy, considering it has been admitted as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council in 2013, and that its role in the region is increasing (Campbell, 2012). We will also consider Japan and South Korea who have also been admitted as permanent members in the Council in 2013. These non-Arctic states have a vested interest in the Arctic, and it would be interesting to see their narrative and stance with regards to the region, while being exterior to it.

We will rely primarily on official state documents and statements underlining each country's Arctic policy stance, in addition to scholarly articles to help us interpret these documents and statements. As we stated before, we will be looking at documents and statements to see which signal it gives with regards to the stance and ideology that is adopted. A secondary source would be to look at actions of some symbolic significance, such as the US not ratifying UNCLOS or being the biggest opponent to politicizing the Arctic Council, and to contextualize them within a broader policy stance.

We will briefly present the history of Arctic involvement of each actor.

## Canada

Canada's involvement in the Arctic is a long and historic one, beginning with its purchase of Northwestern territories from the Hudson Bay Company in 1870. The Arctic became of critical importance on a military level during the Cold War, so much so that the USA and Canada established NORAD, a military bilateral agreement and cooperation effort to monitor the northern aerospace and to coordinate military activities over the Arctic. Despite the tensions between the USA and Canada dating back to the 1960s with regards to the ambiguities surrounding the waters around the Canadian archipelago, which Canada claims to be internal waters while the US considers them international waters, bilateral agreements in 1988 helped reduce that tension, but it does not solve the root cause of the problem or clearly define the legal status of these waters (Laserre, 2011; Huebert, 2011). Another source of tension with the USA is an as of yet unresolved dispute over parts of the Beaufort Sea (Petkunaite 2011; see figure 4). Nevertheless, the two states remain militarily tied, although Canada has been opposed to the idea of NATO involvement in the Arctic (Rynning, 2013; Coffey, 2012).

In 1994 a special joint committee in the Canadian House of Commons and senate proposes the creation of an Arctic Council, with the aims to rally states in the Arctic Circle. The Council was thus established in 1996, in Ottawa, with the aim to "promote coordination, cooperation, and interaction among Arctic states" (Ottawa declaration, 1996). Canada was instrumental in the creation and establishment of the Arctic council, and became its first chair at its inception (Dolata, 2012). On November 6th 2003, Canada ratified UNCLOS, giving it until 2013 to submit its claims over an extended continental shelf alongside required evidence. On May 28th 2008, Canada along with the rest of the 5 Arctic coastal states, adopted the Ilulissat Declaration, which in essence reaffirmed the preeminence of Arctic coastal states in the management of the Arctic ocean. While investments in oil and gas explorations had dwindled in the 1990s, there is an increased interest in potential opportunities in the high North, though there is no active efforts to exploit or explore potential oil and gas provinces in the region as of yet (EY, 2013). However, the exploitation of mineral wealth, in particular diamonds, in Northwest Territory has already contributed to economic growth (Crawford et al., 2008).

In 2000, the Canadian government releases a policy statement with regards to the Arctic, called *The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy*. In 2004, the Canadian government

announced its desire to develop, for the first time, a comprehensive strategy for the North. This document, entitled *Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, was published in 2009. It was supplemented by an additional statement on Arctic Policy, entitled *Statement on Canada's Arctic Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy abroad*, which was published in 2010.

Canada's involvement in the Arctic has been, at least in terms of rhetoric, accrued over the years and Canada presents an important player in the circumpolar region.

## USA

In contrast, the USA's involvement and interest in the Arctic has been limited in terms of both policy and rhetoric (Borgerson, 2008). During the Cold War, the Arctic was primarily seen through the lenses of security. This emphasis on security did not wane even after the Cold War, but American economic and political involvement in the region has been limited (Offerdal, 2014: 78-80).

As part of its national security driven paradigms, the USA views maritime safety and access as paramount, and as such has argued that the Northwest Passage and parts of the Northern Sea Route to be international straits, which challenges the interpretation of both Canada and Russia respectively (Offerdal, 2014: 79). This is one of several disputes with Canada, some of which are unresolved as is the case with the Beaufort sea. Nevertheless, the two countries remain strategic partners, in particular in the realm of security through NORAD.

The USA supported the establishment of the Arctic Council, but was the most outspoken about keeping its role apolitical and unrelated to security matters (Koivurova, 2007; USA, 2009). It also, paradoxically, emphasizes the importance of Arctic states to respect and follow UNCLOS' rules and procedures, while being the only Arctic state to not have ratified it in order to protect its freedom of action (Petkunaite 2011). This is seen as a major weakness in the US' Arctic policy, including by the Bush and Obama administrations (USA 2009, 2013), as it deprives it from submitting its own claims or to criticize others for not adhering to it (Offerdal, 2014; Borgerson, 2008). The USA, as a littoral state, was also part of the Ilulissat Declaration, but has been one of the least committed, with a policy that has been described by Offerdal as a "wait and see" approach (2014: 80). Nonetheless, Arctic Alaska holds the potentially largest reserve of



undiscovered oil in the Arctic (EY, 2013), which is seen by the government as vital for the US's energy security (USA, 2013).

The two principal documents that the US government published with regards to the Arctic are *National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive* published in 2009 and *The National Strategy for the Arctic Region* in 2013.

## **Russia**

Russia's interest and involvement in the Arctic has waned immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Concerned primarily with domestic unrest, economic crises, and political decentralization, the government of Boris Yeltsin was minimally involved in Arctic issues (Young, 2012)<sup>5</sup>. However, with Putin's presidency starting from 2000, there has been a renewed interest in the Arctic, politically and economically. Indeed, Russia is believed to hold the lion's share of all Arctic oil and gas resources (around 52% of all total undiscovered resources), while having the largest undiscovered gas reserve in the region (EY, 2013). Russia's Arctic territory now represents an important part of its economy, with as much as 20 percent of its GDP and 22 percent of its total exports being generated in the Arctic (Zysk, 2010).

Russia was the first nation to submit a claim to UNCLOS, which it had ratified, with regards to the North Pole in 2001. Its claim was rejected and it was asked to submit more evidence (Petkunaite 2011). The expedition meant to gather more evidence planted the Russian flag on the Lomonosov Ridge in 2007, an act which many saw inflamed a race to the Arctic, despite official Russian reassurances to the contrary (Offerdal, 2014: 84-85). This act was protested greatly from Canada (Offerdal, 2014).

Russia has engaged in international cooperation in the Arctic in forums such as the Arctic Council, the Barents Council, and the Northern Dimension. It has also participated in bilateral discussions and negotiations, primarily with Norway with whom it was able to resolve a number of disputes in the Barents Sea and set a delimitation line in 2010 (Petkunaite 2011; Kristian Åtland, 2010; Hoel, 2014). As its other 5 littoral counterparts, Russia signed the Ilulissat

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<sup>5</sup> It must also be reminded that Russia at the time was preoccupied with threats of internal secession, namely from Chechnya.

Declaration, and remains adamant about maintaining regional sovereign states as in the primary actors in the region. It has as such opposed initiatives to politicize the Arctic Council or expand it to become an international decision-making organization (Offerdal, 2014).

Russia released several documents that are of interest to us. The first is *Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020* adopted in 2001, which makes mention of the Arctic. The second is *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020*, published by the Ministry of Defense in 2009.

While it does not focus on the Arctic, it provides a broad understanding of strategic priorities and it does make mention of the Arctic on several occasions, highlighting its importance. The second and more important document, written by the Russian Security Council advising the Executive branch, deals with the Arctic specifically and is entitled *Foundations Of The Russian Federation's State Policy In The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond*, which was approved by President Medvedev in 2008.

## **Denmark**

Through Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Denmark is an Arctic state that speaks on behalf of the semi-autonomous islands in international forums (Offerdal, 2014: 81). Denmark's involvement in the Arctic is comprehensive, focusing on climate change, economic development, and sovereignty and security matters. Furthermore, Denmark claims part of the Lomonosov Ridge and has submitted its claim to UNCLOS in 2014, 10 years after having ratified it, in 2004. Denmark is in fact the only country in the EU capable of filing a claim to shelf areas beyond the 200 nautical mile zone (Kristian Åtland, 2010). Attempts to explore Greenland for hydrocarbons have been largely disappointed, however it is thought that there are sizeable offshore undiscovered resources near the island, that could be potentially exploitable (EY,2013).

While Denmark has been a strong proponent of the special status of the five littoral states, it has also actively supported the expansion of the Arctic council's role (Denmark, 2011; Offerdal, 2014: 81-82). The Kingdom has supported the EU's bid to join the Arctic Council as a permanent observer, but is ambivalent about the EU acquiring too important a role, which might compromise on its sovereignty (Offerdal, 2014: 82). Moreover, some believe that Greenland has aspiration for independence, which would turn Denmark into a non-Arctic state (Rynning, 2013). This particular dynamic is bound to shape Danish policies towards the Arctic.

Denmark has published its first Arctic strategy in 2011, entitled *Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011– 2020*. Its ministry of Foreign affairs has also made several statements about the region.

## **Norway**

As a member of NATO, Norway has been involved in the securitization of the Arctic during the Cold War. Its interest has been renewed as the turn of the century when evidence of global warming and melting surfaced, opening up the possibility for petroleum exploration, fisheries, and new waterways. Indeed, when measured against other Arctic states, Norway's involvement in the Arctic, militarily and otherwise, has been significant (Offerdal, 2014: 82). In fact, Norway was the first Arctic state to declare the High North as its most important strategic priority, in 2005. As the 5th largest oil exporter and the 2nd largest gas exporter, Norway is thought to hold additional reserves of undiscovered oil and especially gas (EY, 2013).

Norway does not have major unsettled boundary issues in the region, but suffers from ambiguities with regards to the Svalbard Island. The island had been recognized as Norwegian territory at the Svalbard treaty of 1920, which is now internationally recognized by most states. However, not all states agree with Norway's interpretation of the treaty, which posits that Norway's EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the island itself, meaning that all fisheries and potential petroleum resources within that EEZ would fall under its management (Hoel, 2014). Russia, as well as Iceland, Portugal, and Spain have rejected this interpretation of the treaty and argue against Norway having an EEZ 200 nautical miles around the island (Norway, 2009). Furthermore, it has managed to resolve disputes over the demarcation line in the Barents Sea bilaterally with Russia in 2010 as seen previously (Kristian Åtland, 2010).

Norway is party to regional cooperation forums such as the Northern Dimension, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Nordic Council. It has supported the Arctic Council as the primary forum of international cooperation, and has assisted Sweden and Denmark in strengthening its institutions, albeit without supporting its transformation into a decision-making supra-national political body. Norway has also supported more EU involvement (Offerdal, 2010), as well as NATO involvement (Coffey, 2012), while also emphasizing the importance of its bilateral relations with Russia (Offerdal, 2014: 84-85).

The Norwegian government published two documents highlight its Arctic strategy. The first is The Norwegian Government's *High North Strategy*, issued in 2006, the first among arctic nations to do so. The second is *New Building Blocks in the North: The next Step in the Government's High North Strategy*, published in 2009.

## **Sweden**

Sweden is one of the least involved Arctic states in the Arctic, if not the least (Offerdal, 2014: 87). It was the last Arctic states, other than Iceland, to adopt an Arctic strategy, having done so only when it assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2011. Sweden's policy with regards to the Arctic has been described as adhoc.

Nevertheless, during its chairmanship of the council, it worked to solidify some of its institutions and to establish a permanent secretariat (Young, 2012). It has also supported the inclusion of more observers in the Council, and has supported the development of an EU Arctic policy, though it is unclear what practical initiatives Sweden is taking to push the process forward (Offerdal, 2014: 87). Furthermore, Sweden participates in other regional forums such as the Northern Dimension and the Nordic council. On virtue of not being a littoral state with territory in the Arctic Ocean, Sweden was excluded from the Ilulissat Declaration, along with Finland and Iceland.

It has published *Sweden's Arctic Strategy* in 2011, and it is its only document dealing with the region.

## **Finland**

Finland has been actively seeking to draw the attention of the international community to northern issues for years (Offerdal, 2014: 87). It had initiated the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991, which is the forerunner of the Arctic Council. It has also introduced the Northern Dimension initiative in a bid to involve the EU in northern issues.

Finland has been actively promoting the involvement of the European Union in the Arctic, and seeks to expand the role of the Arctic Council. Alongside Sweden and Iceland, Finland was excluded from the Ilulissat declaration, on the basis of not being a littoral Arctic state. Finland is also heavily involved in Arctic research, as well as aiming to be a leader in Arctic maritime

technology, shipping, and mining (Offerdal, 2014: 87), a position which it held for decades (Huebert, 2009).

Finland has issues two official Arctic strategy documents. The first being *Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region*, in 2010. It has modified and expanded on it in 2013, in its new *Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013*, though the modifications pertain primarily to the internal management of Finland's Arctic territory, which the previous document had neglected.

## **Iceland**

Having been home to NATO airbases, Iceland had achieved a foreign policy identity revolving around the Cold War (Offerdal, 2014: 86). In light of this and new economic opportunities, Iceland has pushed for a re-imagined geo-strategic importance as an Arctic state.

It has been a strong supporter of the Arctic Council, and a critic of the Ilulissat declaration as a threat to cooperation within the Council as the primary forum for cooperation (Iceland, 2011). It has supported the bid of the EU, as well as East Asian states, most notably China with whom it has signed a Free Trade agreement in 2013, to become permanent observers of the Arctic Council.

Although the Arctic has become one of Iceland's main foreign policy priorities, it has yet to publish an official comprehensive Arctic strategy document. However, its parliamentary resolution with regards to the Arctic, made in 2011, is very revealing of its perception and narrative towards the region.

## **The European Union**

Having 3 member-states in the Arctic Region, as well as 7 member-states participating in the Arctic Council as permanent observers, EU involvement in the Arctic is seen as natural and legitimate. In addition, the EU itself is involved in the Arctic research and is concerned about the effects of climate change, in addition to being dependent on Norway and Russia for 44% of its oil and 58% of its gas (Canadian International Council Report, 2011). However, despite issuing several policy documents, the Arctic has not become a main priority area for the EU and its policy in the area remains general (Offerdal, 2014: 89; Offerdal, 2010). This, in spite of the potential economic implications of the region, such as the opening of the Northern Sea Route, seeing how the EU's imports and exports to China are on the rise (Blunden, 2012).

The EU has advocated to become a permanent observer in the Arctic council, however its membership was declined, primarily because of the European Commission's suggested a ban on seal products, primarily aimed at Canadian seal hunters, which Canada argued negatively impacted indigenous populations (Canadian International Council Report, 2011). Furthermore, European representatives have been vocal with regards to Arctic issues, such as petroleum exploitation, in ways that were seen as infringing on the sovereignty of Arctic states. Moreover, the EU like the USA advocate freedom of navigation on the seas, which is in opposition to both Russian and Canadian claims of the Northern Sea Route and the Northwestern Passage being internal waters, respectively.

The EU did not issue a comprehensive Arctic strategy yet, but it the European Commission, European Council, and European Parliament have all issues statements and documents highlighting the perception of the EU towards the circumpolar region.

## **China**

China has not developed an official Arctic strategy, though debate rages within the scholarship as to whether the Chinese government is operating by a strategic Arctic agenda (Wright, 2011). China's position with regards to the Arctic has been described as "low-profile" on the grounds of it not having any territory or claim in the Arctic (Campbell, 2012). However, with the opening of new commercial passages which will prove paramount to a country that depends on shipping for nearly half its GDP (Jakobson, 2010), and the availability of petroleum resources that would be vital to its increased energy needs as the second largest consumer of oil (Rainwater, 2013), China has a vested interest in the region, and would additionally acquire international prestige from its involvement (Lassere, 2010).

China has been involved in polar research in Antarctica and the Arctic for decades, indeed before the idea of an Arctic race became popular in media (Lassere, 2010). This expertise in polar research is used to push for China's legitimacy as an Arctic actor (Offerdal, 2014: 90; Curtis Wright, 2011). China has collaborated with Russia in the exploitation of gas in Northern Siberia, which is part of Russia's Arctic territory, in order to satisfy its energy needs. In addition, China is involved in many bilateral trade agreements with Arctic states, such as Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Canada (Campbell, 2012). Some suggest that Chinese overtures to such countries are made, at least in part, with access to the Arctic and its resources in mind (Rynning, 2013).

China's bid to become a permanent observer in the Arctic council has been accepted in 2013, though it is not clear whether it will develop or publish a comprehensive Arctic strategy anytime soon.

## **Japan**

Like China, Japan has a history of polar research, and a vested interest in the region on account of climate change, new energy resources, and new maritime passages. Indeed, it has invested in polar research and maritime studies, showing an interest in the potentially new commercial passages that would its oil imports from Venezuela and the gulf of Mexico cheaper due to decreased shipping costs (Huebert, 2011). As a maritime nation, Japan would have a strong interest in the new commercial passages, in particular the North Sea Route (Sinclair, 2014).

Japan has not developed or issued an Arctic strategy, but it has been admitted into the Arctic Council as a permanent observer in 2013.

## **South Korea**

Being a leader in ship production and shipping technologies, including icebreakers, South Korea also has a vested interest in the Arctic as new maritime passages are revealed. Indeed, South Korean companies have become important competitors to Finnish and Russian companies, who had traditionally been leading builders of ice-capable vessels (Huebert, 2009)

South Korea, like its Japanese and Chinese neighbors, has been admitted into the Arctic Council as a permanent observer, although it has yet to develop a comprehensive official Arctic strategy.

## **3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses**

As our paper is focused on explaining the factors influencing a country's decision to adopt a unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral stance, it is crucial to define those concepts that are core to our study. But of equal importance is to first specify what we mean by "policy stance" and what perspective we adopt for the study in general.

James Caporaso notes that 'multilateralism' "comes in the form of an 'ism,' suggesting a belief or ideology rather than a straightforward state of affairs" (Caporaso, 1992). This statement defines the framework of our own study. We seek to look at multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism as beliefs, ideologies, "stances", and not as a tangible specific set of policies, decisions, or actions. What we aim to accomplish is a study of narratives and discourse, of the broad signals that each country sends, and not of explicit decisions and policies per se. As such, reaching the conclusion that a country has adopted a unilateral stance does not mean that the country in question does not engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperation on a day to day basis. But rather, that we argue that its narrative, rhetoric, and signals carry with them a unilateral undertone; that it holds a unilateral stance. The nature of the core-concepts we have elected to use as lenses signify that we will interpret countries' stances based on statements with regards to broad questions of Arctic governance, security matters, disputes, and international cooperation. While the ecological and human dimensions of the Arctic are of paramount importance and are part of every states' Arctic strategy, we will consider them only insofar as they inform of the state's broader stance. We conceive, for the purposes of our study, that multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism are broad stances pertaining to foreign policy in general with regards to the Arctic, and not bound to specific domains or areas.

We must also stress that we are undertaking a study of narratives and signals, and not a study of intentions, if such a thing is even a possible on a state-scale. As such, claiming that a state seems to hold a unilateral stance does not signify that it engages in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in bad faith, any more so than a state with a multilateral stance does the same necessarily in good faith or with genuine conviction. While we realize that words like "unilateralism" and "multilateralism" carry heavy ethical and judgmental connotations in everyday vernacular, we try to employ them not as value judgments but rather as observations of undertones behind countries' narratives. We fully realize, given the ambiguities behind international relations and policy-making, as well as those of narratives and rhetoric, that our study is limited to being a necessarily subjective interpretation of data and of signals.

With that framework in mind, we will define the concepts of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism as policy stances. These three terms can have many and ambiguous definitions, and it is difficult to define them separately, especially when there are no universally accepted



definitions for terms that tend to carry pejorative or positive connotations. Rather, they are easier to define when compared and put in contrast with each other (Bernhard Jansen, 2000).

Unilateralism can be expressed legally or politically, according to Pierre-Marie Dupuy (2000). As stated beforehand, since our interest lies less in unilateral legal action and more in unilateral rhetoric, we will focus on the latter dimension of unilateralism: political. He provides an example of political unilateralism, in the influence exerted on international cooperation to further the state's goals such as the USA's position with regards to UNCLOS. Unilateralism can be described as the advocacy of a foreign policy that is undertaken primarily or solely based on domestic decision-making processes, which is often justified on the basis of national security or sovereignty (Powell, 2003). Indeed, Caporaso (1992) defines multilateralism as embodying the principle of "diffuse reciprocity", which is an understanding that states stand to benefit in the long run over many issues as opposed to all the time at every issue. John Ruggie adds that multilateralism would thus require flexible domestic decision making processes that do not solely aim to achieve national benefits at all times (John Ruggie, 1993). In contrast, unilateralism can be associated with the desire of states to maximize their national interests in most or all their international endeavors. Unilateralism displays suspicion towards inclusive international accords, on the basis of limiting freedom of action and sovereignty (Gabriella Blum, 2008). It can exhibit itself in non-compliance with international norms or law, or indeed in acts outside structured international processes (Hakimi, 2014). The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been described by many as an example of applied unilateralism (Powell, 2003; Kelly, 2003; Blum, 2008; Hakimi, 2014). Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 can also be seen as an example of unilateralism expressed in action.

In contrast, multilateralism advocates a decision making process involving three or more states (John Ruggie, 1993), based on principles of indivisibility, generalized principle of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity (Caporaso, 1992). Indivisibility signifies that members collectively stand for one another, where for example an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Generalized principles of conduct refer to the set of norms and conventions of acceptable state behavior that are applicable to all equally. Finally, diffuse reciprocity emphasizes long-term interests of the whole over short term private interests. These principles, in order to be applied, would require member states to necessarily sacrifice their domestic decision-making processes to a degree, to

the benefit of collective decision-making processes. However, both Ruggie and Caporaso draw the distinction between the institution of multilateralism and multilateral institutions. Multilateral institutions may or may not enshrine the institution of multilateralism as a goal. For the purposes of our paper, we will use the definition of multilateralism as a narrative, to be the promotion of multilateral institutions as a mean rather than an end, through which states achieve their interests (Lisa L. Martin, 1992). However, multilateral rhetoric can use elements of the definition of multilateralism as an institution or principle to advance its arguments, regardless of whether it genuinely or tangibly embraces such principles or not. Moreover, multilateralism, while not strictly speaking defined by the number of adherents, tends to be viewed as best expressed through universality, which is the will to include all or most of the world, such as GATT, the WTO, and the UN (Caporaso, 1992; Blum, 2008). Indeed, inclusion of non-governmental and civil society actors is also a sign of multilateralism (Witte et al., 2000; Motoyo Kamiya, 2007).

Bilateralism on the other hand is basically defined as interactions between two states. For the purposes of this paper however, we will draw upon the literature that associates bilateralism with regionalism. Alexander Thompson and Daniel Verdier (2014) relate bilateralism with the creation of a "club good" which distinguishes it from multilateralism and multilateral institutions such as the Kyoto Protocol for example, which regard their mandate as a public universal good (2014). Regional trade agreements are seen as a prime example of bilateralism at work (Thompson et al., 2014; Blum, 2008). We thus draw the link between bilateralism and "region building." Region building has been described as a phenomenon based on "natural" factors such as geography, culture, and language, or in contrast as a political and artificial process of establishing a regional identity (E.C.H Keskitalo, 2004). Keskitalo argues that the process of region-building in the Arctic was primarily political, and Neumann's research and work on the political process of region-building indicates a use of "othering" in its formation, by demarcating a line between those "inside" and those "outside" (Neumann, 1999). In addition, region building has been described as leading towards either regionalism, where decision-making is based on top-down arrangements, or regionalization, where decision-making is invested in the bottom. We will not seek to determine whether the Arctic demonstrates traits pertaining to regionalization or regionalism, or whether the states in question are seeking to establish either of the two possible dynamics. Rather, we will look at bilateral stances of states as those seeking to emphasize and perpetuate the demarcation of the Arctic as a political region, excluding to one degree or another

the rest of the world. Bilateral region building could however assume two, contradictory forms, that of supra-national regionalism / integration or sub-national. The former refers to an instituted regionalism that ends up transcending nation-states in place of common decision-making processes, while the latter refers to a level of regional cooperation that remains subjected to the sovereignty and autonomy of its members (Edward T. Swaine, 2001). Indeed, Blum (2008) argues that bilateral treaties and regional trade agreements and organizations are attractive because many involve limited participation and the ability of states to retain autonomy. In the context of the Arctic, bilateral region building is sub-national, where the regional institutions and norms do not demand a sacrifice of the exercise of sovereignty, particularly in areas such as security.

In summary, we define a unilateral stance and narrative as emphasizing sovereignty, autonomy, national interests, and national security above all else. Bilateralism would adopt a region-building discourse, defining the Arctic as a political region where its members hold primacy, all the while maintaining it at a subnational level, favoring inter-state cooperation within and outside the realm of international organizations without an infringement on domestic decision-making processes. And finally, multilateralism as a narrative would be based on multilateral institution-building, as well as using principles such as diffuse-reciprocity and universal inclusion to advance the position and interests of its proponents.

In order to ascertain the policy stances of Arctic stakeholders, we will rely primarily on official documents and statements. Because our study focalizes on those three core concepts as ideologies, narratives, and stances, as opposed to a collection of specific policies and actions legal or otherwise, it will necessarily be interpretative and subjective. However, it will be grounded in qualitative methodology and supplemented by quantitative analysis, as we will explain in the methodology section.

Since this is a study of narratives and stance, it is worthwhile to stress that rhetoric need not be reflected in actions at all times. Indeed, public discourse may take symbolisms geared towards domestic audiences primarily (Offerdal, 2014). On the other hand, some actions of symbolic or practical significance may be contextualized within a broader stance. For instance, American opposition to the Arctic Council having a security role can be associated with a broader stance

emphasizing the importance of national security and the ability of the USA to maintain flexibility in order to protect it.

Unilateralism	Bilateralism	Multilateralism
- Sovereignty - National / State Security - National Interests	- Region-building - Subnational Institutions - Bilateral cooperation	- Universality - Institution-Building

Table 3. The different dimensions of Unilateralism, Bilateralism, and Multilateralism.

The importance of the Arctic as the last untapped undiscovered oil and gas reserve in the world, in addition to its wealth of other geostrategic and economic resources, has led to media sensationalism, with claims of a "race to the Arctic" ensuing (nationalpost.com, 2014; Newsweek.com, 2015; Radio Canada International, 2014). This sensationalism has been further inflamed by actions and events such as the planting of the Russian flag in the Losomonov ridge in 2007. In such a context, claims of the Arctic becoming a new battleground between powers has emerged, allegedly driving the militarization of the region and the pursuit of its resources (Borgerson, 2008; Huebert, 2009), even if there is no evidence of any substantial military buildup or militarization in the region (Frederic Lasserre, 2012; Hilde, 2013). The Arctic's attraction would supposedly have encouraged states to resort to more aggressive policies and rhetoric. Petroleum resources in particular are described as the primary fuel behind the Arctic's tensions. While this belief of a race to the Arctic has subsided a bit after 2009 (Frederic Lasserre, 2012), recent events in Crimea have had some repercussions on the region, with the Russian Foreign Minister not attending Canada's final Arctic Council meeting as chairman (globlanews.com, April 12, 2015).

The scholarship is thus divided between an interpretation of the Arctic as the home of a new battleground or race between great powers (Borgerson, 2008; Huebert, 2009), and an interpretation of the Arctic as a region marked by international cooperation and stability (Frederic Lassere, 2012; Hilde, 2013). The former school of thought argues that with Arctic meltdown, new resources are being uncovered, which is allegedly animating a race to claim them. Hydrocarbon resources in particular are given great importance, even though most known and undiscovered resources lie within undisputed territories (Claes et al, 2014). In addition, in light of China's increased participation in Arctic affairs, it is presumed that China's dependence

on oil and gas for its exponentially growing energy needs would encourage it to adopt an aggressive stance (Wright, 2011).

We derive our hypotheses from interpretation that hydrocarbon resources in particular are animating a race to the Arctic, a new "great game", as argued by Borgerson and Huebert. The implication is that the presence of hydrocarbon related factors, such as the existence of vast reserves of discovered and undiscovered oil, or dependence of GDP on oil, are more likely to encourage a state to adopt a unilateral stance.

Our first hypothesis is that *the presence of oil reserves in one's territory or claimed territory is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance* (H1). Our second hypothesis is that *oil dependence is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance* (H2).

Our third hypothesis stipulates that *the presence of gas reserves in one's territory or claimed territory is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance* (H3). Finally, the fourth hypothesis is that *Gas dependence is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance* (H4).

While our study is focused on narratives and not actions undertaken by states, if the school of thought that portrays the Arctic as an unfolding battleground is correct, one would expect that the same resources that incentivized such a race would also shape the narrative and foreign policy stances of states. Presumably, the presence and prospect of hydrocarbon resources would encourage a state to adopt a unilateral stance.

We further elaborate on each hypothesis by adding sub-propositions to each hypothesis:

*H1 - The presence of oil reserves in one's territory or claimed territory is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance:*

*H1a - The presence of known oil reserves in the Arctic is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance.*

*H1b - The higher the share of Arctic oil reserves in total oil reserves the more likely it is for a country to adopt a unilateral stance*

*H1c- The presence of undiscovered oil reserves is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance.*

*H2- Oil dependence is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance:*

*H2a - A country with a larger share of oil rent in its GDP is more likely to adopt a unilateral stance*

*H2b- Exporters of crude oil are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance*

*H2c- Importers of crude oil are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance*

*H2d- The increase of price of oil is more likely to encourage states to adopt a unilateral policy*

*H3 - The presence of gas reserves in one's territory or claimed territory is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance:*

*H3a - The presence of known gas reserves is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance.*

*H3b - The higher the share of Arctic gas reserves in total gas reserves the more likely it is for a country to adopt a unilateral stance*

*H3c- The presence of undiscovered gas reserves is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance.*

*H4- Gas dependence is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance:*

*H4a- A country with a larger share of gas rent in its GDP is more likely to adopt a unilateral stance.*

*H4b- Exporters of dry natural gas are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance.*

*H4c- Importers of dry natural gas are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance.*

## **4. Methodology**

Our methodology is that of a mixed approach combining qualitative and quantitative analysis. Through qualitative analysis, which we explain in the next section, we will qualify the policy stances of Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders as either unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral by interpreting official documents and public narratives. After qualifying each state, we will then test the hypotheses to see whether any such factors influence the adoption of a particular policy stance.

## 4.1. Qualitative Methodology

Our aim is to analyze and interpret official documents and statements, and to link them to the concepts of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism. To do so, we have relied on and been inspired by the open / axial / core coding method to codify and link concepts, dimensions, and sub-dimensions that has been described by Anselm L. Strauss, in *Qualitative analysis for social scientists* (1987).

Since our study is focalized around the core concepts of unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism, we have applied coding to derive sub-dimensions and dimensions from official documents that can then be linked to the core concepts. This linkage is based in large part on the contributions of the literature that has helped us define these core-concepts. Each one of the three core concepts was associated with several dimensions, which were demonstrated in documents through sub-dimensions or elements, as seen in table 3.

Table 4 illustrates the different categories. Through our reading of public documents and statements, we have come across different elements, which we were able to associate with broader categories, which illustrate dimensions of each of our core concepts. Arctic member-states have all published documents and issues statements highlighting their general policy with regards to the region. Those documents are revealing of their priority areas, what they emphasize, what they reject or disapprove of, and how they perceive and define the Arctic.

From them, we observed elements such as sovereignty being prioritized, rhetoric about national identity, international organizations being limited politically, resource ownership being seen as a source of competitive advantage...etc. These elements, we were able to link with broader concepts, dimensions which characterize our core-concepts as we have seen from the literature. The aforementioned elements were linked with the concepts of Sovereignty, National Security, and National Interests, which are dimensions of the core concept of Unilateralism.

Likewise, elements such as promoting the vision of the Arctic as a political region and club good, the limiting of international organizations to be subnational, and bilateral cooperation being emphasized as the primary source of decision making are linked with the broader

categories of Region-Building, Subnational Region, and Bilateral Cooperation, which themselves are different dimensions of the core concept of bilateralism as we have defined it.

Finally, sub-dimensions such as presenting the Arctic as a global issue, the inclusion of outside actors, the will to expand the Arctic Council's role to the political and security spheres, and the establishment or promotion of diffuse reciprocity lead up to the broader dimensions of Universality and Institution-Building, which define the core concept of Multilateralism.

An obstacle is present however in the fact that there exists little to no official documents or statements with regards to the Arctic prior to 2000. In order to qualify the foreign policy stances of states during those periods, we will rely primarily on scholarly studies describing them, and presume that no fundamental changes in rhetoric have occurred if they are not observed in the literature. It is an admittedly limited method, but one used out of necessity.



Core concepts	Dimensions	Sub-dimensions / elements
Unilateralism	Sovereignty	Sovereignty as main priority
		Sovereignty outside the scope of international organizations
		Arctic as vital for national identity
	National Security	Security as main priority
		Security outside the mandate of international organizations
		Freedom of action
	National Interests	resource ownership as main priority
		Resource ownership and management outside the scope of international organizations
		Importance of Arctic in national competitive advantage
Bilateralism	Region-building	Arctic as political region
		Arctic as club good / excluding outsiders
	Subnational institutions	International organizations limited to subnational role
		Interstate cooperation outside of international institutions
	Bilateral cooperation	Bilateral cooperation as main priority
		Bilateral cooperation as main source of decision making
Multilateralism	Universality	Arctic as a global issue
		Inclusion of non-Arctic states
		Arctic to be governed by more global institutions or frameworks (UN)
		Inclusion of NGOs
	Institution-Building	Expanding the role of the Arctic Council as a decision making body
		Generalized principles of conduct / equality of rights
		Diffuse reciprocity / national interests not given priority at all times

Table 4. Qualitative Coding.

## 4.2. Quantitative Methodology

Supplementing our qualitative methodology is our quantitative one, which will attempt to explain the adoption of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral stances from the years 1996 till 2014, which will be our dependent variable, using oil and gas related factors as independent variables.

Our primary sources of data are the US Energy Information Administration for data pertaining to total oil and gas reserves, crude oil exports and imports, and natural dry gas exports and imports, the World Bank for data pertaining to oil and gas rents as part of the GDP, and the US Geological Surveys of 2000 and 2008 for the amount of known oil and gas reserves in the Arctic, and the undiscovered technically recoverable oil and gas reserves in the Arctic. The USGS assesses potential resources by petroleum provinces, without taking into account political borders. As such, we cannot ascribe undiscovered resources in shared provinces to individual countries with precision, forcing us to resort to allocating the undiscovered reserves in shared provinces equally, a method which was used by the Ernst and Young report (EY, 2013). Finally, the British Petroleum dataset provided us with the price of oil and its evolution over the past 2 decades. These sources are listed in the annex.

To test our hypotheses, we will run two logistic regressions, with the dependent variable being "Policy\_Uni" with 0= non-unilateral and 1= unilateral, one for oil related variables, testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, and the other for gas related ones, testing Hypotheses 3 and 4.

We will supplement this with running two ordinal logistic models, one for oil related variable and one for gas related variables, where we will treat the dependent variable, "Policy", as ordinal, with Unilateralism = 0, Bilateralism = 1, and Multilateralism = 2. Doing so will allow us to see the impact of independent variables on policy changes, and whether we can use these variables to accurately predict the policy stance of states for each year. We shall do so after running the appropriate test for the proportional odds assumption, which posits that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same, making the use of ordinal logistic regressions appropriate.

On a theoretical level, we believe that considering unilateralism, bilateralism, and multilateralism to be ordinal variables, in this order, to be legitimate. While each stance is different from the other, certain patterns can be discerned. We observe for instance in bilateral rhetoric a stronger emphasis being put on cooperation, when compared to unilateralism, while multilateral rhetoric would place an even higher emphasis on cooperation than bilateralism. Another elements that can make us see these stances in an ordinal way is the level of institution-building, with unilateralism preferring minimal institutions to maximize freedom of action, bilateralism favoring stronger institutional arrangements but without them necessarily being supra-national, and finally multilateralism promoting more political institutions that would carry a stronger weight. The number of adherents can also further justify the ordinal method, as unilateralism is focused primarily on the country in question, while a region-building bilateralism stresses on inter-state cooperation within a club, and multilateralism would display the tendency of universality and the desire to be as inclusive as possible.

In order to avoid issues of multicollinearity and pairwise correlations, we have elected to run two separate models, one for oil related variables and the other for gas related variables. This is because in the context of the Arctic, oil rich countries tend to also be gas rich and share similar trends, creating a risk of multicollinearity. This separation can also be an interesting way to compare and contrast the importance of oil and gas. Since Lindholt et al. (2011) suggests that gas will be less relevant in the future, perhaps we will be able to observe some pertinent differences between the results of the two models.

The independent variables related to oil that we will use for logistic and ordinal logistic regressions are the price of oil (West Texas Intermediate; \$/barrel), the total reserves of known Arctic oil (bbo), the share of proved Arctic oil in total reserves (%), undiscovered technically recoverable oil in Arctic (bbo), total exports and imports of crude oil (Thousand Barrels Per Day), and finally the oil rent's share of GDP (%).

The gas-related independent variables on the other hand are the total reserves of known Arctic gas (tcf), the share of proved Arctic gas in total reserves (%), undiscovered technically recoverable gas in Arctic (Trillion Cubic Feet), the total exports and imports of natural dry gas (tcf), and finally the gas rent's share of GDP (%).

After running the two ordinal logistic models, we will display the predicted probabilities for each model, to see whether we can make accurate predictions by relying on these sets of variables.

## 5. Results and Findings

### 5.1. Country by Country Analysis

After explaining our methodology, we will now proceed to do a country-by-country qualitative analysis and interpretation of official documents, statements, and actions, and rank the concepts invoked to derive their foreign policy stance.

#### Canada

As seen beforehand, the Canadian government has published 3 official documents, including a comprehensive northern strategy, alongside a number of statements and general actions, from which we can determine its policy stance as well as its evolution across time.

Canada's first statement on its policy for the North, *The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy*, is quite revealing to Canada's Arctic policy stance in the early 2000s. The document strongly emphasizes cooperation between Canada and its circumpolar neighbors:

It lists Canada's objectives as follows:

1. to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and Aboriginal peoples;
2. to assert and ensure the preservation of Canada's sovereignty in the North;
3. to establish the Circumpolar region as a vibrant geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based international system; and
4. to promote the human security of northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic.

It also states that the concern over sovereignty has been mitigated, and that cooperation has become the name of the game in an increasingly globalized and interactive world. However, it puts great emphasis on cooperation between Arctic states, with limited mention of including the rest of the world in the decision making process.

Indeed, the document indicated in several passages the existence and maturing of a "circumpolar community."

This idea is further promoted by the Speech from the Throne in 2004, where it declared that Canada's first comprehensive strategy will, among other objectives, "*promote cooperation with the international circumpolar community.*" These elements can be interpreted as being advancing the Arctic as a political region and excluding the rest of the world from meaningful participation.

We also observe the failure of the document to mention strengthening the Arctic Council as a decision making body. In fact, in its section entitled "Strengthening the Arctic Council", it makes no mention of increasing its mandate and granting it the ability to make legally binding decisions, but rather concentrates on issues of funding and granting resources and support to the permanent indigenous participants. In addition, the document also underlines the importance behind bilateral cooperation with Russia, outside the boundaries of international organizations. This demonstrates a desire to keep the Arctic Council as a limited, albeit valued, subnational institution, and a desire to maintain bilateral cooperation as the primary decision making mechanism.

The document does however emphasize the importance of growing a civil society in the North, as a body that could potentially influence "*the decision-making process on Arctic issues in major world capitals.*" While it does not specify a clearly defined legal role of Northern civil society nor does it state that they could acquire a decision-making role that lies above "influencing", the document does promote the importance of cooperation with and inclusion of indigenous peoples.

However despite this, we perceive that the document enshrines the concepts of region-building, subnational institutions, and bilateral cooperation more so, by what seems to us to be a stronger emphasis. The rhetoric of region building and of treating the Arctic as a community is particularly prevalent, and corroborated by the 2004 Speech of the throne as mentioned earlier. These concepts are dimensions of Bilateralism. As such, it is our interpretation that *The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy* reveals a bilateral stance on the part of Canada.

There is however a noticeable discrepancy between these documents and statements, and those made and published after 2006.

In a speech made in Nunavut in 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stressed on "our new Government's commitment to asserting Canada's sovereignty over our Arctic territory", the deployment of boots on the ground being crucial to fulfill that objective. He contrasts his own

policy with the failures of Canadian governments to enforce Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic. He stresses that the Arctic is vital for the country's economic development, and that the need and urgency to enforce sovereignty and protect territorial integrity has never been greater (Stephen Harper, 2006, speech posted in the Prime Minister website). Indeed, the Prime Minister is quoted to have said that Canada is "an energy superpower" (Stephen Harper as cited by Dolata, 2012).

*Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future*, the comprehensive Northern strategy document published in 2009, perhaps already reveals from its title a strong emphasis on the Arctic's importance to Canada's identity. Indeed, the document starts with a message from the Honourable Chuck Strahl: "Canada is a Northern nation. The North is a fundamental part of our heritage and our national identity, and it is vital to our future."

The primordial importance of the Arctic as part of Canadian identity is mentioned several times throughout the document, and in another speech made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper:

"We are a northern country. The True North is our destiny – for our explorers, for our entrepreneurs, for our artists. To not embrace the promise of the True North, now, at the dawn of its ascendancy, would be to turn our backs on what it is to be Canadian."

- Prime Minister Stephen Harper, August 2008, Inuvik, Northwest Territories.

The document lists four priorities:

1. Exercising our Arctic Sovereignty
2. Promoting Social and Economic Development
3. Protecting our Environmental Heritage
4. Improving and Devolving Northern Governance

Sovereignty and national interests are given particular importance, more so than in *The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy*.

In the section dedicated to the devolving of Northern governance, the document mentions the territories' autonomy in resource management, but it does not go as far as to provide indigenous communities powers to participate meaningfully in the decision making process.

When talking about international cooperation, the document reasserts the importance of cooperation on a bilateral level, in the Arctic Council, and of the primacy of UNCLOS. But it does not suggest any expansion of the Arctic Council's role and scope, of turning it into a

decision making body, nor does it promote universality and institution-building. Indeed, while the rhetoric of the Arctic being fundamental to Canada's national identity has visibly increased, the rhetoric of the Arctic as a political community and region has decreased in a major way compared to the previous document.

The other supplementary document, *Statement on Canada's Arctic Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy abroad* published in 2010, displays a similar rhetoric:

" The Arctic is fundamental to Canada's national identity. [...]The Arctic is embedded in Canadian history and culture, and in the Canadian soul. [...]Exercising sovereignty over Canada's North, as over the rest of Canada, is our number one Arctic foreign policy priority."

It reasserts the importance of the regional bilateral cooperation, as well as reasserts the importance of recognizing the sovereignty and primacy of the Arctic states over the region as a necessary condition to any participation in Arctic affairs:

The document ends with the following statement:

" Cooperation, diplomacy and respect for international law have always been Canada's preferred approach in the Arctic. At the same time, we will never waver in our commitment to protect our North."

The implication being, we think, that Canada would be willing to protect the north independently and militarily if necessary.

The two documents, *Canada's Northern Strategy* and *Statement on Canada's Arctic Policy*, showcase a number of elements / sub-dimensions. While there is continued emphasis on maintaining the Arctic as a region governed by its member states, which is tied to the concept of region-building and bilateral cooperation, there is a reduction of the rhetoric describing the Arctic as a community and political region. In addition, there is a visible increase in the mention and prioritization of sovereignty, national interests, and national identity, as well as the protection of Arctic territory. There is no mention of a desire to turn the Arctic Council into a political organization capable of setting legally binding decisions, nor is there a mention of including the rest of the world in the decision making process.

The elements present in Canadian narrative after 2006 can be associated with the concepts of Sovereignty, National Security, and National Interests, which leads us to the conclusion that

Canada's foreign policy stance became marked by more unilateral rhetoric, as opposed to that prior to 2006 which was more bilateral.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Arctic as political region</li> <li>- Bilateral cooperation as main priority</li> <li>- Bilateral cooperation as main source of decision making</li> <li>- International organizations limited to subnational role</li> <li>- Interstate cooperation outside of international institutions</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Region building</li> <li>2. Bilateral Cooperation</li> <li>3. Subnational Institutions</li> </ol>	<p><b>Bilateralism (1996-2006)</b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sovereignty as main priority</li> <li>- Sovereignty outside the scope of international organizations</li> <li>- Arctic as vital for national identity</li> <li>- Security as main priority</li> <li>- Freedom of action</li> <li>- Resource ownership as main priority</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. National Sovereignty</li> <li>2. National Security</li> <li>3. National Interests</li> </ol>	<p><b>Unilateralism (2006-present)</b></p>

Table 5. Foreign policy stance of Canada

## The United States of America

The USA government has published two main documents highlighting its Arctic strategy. The first one, *National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive* was published on January 9th, 2009 and signed by president George W. Bush. It lists the following priority areas:

1. Meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the Arctic region;
2. Protect the Arctic environment and conserve its biological resources;
3. Ensure that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable;
4. Strengthen institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations (the United States, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden);
5. Involve the Arctic's indigenous communities in decisions that affect them; and
6. Enhance scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.

National security is placed at the top, and the following statement is quite revealing:



" The United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests."

This statement clearly implies that the USA is willing to act unilaterally to promote its national security interests if it deems it necessary. Freedom of action is highlighted.

The document is also explicitly clear on how it views the Arctic Council and its role in the future. describing it as a positive institution while working within its limited mandate, and that it is the position of the USA that the council "should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed contributions."

It denotes the USA's desire to maintain the Arctic Council in its currently limited and apolitical role, while also rejecting the possibility of the Arctic Council to be involved in security matters, which is compatible with the USA's traditional stance with regards to the Council since its conception when it expressed opposition to involving the institution in security matters.

We can thus detect within that document, elements pertaining to the concepts of national security and national interests.

*The National Strategy for the Arctic Region*, published in 2013 under the Obama administration, remains more or less in line with the rhetoric of its predecessor document. It lists the following three objectives:

1. Advance United States Security Interests
2. Pursue Responsible Arctic Region Stewardship.
3. Strengthen International Cooperation

National security is once more brought forward as the number one priority, alongside sovereignty and national interests: "Our highest priority is to protect the American people, our sovereign territory and rights, natural resources, and interests of the United States."

These priorities are underlined further in other statement such as the importance of the Arctic region's energy resources as "a core component of our national security strategy: energy security. "

The document, in our view, consistently prioritizes the importance of national security and national interests as a whole.

An additional element similar to the one seen in the previous document can also be recognized with regards to the role of the Arctic Council, which it specifies should remain within its current mandate.

Like the previous document, *the National Strategy for the Arctic Region* insists on maintaining the current, limited and apolitical, mandate of the Arctic Council. This desire to limit international institutions and exclude them from national security and national interest matters and decision making can be linked with the concepts of National Security, Sovereignty, and National Interests.

These two documents appear to be generally in line, with them prioritizing national security and national interests as of utmost importance. The Arctic Council is to remain in its current, limited, role and cooperation with states outside the region would remain subjected to the interests and sovereignty of Arctic states.

As mentioned previously, the United States has not ratified UNCLOS, however it must be noted that both documents in fact stress the importance of being part of the agreement and urge the Senate to allow the government to do so. So far, the motion continues to be blocked in the Senate, with the rationale that the international agreement infringes on the US' sovereignty. This prevents the US from being able to submit legal claims of extended continental shelves in the Arctic or anywhere else, which might limit its legal options.

These two documents, in addition to the US being adamant about excluding the Arctic Council from the domain of security and its unwillingness / inability to ratify UNCLOS, demonstrate a primordial importance to the concepts of national security, national interests, and sovereignty. These three concepts, as explained beforehand are dimensions of Unilateralism. It is our interpretation that the USA has had a consistently unilateral policy stance with regards to the Arctic with no fundamental change in its rhetoric or the signals it sends.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security as main priority</li> <li>- Security outside the mandate of international organizations</li> <li>- Freedom of action</li> <li>- Resource ownership as main priority</li> <li>- Resource ownership and management outside the scope of international organizations</li> <li>- Sovereignty as main priority</li> <li>- Sovereignty outside the scope of international organizations</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. National Security</li> <li>2. National Interests</li> <li>3. National Sovereignty</li> </ol>	<p>Unilateralism</p>
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Table 6. Foreign policy stance of USA

## Russian Federation

Russia presents a challenge with regards to analyzing its discourse with regards to the Arctic before 2000. The Boris Yeltsin government was not mobilized towards the Arctic in both practice and in terms of rhetoric. There are no official documents or statements during the Yeltsin era that we can access that is remotely related to the Arctic. One needs to consider that Russia at the time underwent periods of internal economic, political, and military crises that would preclude it from having an active or pro-active foreign policy. We can however argue that the Russian foreign policy stance demonstrated elements of bilateralism through its adherence to the Arctic Council. It is, admittedly, a very limited argument, but one that is made under some duress. We believe it however to be pertinent to distinguish Russia's foreign policy stance before and after 2000, as many academics such as Simmons (2008) argue that a significant shift had occurred in both the internal management of the country and its outward projections with Putin's ascension to the presidency.

For the years after 2000, we will rely on general foreign policy statements made by President Vladimir Putin, as well as three official documents. The first is *Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020*, signed by Putin in 2001. The second is *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020*, published by the Ministry of Defense. While it does not focus on the Arctic, it provides a

broad understanding of strategic priorities and it does make mention of the Arctic on several occasions, highlighting its importance. The second and more important document, written by the Russian Security Council advising the Executive branch, deals with the Arctic specifically and is entitled *Foundations Of The Russian Federation's State Policy In The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond*.

The Maritime doctrine highlights the economic and strategic importance of the Arctic, and lists among its priority objectives the safeguarding of Russian interests in the region, economic development in particular export-oriented sectors, and free access of the Russian fleet to the Atlantic.

The National Security strategy document also underlines the critical importance of the Arctic with regards of resource ownership and national interests:

"In the long term, the attention of international politics will be focused on ownership of energy resources, including in the Near East, the Barents Sea shelf and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian basin, and in Central Asia."

Resource ownership is described as the priority in foreign policy, and the Arctic's position and importance to promote that ownership and those interests are clear. This is a significant emphasis on national interests through resource ownership.

In addition, the Arctic is described as important for providing competitiveness, which itself is paramount to ensuring national security:

" In the interests of ensuring national security in the medium term, competitive economic sectors are being developed [...] especially in the Arctic zone, Eastern Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation. "

This shows that the Arctic is considered to be important in securing Russia's national security, through economic competitiveness, petroleum and energy development, military infrastructure among others.

The second, more comprehensive and Arctic-centric document, *Foundations Of The Russian Federation's State Policy In The Arctic*, uses a similar narrative.

The document lists six elaborate objectives, which are summarized as follows:

1. the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia's needs;
2. the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation;
3. the safeguarding of the Arctic environment;

4. the formation of a unified information space of the Russian Federation in its Arctic Zone;
5. the provision of a sufficient level of fundamental and applied scientific research;
6. the provision of a mutually beneficial regime of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and Arctic states on the basis of international treaties and agreements to which the Russian Federation is party.

As we can see, the idea of the Arctic presenting a major asset to Russia's energy and resource needs, interests, and security is highlighted and arguably placed as the highest priority. National military security is mentioned in second place, while international cooperation is left to last.

While relying on simply ranking to make analyses and interpretations might be a bit simplistic, seen in tandem with the general nature of the discourse, it could be seen as a revealing element.

With regards to international cooperation, the importance of UNCLOS and the Arctic Council are upheld, but there is no mention of expanding the Arctic Council in terms of mandate or inclusivity nor of turning it into a political and decision-making body. It would seem that decision-making would remain irrevocably the prerogative of states.

The Northern Sea Route is mentioned, and the position of the Russian Federation with regards to its legal status is made explicit: "[...]the use of the Northern Sea Route by international shipping under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and in accordance with the international treaties of the Russian Federation[...]"

This is an explicit claim that the Northern Sea Route is part of Russia's internal waters, and not international waters, where international shipping is subject to Russian jurisdiction and sovereignty. This claim is significant, as there is no legal statement or decision on the part of UNCLOS with regards to the status of the Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage.

The strategy concludes with the following, revealing and concise, statement:

Overall, in the medium-term, the realization of the Russian Federation's state policy in the Arctic will enable Russia to retain its role as the leading Arctic Power. In the longer-term, it is necessary to implement the integrated development of the competitive advantages of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation in order to strengthen Russia's position in the Arctic, consolidate international security, and promote peace and stability in the Arctic region.

This statement indicates two elements. It re-emphasizes the importance of the Arctic in providing Russia with competitive advantages, through we can state ownership of its petroleum and natural resources as stated beforehand. Secondly, there seems to be the perception that Russia is the leading Arctic power, a position it needs to retain.

While international, specifically bilateral, cooperation in addition to adherence to international treaties such as UNCLOS is mentioned as important, even crucial to Russia's strategy, we can still detect a strong emphasis on the concepts of national interests, specifically resource ownership and competitiveness, and national security.

The discourse and narrative of both documents is perhaps best described, or enshrined, in 2 statement made by President Putin:

" We are building constructive, normal relations with all of the world's nations—I want to emphasize, with all of the world's nations. However, I want to note something else: the norm in the international community, in the world today, is also harsh competition—for markets, for investment, for political and economic influence. And in this fight, Russia needs to be strong and competitive."

- Putin, 2002 (as cited in Jensen et al. 2010: p.445)

"In this context, it is understandable that the world should be showing growing interest in Russia and in Eurasia in general. God was generous in giving us natural resources. The result is that we are running up against repeats of the old "deterrence" policy more and more often. But what this usually boils down to, essentially, are attempts to impose unfair competition on us and secure access to our resources."

- Putin, 2008 (as cited in Jensen et al. 2010: p.445)

These two statements can be said to encapsulate Russia's foreign policy thinking and stance.

There is a great, critical importance given to the ownership of resources, as a source of competitive advantage, one that Russia must protect in the face of international incursions.

Claims that Russian unilateralism are based on international insecurities, especially with regards to a NATO intervention, are grounded on such statements (Canadian International Council Report, 2011). The two documents we have analyzed seem to show that Russia's policy stance with regards to the Arctic is shaped by this perspective and narrative, one that has been described as a traditional zero-sum game perspective, where states benefit at the expense of others.

All these elements tie into concepts of National Security, and perhaps most of all, National Interests in the sense of ownership of resources and the competitive advantages that it provides. This is further substantiated by several actions undertaken by Russia, such as the military flights over the Arctic close to its circumpolar neighbors' aerospace, specifically Canada's (Borgerson, 2008). All these elements, as such lead us to believe that unilateralism best describes Russia's policy stance under Putin's presidency.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sovereignty as main priority</li> <li>- Sovereignty outside the scope of international organizations</li> <li>- Security as main priority</li> <li>- Security outside the mandate of international organizations</li> <li>- Freedom of action</li> <li>- Resource ownership as main priority</li> <li>-Importance of Arctic in national competitive advantage</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. National Interests</li> <li>2. National Security</li> <li>3.National Sovereignty</li> </ol>	<b>Unilateralism</b>
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Table 7. Foreign policy stance of Russia

## Denmark

Through Greenland, Denmark has been greatly involved in Arctic affairs, and has published its Arctic strategy, *Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011– 2020*, in 2011. We will rely primarily on this document to interpret the kingdom's Arctic stance, in addition to statements made by the foreign ministry and crown prince.

It is interesting to see the document begin with the challenges present in the Arctic with regards to the environment and climate change, and how that presents a challenge for the global community:

Climate change has major implications for the global, regional and local climatic and environmental conditions and requires decisive global action.[...] The Arctic and the global community are presented with both new challenges and new opportunities.

The primary objective of Denmark's Arctic strategy is described as "a development that benefits the inhabitants of the Arctic."

This is specified as meaning the indigenous populations of the Arctic primarily. This potentially stems from the Kingdom's unique position of reconciling its 3 parts, Denmark, Faroe Islands, and Greenland, which makes up the Danish Realm. Indeed, the Kingdom is only an Arctic state through the Faroe Islands and Greenland, which has established self rule within the realm since

2009. An emphasis being put on the prevalence of the interests of Arctic peoples might stem from a certain dynamic that has become inherent in the Danish realm.

The strategy lists four objectives:

1. A peaceful, secure and safe Arctic
2. with self-sustaining growth and development
3. with respect for the Arctic's fragile climate, environment and nature
4. in close cooperation with our international partners.

It is interesting to see that elements pertaining to sovereignty, national interests, or security are not mentioned in the kingdom's list of objectives. This does not mean that sovereignty issues are not mentioned, in fact the importance of military deployment has been emphasized as one of several important tools in exercising sovereignty. However, it is revealingly absent from its list of priorities and objectives, which from a symbolic and narrative standpoint, we find to be significant.

In addition, the document specifically and explicitly mentions the Kingdom's desire to include non-Arctic states, specifically the EU, into the Arctic, in order to deal with global issues such as climate change. It adds that cooperation with the EU "is to be promoted." While Denmark remains dedicated to bilateral and regional cooperation, as well as dedicated to the idea of the "Arctic Five" coastal states being the primary decision makers in certain issues pertaining to the Arctic Ocean, we can detect a strong emphasis on global cooperation.

This is further shown in the following statements, where perhaps more pertinently, we see an explicit and clear desire to turn the Arctic Council into a more political body capable of decision making:

The Kingdom wants to ensure a future-oriented Arctic Council, i.e. that the Council has an increasingly direct impact on the Arctic peoples. The Arctic Council must evolve from a 'decision-shaping' to a 'decision-making' organization. The Council's function as an instrument exerting influence on nation states and international organizations should be reinforced, and where feasible, the possibility of real decision-making ought to be developed. It is also important to ensure cooperation with all countries and organizations that are of importance to the Arctic and can contribute to cooperation within the Council. [...] The Arctic Council must be reinforced as the only relevant political organization that has all Arctic states and peoples as members. At the same time the Arctic Council must cooperate with all relevant countries and organizations with interest in the Arctic.

These two statements reveal two important elements. The first is an explicit desire on the part of the Danish kingdom to transform the Arctic into a political body, capable of making decisions as



opposed to shaping and influencing them. This is a clear indication of Denmark's willingness to instate decision-making institutions when it comes to the Arctic. The second element that we can detect is a willingness to include non-Arctic states that have an interest and relevance in the region into the process and to promote inclusion. While it is true that these statements do not clearly state what role non-Arctic states can play within the Arctic Council beyond observation, we still believe that this is an endorsement of universality to a certain degree. It is a level of endorsement that is arguably not shared or made as explicit by the three previous states we have seen.

It is important to note that Denmark reinforces the importance of the Arctic Five, enshrined in the Ilulissat Declaration, as a regional body to supplement other processes and institutions. Indeed, the Declaration was made in Greenland and pioneered by Denmark (Petersen, 2009). However, there is we believe an absence of a region-building or regionalist discourse in the document, as opposed to a more visible globalist discourse. In addition, the above citation shows a determination to promote the Arctic Council as "the only relevant political organization", while there is no expressed desire to turn the Arctic Five into an institution or organization with a political role of any kind. That is, at least, the narrative that is being presented. Petersen (2009) argues that there are two faces of the Ilulissat Declaration, one which presents the event as a onetime event to ease tensions especially after the 2007 Lomonosov incident that we can see in official Danish documents, and the other being a more serious and long term event which may end up forming the basis of an international regime comprising the Arctic Five. It is thus entirely possible that the multilateral narrative of Denmark is being used in part to hide bilateral intentions. This however has to remain in the realm of speculation. What we can observe, as far as official documents go, is a stance characterized by multilateralism, which may or may not be contradicted by actual policies and goals.

The importance of the Arctic is reinforced by a speech made by the Danish Foreign Minister, on the 10th of April 2014, where the Arctic features in his 4 focus areas. In that speech, we see a strong global discourse, where the region is described as "a setting for global political and economic forces."

The Arctic is referred to and described as a region with global implications and significance, as opposed to an exclusive political region. This is an additional element showcasing a will to include the world in Arctic issues in a significant way. Indeed, Denmark has been an active supporter to the inclusion of China as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2014). It has also made a joint statement alongside the government of Japan on the importance of including non-Arctic states in trans-regional issues such as environmental protection and economic development (Joint Statement, 2014).

All these elements push for the concepts of Universality and Institution-building, which leads us to the conclusion that the Kingdom of Denmark's policy stance with regards to the Arctic is that of Multilateralism. It is of course the case that Denmark cares about its interests and its sovereignty, in addition to promoting and reinforcing regional cooperation. However, we argue that the narrative and discourse present in official documents and speeches put a strong emphasis on treating the Arctic as a region with global implications as well as promoting the Arctic Council as a political body. This type of rhetoric fits better into a generally multilateral stance.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expanding the role of the Arctic Council as a decision making body</li> <li>- Diffuse reciprocity</li> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Institution-Building</li> <li>2. Universality</li> </ol>	<b>Multilateralism</b>
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Table 8. Foreign policy stance of Denmark

**Norway**

The Norwegian government published two documents highlight its Arctic strategy. The first is *The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy*, issued in 2006, the first among arctic nations to do so. The second is *New Building Blocks in the North: The next Step in the Government's High North Strategy*, published in 2009.

In its High North Strategy, Norway lists its objectives with regards to the region:

- We will continue to build on our good neighbourly relations with Russia, which were resumed at the end of the Cold War.

- We will continue to exercise our responsibility for combating illegal fishing and managing the renewable fish resources for present and future generations.
- We will take advantage of the opportunities the Barents Sea presents as a new European energy province in accordance with the principles of sustainable development.
- We will take environmental and climate considerations into account in everything we do.
- We will improve living conditions, opportunities and the quality of life for all those who live in the High North, and we will exercise our particular responsibility for safeguarding indigenous peoples' rights.

We can make several observations. Firstly, there is no explicit mention of sovereignty, national interests, or security in that list which is telling. Indeed, the word "sovereignty" is only mentioned 5 times in a 76 pages document. Secondly, there is also no mention of international or global cooperation in the list of primary objectives, but rather special emphasis is being put on bilateral cooperation with Russia. This discourse is repeated throughout the document.

There is an almost unusually strong and puzzling emphasis being put on bilateral cooperation with Russia, an endorsement that is repeated multiple times in the document. This bilateral cooperation is not described to be through regional or international forums, but rather to be carried out independently by the two states. This is very telling of the importance Norway puts in Russia's involvement in the Arctic. It is not too difficult to see why however. Norway and Russia are "immediate" Arctic neighbors, sharing maritime borders in the Barents seas (Petkunaite 2011). Russia and Norway share a history of bilateral negotiation and cooperation with regards to the Barents sea, and have been able to reach agreements and coordinate effectively for years. In its Arctic strategy, Norway reinforces its commitment to continue working with Russia bilaterally.

That being said, the document also declares Norway's right and willingness to "unilaterally establish maritime zones around Svalbard, and an obligation to prevent over-exploitation of the fisheries resources." This is a direct and strong statement of exercising sovereignty through unilateral action. But this statement is rather unique and exceptional in a document that consistently promotes regional cooperation.

In terms of international cooperation, Norway's High North Strategy mentions several regional forums such as the Nordic Cooperation, the Barents Cooperation, and the Arctic Council. However, there is little mention of cooperation with non-Arctic states, and there is no talk of expanding the Arctic Council. Strong emphasis is put on regional cooperation, especially with Russia, but there are no elements that can be tied to universality or institution building.

It is interesting to see the Norwegian perspective on demarcating the Arctic as a region:

The High North is a broad concept both geographically and politically. In geographical terms, it covers the sea and land, including islands and archipelagos, stretching northwards from the southern boundary of Nordland County in Norway and eastwards from the Greenland Sea to the Barents Sea and the Pechora Sea. In political terms, it includes the administrative entities in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia that are part of the Barents Cooperation. Furthermore, Norway's High North policy overlaps with the Nordic cooperation, our relations with the US and Canada through the Arctic Council, and our relations with the EU through the Northern Dimension.

On one hand, we see the traditional views on the High North as a political region encompassing Norway, Russia, Sweden, and Finland, all of which cooperate in the Barents cooperation, a regional forum. On the other hand, a certain ambiguity and overlap is expressed, with the High North also overlapping with the Arctic as a whole. Arguable, we see Norway's perception of the region in both geographic and political terms being expanded to include the circumpolar region as a whole. Skagestad (2010) has described the concept of the "High North" as being elastic, being redefined and overlapping with the "Arctic", though still distinct to illustrate the immediate geographic and political priorities of Norway.

A similar discourse is present in Norway's second document, the *New Building Blocks in the North* in 2009. It lists 7 priorities:

1. We will exercise our authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predictable way.
2. We will be at the forefront of international efforts to develop knowledge in and about the High North.
3. We intend to be the best steward of the environment and natural resources in the High North.
4. We will provide a suitable framework for further development of petroleum activities in the Barents Sea, and will seek to ensure that these activities boost competence in Norway in general and in North Norway in particular, and foster local and regional business development.
5. We intend the High North policy to play a role in safeguarding the livelihoods, traditions and cultures of indigenous peoples in the High North.
6. We will further develop people-to-people cooperation in the High North.
7. We will strengthen our cooperation with Russia

This list is very similar to the one present in the previous document, specifically in terms of bilateral cooperation with Russia. This priority is also repeated numerous times throughout the document. In addition, like its predecessor, *New Building Blocks in the North* does not mention a Norwegian ambition to expand the Arctic Council politically, nor does it mention including the rest of the world in the Arctic decision making process in a substantive way. Regional inter-state cooperation is given primacy, where "most of the practical cooperation on current issues in the region takes place at levels other than the global. Where appropriate and desirable, two states can cooperate directly."

While this might be seen as a simple statement of fact, it is expressive of a general discourse that puts more weight on bilateral cooperation, as opposed to cooperation on a global and multilateral level. Regional cooperation rallying all Arctic states within forums such as the Arctic Council are also promoted, but without an explicit wish to establish more political institutions.

The past ambiguity with regards to the natures of the Arctic and the High North as political regions has lessened in the *New Building Blocks in the North*. More emphasis is now being put on the circumpolar region as a whole, as opposed to the traditionally more restrictive region of the High North: "With regard to closer international cooperation, we must bear in mind that the High North is gradually becoming more synonymous with the Arctic."

This signifies, in our view, a broadening of the still region-centric stance of Norway's Arctic policy, where the Arctic in its entirety is perceived and constructed as a political region. This is mirrored in a reinforced focus on regional cooperation, where "strengthened international cooperation in the north – both circumpolar cooperation and cooperation with Russia in particular – will in turn be beneficial for development in Northern Norway."

The element of promoting regional cooperation confined to the circumpolar countries, with once again a special emphasis on cooperation with Russia, is showcased. Less emphasis is being put in including other countries outside the Arctic.

These 2 documents demonstrate elements pertaining to region-building, where we can see its evolution from the Norwegian perspective, to sub-national institutions, with a limited role to be played by regional and international institutions in terms of decision making, and bilateral cooperation. These elements and concepts illustrate a bilateral Arctic policy stance on the part of Norway.

However, it is important to remind the reader that Norway has also been a very strong proponent for the involvement of NATO, of which it is a part, in the Arctic. This involvement would in essence involve many non-Arctic countries in the management of military security in the Arctic, which is a sphere of great importance. This is seen by scholars as an attempt by Norway to counterbalance Russia (Petkunaite 2011; Lassere, 2012). While supporting NATO involvement

could be interpreted as a multilateral element, we believe that the general discourse as observed in Norway's official documents still reflects bilateralism more so.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interstate cooperation outside of international institutions</li> <li>- Bilateral cooperation as main priority</li> <li>- Bilateral cooperation as main source of decision making</li> <li>- Arctic as political region/ club good</li> <li>- International organizations limited to subnational role</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bilateral Cooperation</li> <li>2. Subnational Institutions</li> <li>3. Region building</li> </ol>	<p><b>Bilateralism</b></p>
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Table 9. Foreign policy stance of Norway

## Sweden

It is challenging to analyze Sweden's narrative and discourse with regards to the Arctic, due to its limited statements and relatively limited practical involvement. In fact, Sweden was the last country to issue an official comprehensive Arctic strategy, published in 2011, with the exception of Iceland, which has yet to publish a comprehensive strategy. *Sweden's Arctic Strategy* states Sweden's objective to keep the Arctic a peaceful and stable region, to enhance the role of the Arctic Council, to contribute to the development of an EU Arctic policy, to promote economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable development, and to bring to the foray human and gender issues in Arctic-related bodies.

In more specific terms, Sweden declared a desire to expand the Arctic Council on an institutional and political level, capable of dealing with issues such as joint security:

"The Council could however be further energized if its mandate were broadened to include other important strategic issues such as joint security, infrastructure and social and economic development. [...] Sweden therefore wishes to strengthen the Council both institutionally and politically."

This can be seen as a strong endorsement to the politicization of the Arctic Council, at least to a significant degree, allowing it to deal with issues such as security, a notion which has hitherto been opposed by a number of Arctic states, the most vocal being the USA.

Indeed, expanding the Arctic Council is in part justified as a means to curtail the Arctic Five group of the Ilulissat declaration, from which Sweden a non-coastal state was excluded, as "an energised Arctic Council could reduce the need for the coastal states to drive forward issues in the Arctic Five format. It is important for Finland, Iceland and Sweden to be able to participate in decision-making in cases where they have legitimate interests and that the status of the Arctic Council is maintained."

This is quite indicative of Sweden's preference of expanding the Arctic council's role as opposed to having the Arctic Five be the principal decision making forum in the region. Sweden also reinforces the importance of several regional forums, such as the Barents Sea cooperation and the Nordic cooperation. However, it also brings forth to the limelight the inclusion of the EU as a priority in its Arctic strategy. Indeed, the official Swedish government website also highlights the importance of EU involvement in the Arctic (government offices of Sweden, 2012).

In addition, as chairman of the Arctic Council, Sweden invited high level delegates of observers and ad-hoc observers to the Arctic Council to be briefed on Arctic issues and to then participate in discussion, which has been lauded by the Japanese Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shuji Kira, as the first attempt of its kind by the Arctic council (Shuji Kira, 2012). This act could be seen as further indication of Sweden's commitment or leaning towards involving non-Arctic states in the process and enhancing international cooperation.

From this admittedly limited material, we can see elements pertaining to institution building in order to make the Arctic Council a more political body with a grander mandate. We also detect the element of including non-Arctic states, especially the entirety of the EU, into the Arctic. We can derive from these elements the concepts of Institution-building and universality, at least when it comes to the EU. We thus qualify Sweden's Arctic policy stance and discourse to be mostly multilateral in hue.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expanding the role of the Arctic Council as a decision making body</li> <li>- Generalized principles of conduct</li> <li>- Diffuse reciprocity</li> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Institution-Building</li> <li>2. Universality</li> </ol>	<p>Multilateralism</p>
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Table 10. Foreign policy stance of Sweden

## Finland

Finland has adopted an arctic strategy, *Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region*, in 2010. It has modified and expanded on it in 2013, in its new *Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013*. We will be primarily relying on these two documents, supplemented by statements made by the Finnish foreign ministers throughout the years.

*Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region* summarizes the objectives of Finland with regards to the Arctic Circle thusly:

- Cooperation based on international treaties lays the foundation for Finland's activities in the Arctic Region.
- Finland strives to increase international cooperation in Arctic issues at global and regional levels and in bilateral relations.
- Finland considers it important that the EU develops its Arctic policy.

It declares that the Arctic region carries global significance due to environmental and economic factors, such as shipping. Indeed more specifically, it presents the possibility of the region becoming a "major energy reserve and transport channel to Europe."

The document states that Finland is not a coastal Arctic state and that it has no claims in the Arctic Ocean. This could explain in large part why the word "sovereignty" was not mentioned at all in a 98 pages document. However, it stresses that decisions pertaining to claims in the Arctic Ocean affect it directly and substantially, and as such should be solved in accordance to the United Nations' Convention on the Laws of the Sea.

In addition, the strategy underlines the importance of involving two trans-regional organizations into the Arctic. The first is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the involvement of which seems to be favored by Finland. However it is emphasized that the involvement of NATO would not "change the region's security situation in any essential way." Rather, the organization's role



would be limited to spheres like search and rescue, and the containment of environmental and natural disasters. This is still in our view a code signaling Finland's desire to expand the role of trans-regional international organizations in the Arctic.

The second organization, which is given more importance and weight in the document, is the European Union of which Finland is part. The EU is seen as an important "global player" in the region "owing to political, geographic, economic, and scientific factors."

Its importance is further demonstrated by the fact that three Arctic states - Finland, Sweden, and Denmark - are members of the Union. The Northern Dimension, which Finland attaches significant importance to, is presented as proof of the importance of the EU as an Arctic player. It is made explicit that regional forums such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Northern Dimension create tighter links, in order to make the EU "the voice of regional actors."

The strategy document states that the present treaties on a global level, such as UNCLOS and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), are "a sufficient regulatory basis to deal with Arctic issues." In contrast, the Arctic Council is presented as the most important cooperation forum. Finland supports the inclusion of more observers, as "environmental changes and the opening of shipping routes have global impacts on non-Arctic states as well", on the condition that " they are committed to the attainment of (the Arctic council's) goals." It also supports the broadening of the Arctic Council's agenda, though it shies away from specifying that it should adopt a more political role.

We can see in *Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region* a general discourse of presenting the Arctic as a globally significant region, and while the Arctic Council is promoted as being the most important regional forum, there is a telling lack of rhetoric presenting the Arctic as a political region. In addition, we see a strong emphasis and prioritization being put in the involvement of the EU as a global Arctic player.

The amended 2013 strategy, which focused on expanding the strategy with regards to the internal management of Finnish territory in the Arctic, does not fundamentally change the country's position with regards to its Arctic foreign policy. The importance of the Arctic Council as the principal forum is reinforced, and while it does not explicitly promote a politicization of the

Council or a transformation towards becoming a decision-making body, the strategy does mention that the political weight of the Council ought to be expanded through regular summits.

Like its predecessor, the 2013 Arctic strategy insists upon the role of the EU as an Arctic player: Indeed, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland's website, as well as speeches made by ministers and ambassadors since 2002 which are posted in the government website, further stress the importance of involving the EU in the circumpolar region.

And finally, the global dimension of the Arctic is also stressed as an objective in international cooperation:

These 2 documents, in addition to statements made by members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, show a commitment to increase the involvement of trans-regional organizations and countries, especially the EU, as well as adding more political weight to the Arctic council, albeit presented in vague terms. These elements can be tied to concepts of universality and institution building, concepts that are dimensions of Multilateralism as a policy stance. Thus, we deem it appropriate to describe Finland's policy stance as multilateral.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> <li>- Generalized principles of conduct</li> <li>- Diffuse reciprocity</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.Universality</li> <li>2.Institution-Building</li> </ol>	<p><b>Multilateralism</b></p>
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Table 11. Foreign policy stance of Finland

**Iceland**

As seen beforehand, Iceland is the only Arctic nation that has yet to publish a comprehensive document describing its Arctic strategy. However, a parliamentary resolution on Iceland's Arctic policy has been issued in 2011, which highlights the country's priorities and objectives. In addition to that, we will also rely on the presentation of Ambassador Hjalmar W. Hannesson, Iceland's Senior Arctic Official, in Iceland in 2012 with regards to the Arctic, in order to qualify Iceland's Arctic policy stance.

The parliamentary resolution revolves around twelve principles, summarized as:

1. Promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council as the most important consultative forum on Arctic issues.
2. Securing Iceland's position as a coastal State within the Arctic region.
3. Promoting understanding of the fact that the Arctic region extends both to the North Pole area proper and the part of the North Atlantic Ocean which is closely connected to it.
4. Resolving differences that relate to the Arctic on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
5. Strengthening and increasing cooperation with the Faroe Islands and Greenland with the aim of promoting the interests and political position of the three countries.
6. Supporting the rights of indigenous peoples in the Arctic in close cooperation with indigenous organizations and supporting their direct involvement in decisions on regional issues.
7. Building on agreements and promoting cooperation with other States and stakeholders on issues relating to Icelandic interests in the Arctic region.
8. To use all available means to prevent human-induced climate change and its effects in order to improve the wellbeing of Arctic residents and their communities.
9. Safeguarding broadly defined security interests in the Arctic region through civilian means and working against any kind of militarization of the Arctic.
10. Developing further trade relations between States in the Arctic region
11. Advancing Icelanders' knowledge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland abroad as a venue for meetings, conferences and discussions on the Arctic region.
12. Increasing consultations and cooperation at the domestic level on Arctic issues

We can see an explicit desire to include indigenous peoples in the decision making process. But two points seem to be given primacy in this resolution, which are in many ways tied. The first is the stressing of the importance of the Arctic council as the primary regional forum. This emphasis is put as an explicit counter to the Arctic Five and the Ilulissat Declaration:

Importantly, individual Member States must be prevented from joining forces to exclude other Member States from important decisions, which would undermine the Arctic Council and other Arctic States, including Iceland. [...]The Icelandic Government has publicly, as well as in talks with the five States in question, protested their attempts to assume decision-making power in the region.

Iceland is vocally critical of the Arctic Five, and warns "clearly some of the States in question are willing to develop cooperation in this direction (of supplanting the Arctic Council as the main forum)." The resolution declares "further efforts that may undermine the Arctic Council and Iceland's interests in the region must be prevented."

This is arguably the most vocal criticism of the Ilulissat declaration on the part of an Arctic state which, alongside Finland and Sweden, was excluded. The importance of the Arctic Council is thus accentuated in opposition to the Arctic Five. Indeed, Iceland's Senior Arctic Official Hjálmar W. Hannesson stated Iceland's support of the Arctic Council "growing up" to assume a "stronger policy making role."

This can be tied with the 2nd objective that the resolution lists, that of establishing Iceland's status as not only an Arctic state, but an Arctic coastal state on the grounds of its EEZ extends into the outlying portion of the Arctic ocean. This objective would serve "to put Iceland on equal footing with the other coastal States in the region."

It is also interesting to note that while Iceland does not deny the existence of a political region called "the Arctic", it prefers to not have it based on narrow geographic borders, by including the North Atlantic, possibly so as to further justify its status as a littoral Arctic state. Parallel to this, Iceland supports the involvement of the EU in the Arctic and supports its bid to become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council, as shown in a joint statement (Joint Parliamentary Committee, 2013). It also favored the inclusion of East Asian countries - China, South Korea, and Japan - as permanent observers. Finally, it is interesting to see Iceland's perception of the signals sent by other countries. It describes "Russia, Canada and the United States, have not ruled out taking unilateral action to protect their sovereign interests." It would seem that from an Icelandic perspective, Russia, Canada, and the USA exhibit something of a unilateral tendency; it is a perspective that we believe to be justified, or at least grounded, based on the official documents and statements of these three countries that we have evaluated.

We observe in Iceland's position a desire to promote the Arctic Council as the primary regional forum, enhance its policy making role though it endorses it on vague terms, to involve the EU and non-Arctic states as well as indigenous peoples, and a strong criticism towards the Arctic Five as an exclusionary forum. We believe this exhibits concepts of more universality, through the involvement of the EU, and some institution building, through the enhancement of the Arctic Council's political weight. As such, we believe qualifying Iceland's policy stance as multilateral to be the most appropriate.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expanding the role of the Arctic Council as a decision making body</li> <li>- Generalized principles of conduct</li> <li>- Diffuse reciprocity</li> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Institution-Building</li> <li>2. Universality</li> </ol>	<p>Multilateralism</p>
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Table 12. Foreign policy stance of Iceland

## The European Union

We now take a look at non-Arctic states and polities, the first being the EU. The European Union has yet to publish a comprehensive Arctic strategy, but it is in the process of doing so. We will instead rely on statements, joint communications, resolutions, and documents made by the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, to inform us what the EU's Arctic policy stance is, broadly speaking. We are presented with a challenge when it comes to evaluating EU foreign policy, precisely because there isn't a formal collective foreign policy, nor are there formal foreign policy making mechanisms. Instead, we are forced to observe the narrative used by all three European institutions mentioned previously, through which we can attempt to draw conclusions and interpretations.

The first pair of such document we can observe is EEA Consultive Committee's *Resolution on the EU's Northern Dimension* in 2000 and its *Resolution and Report on the EU's Northern Dimension* in 2004. While these documents specifically deal with the Northern Dimension, which as we have seen beforehand is a joint policy by the EU, Norway, Russia, and Iceland which deals with a portion of the Arctic as a geographic entity, it would still be interesting to see mentions of the Arctic and the EU's involvement therein. Or the lack thereof.

It is interesting to see how in these documents, there is no mention of European involvement in the entirety of the Arctic, through the Northern Dimension. It would seem that the EU's perception of the Arctic as a political region, a whole, might not have yet materialized in 2000 and 2004. While this doesn't directly point to a policy stance, it is important to observe the different polities' perception towards the Arctic as a factor that may potentially shape their stances. Nevertheless the reports and resolutions stress the importance of EU involved in the Northern Dimension.

We can count among the documents pertaining more specifically to the Arctic, the European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance. It lists the European Parliament's concerns with regards to the Arctic and the issues it believes the European Commission should address in its Arctic strategy. One of the concerns stated by the Parliament is the idea that "the Arctic region is currently not governed by any specifically formulated multilateral norms and

regulations, as it was never expected to become a navigable waterway or an area of commercial exploitation."

This, it would seem, is a clear position that does not consider the Arctic Council in its current state as a platform for multilateral norms and regulations sufficient for the Arctic. As such, it is in the European Parliament's view that a multilateral international treaty similar to the Antarctic treaty of 1961, while respecting the particularities and differences of the Arctic region, would be desirable.

This clearly signals a desire on the part of the EU to establish a global multilateral treaty, that would complement UNCLOS. It does not seem that it considers the Arctic Council as a sufficient institution to put in place multilateral governance. This goes hand in hand with the stressing of the global importance of the Arctic and "that awareness of the Arctic's importance in a global context needs to be raised further by delivering a standalone EU Arctic policy."

The general discourse of this resolution reveals a more globalist perspective than a regionalist one. In addition to that, the resolution emphasizes the importance of involving the EU in the Arctic "by at least, as a first step, taking up 'observer status' on the Arctic Council." This can be interpreted as a desire for participation in the Arctic to go beyond permanent observer status in the Arctic Council in the long run. Indeed, the parliamentary resolution considers that the Commission's role in the Arctic should be comprehensive, by calling "on the Commission to include energy and security policy in the Arctic region on its agenda." This, in addition to economic development, environmental protection, and maritime policy.

This to us shows that the EU considers areas such as security, which have until now been strictly outside the mandate of the Arctic Council and in the hands of circumpolar and especially coastal states, to be within the realms of its involvement in the Arctic. While the practical policies of the EU may not be characterized by much involvement in the Arctic, the discourse and rhetoric promotes a deep and meaningful role in the circumpolar region.

The European Commission, in response, made a communication to the European Parliament and Council, entitled *the European Union and the Arctic region* on the 20th of November 2008. In

it, the European Commission agrees with the Parliament's resolution that the EU should have an active role in the region, and that there is no treaty system in the Arctic but it also underlines the important legal framework provided by UNCLOS. Moreover it declares that the main problems in the Arctic "include the fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of effective instruments, the absence of an overall policy-setting process and gaps in participation, implementation and geographic scope."

This seems to reinforce the European Parliament's perspective that there is no defined and effective multilateral decision making process, but at the same time insists that "the full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new legal instruments should be advocated." In light of this ambiguity, the Commission intends on evaluating the effectiveness of present Arctic institutions.

We can see in both documents an explicit intent to ensure multilateral governance in the Arctic circle, with the ambition of involving the EU in the region. The European Council's conclusions published in December 2008 supports the Commission's ascension into the Arctic council as permanent observer and multilateral cooperation, but insists on the importance of establishing bilateral partnerships with Arctic states. In addition, the Council's conclusions on the Arctic published in 2009 makes similar propositions. It is also very interesting to compare these 2008 documents, with the European Commission's joint communication to the European Parliament and Council made in 2012. Intriguingly, the Commission's position has become less "forward."

In the communication, *Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: progress since 2008 and next steps*, the Commission's position that the EU has an important role to play in the region is reinforced. However, a different discourse emerged with regards to the effectiveness of Arctic governance:

Arctic states play a primary role in the region, both individually as well as in regional bodies. The EU acknowledges that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other relevant international instruments, and considers UNCLOS as a key basis for the management of the Arctic Ocean. It also recognizes the remarkable international cooperation already established between Arctic states and within the different Arctic regional fora.

Unlike the previous communications, we have a more explicit concession of the primacy of Arctic states in the region. In addition, unlike the somewhat critical report about Arctic governance in previous communications, the European Commission qualifies the international cooperation in the circumpolar region to be remarkable and did not qualify it as insufficient, or "ineffective" as it previously did. The Arctic Council is considered to be " the primary forum for international cooperation in the region."

We see these concessions to be, in a way, recognition of the Arctic as a political region, as opposed to being a purely global issue. Speculation can lead us to link such new discourse to the EU's application to become a permanent observer in the Arctic Council, but that will have to remain in the realm of speculation as the internal decision making processes in the EU and the rationale behind them are not within the scope of our study. It is worthwhile however to remind the reader that two of the conditions to becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council are: "*Accept and support the objectives of the Arctic Council defined in the Ottawa declaration.*" - *Recognize Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.*" (Arctic Council, 2011)

The European Commission thus adopted a discourse and stance more favorable to the current status quo in Arctic governance, than before, stressing multiple times that the Arctic Council is the primary forum of international cooperation and of the importance of bilateral cooperation and partnership with Arctic states.

The Joint Parliamentary Committee's resolution in October 2013 mirrors the softer language employed by the European Commission of 2012 and reaffirms the Commission's points and views. The primacy of the Arctic council as the main body for international cooperation in the region is emphasized. This has been reaffirmed in the joint statement by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and EU Commissioner Maria Damanaki regarding Arctic Council decision on EU's observer status, which had been rejected due to Canada's veto. This position has also been reaffirmed by the European Council's *conclusions on developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region* published in May 2014, which also stated the



Council's continued commitment to support the European Commission joining the Arctic council as permanent observer.

There is a visible transformation of EU rhetoric, especially from 2008 till the present. EU institutions have adopted a "softer" language, with less explicit desires to institute more global multilateral processes in the Arctic region. What initially was a firmer endorsement of concepts of universality and institution building has been replaced by a more conciliatory approach and concession to the primacy of circumpolar regional bodies. However, with that said, we still believe that the EU narrative post-2008 does not reflect a bilateral stance, but rather still reflects a multilateral one with a softer hue.

This is in part demonstrated in the European Union's External Action Services website:

EU Arctic policy has 3 main policy objectives:

- protecting and preserving the Arctic in cooperation with the people who live there
- promoting sustainable use of resources
- international cooperation.

We further justify this conclusion on the basis of not only an explicit desire to increase cooperation with indigenous and environmental NGOs as was mentioned in the joint communications and conclusions of the European Commission and of the European Council as well as the EEAS, but also with the EU's continued and determined goal to join and participate in the Arctic Council as a permanent observer. Despite its concessions, its striving to be involved in the Arctic denotes a desire to see more multilateral and inclusive processes in Arctic governance. As such, we are compelled to qualify the EU's Arctic policy stance to have been consistently multilateral, despite the change and softening of its rhetoric.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Arctic to be governed by more global institutions or frameworks</li> <li>- Generalized principles of conduct</li> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Institution-Building (pre-2008)</li> <li>2. Universality (pre-2008)</li> <li>1. Universality (post-2008)</li> <li>2. Institution Building (post-2008)</li> </ul>	<p><b>Multilateralism</b></p>
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Table 13. Foreign policy stance of European Union

## China

China has recently been admitted as permanent observer in the Arctic Council and has declared the important environmental and economic implications of the Arctic on itself. However, there is an absence of official documents describing the state's Arctic policy. The only official document that we can access is a statement by H.E. Ambassador Lan Lijun at the Meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers in November 2012 in Sweden, prior to the acceptance of its bid to become permanent observer. In addition to that one document, we will be forced to rely on academic studies of China's Arctic policy in order to evaluate its stance.

It is however important to note that many academic studies with regards to China's position in the Arctic, such as *The Dragon Eyes the Top of the World* (David Curtis Wright, 2011), rely mostly on scholarly work in China and not on official government statements. Indeed, Wright and other authors all recognize that the Chinese government speaks very little about the Arctic, and does not have a formulated Arctic strategy. While it is of course interesting to see the diverse scholarly discourses vis-a-vis the Arctic in China, we believe it to be inappropriate to assume that the Chinese government necessarily views the Arctic in the same light or with the same priorities.

The ambassador's statement reaffirms that "the Arctic Council is the most important regional inter-governmental forum" to discuss issues within its mandate of sustainable development and environmental protection, and that it has succeeded in allowing relevant parties to tackle regional and trans-regional issues. The statement, in line with China's foreign policy in general, clearly indicates that China respects the sovereignty and primacy of Arctic states with regards to national and regional issues, and reassures that "the participation of observers does not prejudice the dominant role of Arctic states in the Council."

However, at the same time, it brings forward the global nature of some Arctic issues, characterizing them as "trans-regional, such as climate change and international shipping, which involve the interests of non-Arctic states. Arctic states and non-Arctic states share common

interests in addressing trans-regional issues and should further their communication and cooperation."

This element of increased global cooperation with regards to trans-regional issues, such as international shipping, which is a geo-strategic area of interest, can be tied to the concept of universality. The ambassador praises the Arctic Council for its effort to enhance "its openness and inclusion", which seem to point towards a preference towards multilateral processes defined by transparency and inclusion. Further enhancing this inclusion and participation from non-Arctic states would allow, the Ambassador argues, the Arctic Council to acquire a broader perspective and to facilitate international cooperation to better tackle trans-regional issues.

Indeed, the ambassador describes China as "a near Arctic state", on the basis of it being affected significantly on many levels by developments in the Arctic. The importance of the Arctic to China is made explicit, and so are the reasons why it should be included in the process of tackling trans-regional issues, in particular international shipping and ecology.

In his concluding remarks, the ambassador expressed the following wish of "keeping the Council open as a policy exchange institution so that the Council could serve as a platform for cooperation between Arctic states and non-Arctic states for sound interaction and concerted efforts to address trans-regional issues together."

It is interesting to make the observation that the ambassador did not expressed a wish to see the Arctic Council become a multilateral decision making body, perhaps out of concern over infringing on the sovereignty and primacy of Arctic states or of compromising the status of the Arctic as a political region. Rather, the Arctic council is described as a "policy exchange institution." Alternatively, the prospects of a genuine international institution capable of making binding decisions in the Arctic may not be attractive to China in practice (Lassere, 2010). Nevertheless, China's expressed desire and rhetoric to be involved meaningfully in the Arctic council as a "near Arctic" player, to collaboratively tackle issues of global importance in an inclusive and transparent environment, could be seen as an element of increased cooperation

between Arctic and non-Arctic states in an institutional environment that is more multilateral, defined by transparency and inclusion.

We are as such inclined to interpret China's Arctic policy stance as cautiously multilateral. This is further corroborated by the statements made by Hu Zhengyue, China's assistant minister of foreign affairs, at an address on the Chinese government's perspectives at an Arctic forum in Norway's Svalbard Archipelago in 2009, as cited by David Curtis Wright (2011, p.28) and by Caitlin Campbell (2012, p. 3-4). It would seem that Hu Zhengyue asserted that the Arctic is primarily a regional issue, but that it carries global implications, which would require cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. This is a position identical in essence to Ambassador Lan Lijun's. In addition, China's State Oceanic Administration concluded that the Arctic is the "inherited wealth of all humankind... The Arctic Ocean is not the backyard of any country and is not the 'private property' of the Arctic Ocean littoral states. As with Europe's other oceans, under the framework of international law, every country in the world has an equal right to exploit the Arctic Ocean" (cited by David Curtis Wright, 2011: pp.28-30). It is a position that could be qualified as multilateral.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> <li>- Generalized principles of conduct</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Universality</li> <li>2. Institution-Building</li> </ol>	<p>Multilateralism</p>
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Table 14. Foreign policy stance of China

## Japan

As with China, we are confronted by the challenge of limited official sources, as Japan has yet to formulate an Arctic strategy and because official statements with regards to the region are sparse. The two official sources that we have are a joint statement by the governments of Japan and Denmark on their strategic partnership dealing with a variety of issues where the Arctic is mentioned in one paragraph. The second is a statement by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Shuji Kira, at meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and observers/ad-hoc observers in Stockholm, Sweden, in November 2012.

The joint statement with the Danish government describes that the two governments "[...] attached great importance to the cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic States on trans-regional Arctic issues such as protection of the environment, respect for international law and sustainable development for the benefit of the peoples living in the Arctic."

We can observe as an element the shared appreciation of the inclusion of non-Arctic states and of the importance of collaboration in specific areas. What we can also derive from the statement is a possibility of cooperation in other areas, perhaps areas of a more strategic or political nature, in an environment marked by transparency and exchange of information. This could be tied to both global inclusion and a certain degree of institution-building to ensure transparency and information exchange.

The speech of Vice-Minister Shuji Kira is only slightly more revealing. It begins by stating "Japan, as a maritime State, has been paying great attention to the Arctic." It then commends the Eight Arctic states for their collaboration and assures that "Japan recognizes and respects sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction of the Members of the Arctic Council." Shuji Kira also states Japan's continued support to UNCLOS as an international legal framework to govern and settle issues in the Arctic Ocean. In addition, it assures that Japan will be able to contribute to the Arctic council through its expertise and research, and "[...] that Japan has followed the activities of the Council since its inception."

This document denotes a strong interest on the part of Japan towards the Arctic, at least as far as narrative and discourse are concerned. We also see an insistence on respecting the sovereignty of Arctic states quire reminiscent of China's and the EU's post-2008 documents and statements. It should be reminded that Japan had, at the time of that speech, submitted its application to become permanent observer, which had been accepted in 2013.

From the limited source we have available, we discern a will on the part of Japan to participate in the Arctic council and to promote cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. These

elements can be tied to global inclusion and expansion of institutions in terms of inclusion and openness.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Arctic as a global issue</li> <li>- Inclusion of non-Arctic states</li> <li>- Generalized principles of conduct</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Universality</li> <li>2. Institution-Building</li> </ol>	<b>Multilateralism</b>
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Table 15. Foreign policy stance of Japan

## South Korea

As was the case with its Chinese and Japanese neighbors, South Korea has not yet formulated a comprehensive Arctic strategy despite becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic council in 2013. We only have access to one official document, a speech made by H.E. Mr. Byong-hyun Lee, the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Norway.

The speech begins with asserting the acute impact of climate change which South Korea felt, describing it as "part of a global drama which calls for global efforts, and thus Korea has turned its eyes to the Arctic region which is a barometer of our planet's changing climate." The Arctic thus necessitates cooperation between like-minded countries to tackle this issue. The global relevance of the Arctic, at least on an environmental level, is pushed forward at the beginning of the speech. The importance of the Arctic Council is reaffirmed, as well as the importance of the cooperation of the latter with non-Arctic states. The ambassador said: "I believe that the Arctic Council as a leading framework of the Arctic cooperation would achieve its objectives better by recognizing contributions and legitimate interests of non-Arctic countries."

This can be tied to the element of global cooperation and inclusion. Furthermore, the ambassador underlined South Korea's position as a major ship builder in the world, with vested interest in the opening up of new commercial routes, in particular the Northern Sea Route. It is important to note that he was silent on Russia's claims of the Sea Route passing through its internal waters, as it is a sovereignty issue. Furthermore, the ambassador stated his preference to avoid discussing issues pertaining to security, which is revealing of South Korea's general policy of not infringing on Arctic countries' sovereignty or security matters. Instead, he focused on the economic and energy importance of the Arctic to South Korea.

In general, we detect a discourse that is quite similar to Japan and China. It is a discourse marked by respect of the sovereignty of Arctic states, of recognition of the Arctic council's position as the principal regional forum to tackle Arctic issues, that nevertheless stresses the global importance of the Arctic, and the desire and necessity of non-Arctic states to participate in the Arctic Council and cooperate with the Arctic states, on both a bilateral and multilateral level. These elements are tied to global inclusion and institution building, or at least expansion, as concepts that lead us to conclude that South Korea, much like Japan and China, has a multilateral Arctic policy stance.

- Arctic as a global issue	1.Universality	Multilateralism
- Inclusion of non-Arctic states	2.Institution-Building	
- Generalized principles of conduct		

Table 16. Foreign policy stance of South Korea

## 5. 2. Comparative table of narratives

Country	Canada	USA	Russia	Denmark	Norway	Sweden
Sub-dimensions	1.Region building (pre-2006) 2. Bilateral Cooperation (pre-2006) 3. Subnational Institutions (pre-2006) 1. National Sovereignty (post-2006) 2. National Security (post-2006) 3. National Interests (post-2006)	1.National Security 2. National Interests 3. National Sovereignty	1. National Interests 2. National Security 3.National Sovereignty	1. Institution-Building 2. Universality	1. Bilateral Cooperation 2. Subnational Institutions 3.Region building	1. Institution-Building 2. Universality
<b>Policy Stance</b>	<b>Unilateralism</b>	<b>Unilateralism</b>	<b>Unilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>	<b>Bilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>
Country	Iceland	Finland	EU	China	Japan	South Korea
Sub-dimensions	1. Institution-Building 2. Universality	1.Universality 2.Institution-Building	1. Institution-Building (pre-2008) 2. Universality (pre-2008) 1. Universality (post-2008) 2. Institution Building (post-2008)	1.Universality 2.Institution-Building	1.Universality 2.Institution-Building	1.Universality 2.Institution-Building
<b>Policy Stance</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>	<b>Multilateralism</b>

Table 17. Comparative table of Arctic stakeholders' foreign policy stances



### 5. 3. Testing the Hypotheses

We will now run our models in order to test our hypotheses. We will interpret and analyze our results in the following section. Running a logit regression to test the effect of oil related independent variables on the adoption of a unilateral policy, where 1= Unilateralism and 0= no Unilateralism, has revealed these results:

Number of obs = 201  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.7396

Policy Unilateralism	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
<b>Price of Oil WTI</b>	<b>1.06923</b>	0.024018	<b>0.003</b>
Arctic Oil reserves	1.302454	0.369796	0.352
Share of Arctic reserves in total reserve	1.083152	0.071655	0.227
<b>Undiscovered oil</b>	<b>1.1208</b>	0.054148	<b>0.018</b>
<b>Crude Oil Exports</b>	<b>1.002969</b>	0.000838	<b>0</b>
<b>Crude Oil Imports</b>	<b>1.00037</b>	0.000109	<b>0.001</b>
<b>Oil Rent</b>	<b>0.359557</b>	0.105626	<b>0</b>
_cons	2.49E-05	0.000063	0

\* bolded values are significant at the 5% level  
 Table 18. Results of the logit regression for oil related variables

As we can see, the model is globally significant with a prob > chi2 below 5%. We have a number of significant correlations.

Ceteris paribus, Price of Oil is significant, where an increase of the price per barrel of oil by one unit leads to the chances of unilateralism being adopted increasing by 1.069. Similarly, the undiscovered oil reserves are significant, where an increase of the undiscovered reserves by one unit leads to the chance of unilateralism being adopted increasing by 1.12. In addition, both crude oil exports and crude oil imports are significant but with moderate effect, where an increase of each by one unit would lead to an increase of the chances of unilateral policies by 1.003 and 1.0003 respectively. Finally, an increase in oil rent by one unit would lead to a

decrease of the chances of unilateralism by 0.36. It is worthwhile to remind the reader that manufactured oil products and exports / imports are considered in oil rents.

As such, we find support for the Hypotheses: H1c- The presence of undiscovered oil reserves is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance; H2a - A country with a larger share of oil rent in its GDP is more likely to adopt a unilateral stance; H2b- Crude exporters of oil are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance; H2c Crude Importers of oil are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance.

The hypotheses H1a - The presence of known oil reserves in the Arctic is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance; H1b - The higher the share of Arctic oil reserves in total oil reserves the more likely it is for a country to adopt a unilateral stance are on the other hand not supported.

The logit regression run to test the effect of gas related independent variables on the adoption of unilateral policy has revealed these results:

Number of obs = 205  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.4735

Policy Unilateralism	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
<b>Arctic Gas reserves</b>	<b>0.99414</b>	.0020373-	<b>0.004</b>
<b>Share of Arctic reserves in total reserve</b>	<b>1.10348</b>	0.030204	<b>0</b>
<b>Undiscovered Gas</b>	<b>1.009798</b>	0.002878	<b>0.001</b>
Crude Gas Exports	1.000108	0.000246	0.66
<b>Crude Gas Imports</b>	<b>1.000273</b>	7.83E-05	<b>0.001</b>
<b>Gas Rent</b>	<b>0.667136</b>	0.100102	<b>0.007</b>
_cons	.0204394	.011653	0

\* bolded values are significant at the 5% level

Table 19. Results of the logit regression for gas related variables

The model is also globally significant, and with significant results.

The presence of known gas reserves in the Arctic is significant, though with an odds ratio very close to 1, meaning that an increase in the known reserves of gas by one unit has minimal effect. An increase in the share of Arctic gas reserves in the total reserves of gas by one unit on the other hand leads to an increase of the odds of a unilateral policy being adopted by 1.10348, *ceteris paribus*. The increase by one unit of undiscovered gas reserves also leads to an increase of the odds of the adoption of unilateralism but only by 1.009. Likewise, an increase in natural gas imports by one unit leads to a small increase of the chances of unilateralism being adopted by 1.0002. Finally, an increase by one unit of the gas rent would lead to a decrease of the odds of unilateralism by 0.667.

We do not find evidence to support the hypothesis H4b that exporters of dry natural gas are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance. Also, hypothesis H3a is refuted, as the presence of gas reserves very minimally decreases the likelihood of the adoption of unilateralism as opposed to increase it. Likewise, H4a which stipulates that countries with higher gas rents are more likely to be unilateral is refuted, as the opposite effect is observed.

The following hypotheses are on the other hand supported: H3b - The higher the share of Arctic gas reserves in total gas reserves the more likely it is for a country to adopt a unilateral stance; H3c- The presence of undiscovered gas reserves is more likely to make a country adopt a unilateral stance; H4c- Importers of dry natural gas are more likely to adopt a unilateral stance are supported, although for the latter the effect observed is minimal.

We will now proceed to presenting the results of the ordinal logistic (ologit) models. Tests on proportional odds assumption or the parallel regression assumption, using a likelihood ratio test (omodel command in Stata) based on the null hypothesis that is no difference in the coefficients between models, has produced non-significant results for both models pertaining to oil and gas variables. This means that we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no difference in coefficients between models, thus making the use of the ordinal logistic regression appropriate.

Policy Stance	Frequency	Percent	Cum.
Unilateralism	43	18.86	18.86
Bilateralism	33	14.47	33.33
Multilateralism	152	66.67	100
Total	228	100	100

Table 20. Policy stances as ordinal variables.

The Ordinal logistic regression using oil variable has produced these results:

Number of obs = 201  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.5721

Policy	Odds Ratio	Std.Err.	P>z
<b>Price of Oil WTI</b>	<b>0.946148</b>	0.011039	<b>0</b>
Arctic Oil reserves	1.017569	0.141867	0.901
<b>Share of Arctic oil reserves in total oil reserve</b>	<b>0.852366</b>	0.025549	<b>0</b>
<b>Undiscovered oil</b>	<b>0.933685</b>	0.021234	<b>0.003</b>
<b>Crude Oil Exports</b>	<b>0.997995</b>	0.00042	<b>0</b>
<b>Crude Oil Imports</b>	<b>0.999844</b>	5.47E-05	<b>0.004</b>
<b>Oil Rent</b>	<b>1.349449</b>	0.116048	<b>0</b>
/cut1	-9.90476	1.34401	
/cut2	-7.20492	1.160894	

\* bolded values are significant at the 5% level

Table 21. Results of the ordinal logistic regression for oil related variables

The model is globally significant, and produces a number of significant results, which we will now present.

An increase of one unit in the price of oil, would lead to the odds of multilateralism (=2) versus the combined odds of unilateralism (=0) and bilateralism (=1) being 0.946 lower. Likewise, an increase of one unit in the price of oil would lead to the combined odds of multilateralism and bilateralism vs unilateralism to be 0.946 lower, *ceritus paribus*. Furthermore, an increase of the share of Arctic oil reserves in the total oil reserves by one unit, leads to the odds of multilateralism versus the combined odds of unilateralism and bilateralism to be 0.85 lower, and of the odds multilateralism and bilateralism combined to be 0.85 lower than that of unilateralism. Likewise, an increase of one unit of undiscovered oil would lead to the odds of multilateralism being 0.933 lower than the combined odds of bilateralism and unilateralism, and for the odds of multilateralism and bilateralism being 0.933 lower than unilateralism. Moreover, crude oil exports and imports share a similar dynamic, where one unit increase of exports and imports lead to the odds of multilateralism versus the odds of bilateralism and unilateralism to be 0.99 lower for both variables, and for the combined odds of multilateralism and bilateralism being 0.99 lower than unilateralism. Finally, an increase of one unit of the oil rent would lead to the odds of multilateralism being 1.349 higher than the combined odds of bilateralism and unilateralism, and the odds of multilateralism and bilateralism being 1.349 times higher than unilateralism. The presence of Arctic oil reserves on the other hand is not significant and no conclusion could be reached about any correlation.

Hypotheses H1b, H1c, H2b, H2c, and H2d are supported. Hypothesis H1a on the other hand is not. Furthermore, H2a is disproven, as the opposite effect was observed, ie. countries with larger oil rents are less likely to be unilateral.

The ordinal logistic regression for gas related variables has produced the following results:

Number of obs = 205  
 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000  
 Pseudo R2 = 0.5460

Policy	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z
<b>Arctic Gas reserves</b>	<b>1.011766</b>	0.0020607	<b>0</b>
<b>Share of Arctic reserves in total reserve</b>	<b>0.8360568</b>	0.0269997	<b>0</b>
<b>Undiscovered technically recoverable Gas</b>	<b>0.9906859</b>	0.0022329	<b>0</b>
<b>Dry Natural Gas Exports</b>	<b>0.9992605</b>	0.0001791	<b>0</b>
<b>Dry Natural Gas Imports</b>	<b>0.9998756</b>	0.0000626	<b>0.047</b>
<b>Gas Rent</b>	<b>1.50714</b>	0.1802796	<b>0.001</b>
/cut1	-5.817367	0.6358586	
/cut2	-3.309014	0.4506256	

\* bolded values are significant at the 5% level

Table 22. Results of the ordinal logistic regression for gas related variables

As we can observe, the model is globally significant and with significant results.

An increase of the known gas reserves in the Arctic by one unit, leads to the odds of multilateralism versus the combined odds of unilateralism and bilateralism to be 1.011 higher, and of the odds of multilateralism and bilateralism combined to be 1.011 higher than that of unilateralism. On the other hand, an increase of one unit of the share of known gas reserves in the Arctic of the total gas reserve would lead to the odds of multilateralism being 0.836 lower than the combined odds of bilateralism and unilateralism, and for the odds of multilateralism and bilateralism being 0.836 lower than unilateralism. Likewise, an increase of one unit of undiscovered gas reserves would lead to the odds of multilateralism compared to the combined odds of unilateralism and bilateralism to be 0.99 lower, and of the combined odds of multilateralism and bilateralism to be 0.99 lower than the odds of unilateralism. Furthermore, exports and imports of dry natural gas increasing by one unit leads to the odds of multilateralism

versus the odds of bilateralism and unilateralism to be 0.999 lower for both variables, and for the combined odds of multilateralism and bilateralism being 0.999 lower than unilateralism.

Finally, an increase of one unit of the gas rent would lead to the odds of multilateralism being 1.507 higher than the combined odds of bilateralism and unilateralism, and the odds of multilateralism and bilateralism combined being 1.507 times higher than unilateralism.

The hypotheses H3a and H4a, which posit that an increase of arctic gas reserves and an increase in gas rents respectively would lead to higher chances of the adoption of unilateralism, are not supported. In fact, the opposite effect has been observed, where higher gas rents and higher reserves of Arctic gas are less likely to produce unilateral stances.

On the other hand, hypotheses H3b, H3c, H4b, and H4c are all supported. Meaning that the higher the share of Arctic gas reserves in total reserves and the undiscovered gas resources, as well as the exports and imports of dry natural gas, the higher the chances of unilateralism being adopted.

As we see, most hypotheses that we have presented have been supported, however does this mean that hydrocarbon related factors are enough to be able to accurately predict the policy stance of states? We can observe in the results for the ordinal logistic regressions, that the odds ratios tend to be close to 1, signifying that the change they cause is limited if increased by one unit. This means that for significant changes to occur, especially a shift from multilateralism to unilateralism and vice versa that important changes in value of independent variables need to occur.

We verified this by looking at the predicted probabilities, through the command *prvalue*, where we can observe the predicted effect of any increase or decrease of the independent variables with a significant correlation with the dependent variable. As an example, let us consider three situations. Situation A, where undiscovered oil reserves in the Arctic are set at 0 while all other variables are set at their mean values; situation B, where undiscovered oil reserves in the Arctic are set at 40 billion barrels of oil; and situation C, where undiscovered oil resources are set at 80 bbo. *Ceteris paribus*, the changes to the probabilities of each policy stance from changes in undiscovered oil reserves are shown in table 5.

Policy Stances	Predicted probabilities A	Predicted Probabilities B	Predicted Probabilities C
Unilateralism	0.94	12.85	69.65
Bilateralism	11.42	55.84	27.5
Multilateralism	87.64	31.3	2.85

Table 23. Predicted probabilities of policy stances with changes in undiscovered oil reserves.

When undiscovered oil reserves are zero, there is an almost 88% chance that states would adopt a multilateral stance, with only a 11.4% chance of adopting bilateralism and a 0.94% chance of adopting unilateralism. If on the other hand undiscovered oil reserves are 40 bbo, the chances of multilateralism being adopted drops to 31%, while the chances of unilateralism rise to almost 13% and those of bilateralism to approximately 56%. Finally, if undiscovered oil reserves are 80 bbo, the chances of unilateralism being the policy stance chosen rise to almost 70%, while the probabilities of bilateralism and multilateralism drop to 27.5% and almost 3% respectively.

From this example, we can see how changes in only one variable, where all others are fixed, would have to be significant in order to cause a shift of probabilities, especially from multilateralism to unilateralism. This suggests that simultaneous changes of several variables are more likely to explain policy shifts than simply one or two main variables.

To further answer the question of whether relying on hydrocarbon resources in their entirety is enough to predict policy, we resorted to postestimation, through the Stata command *predict* after each ordinal logistic regression to estimate predicted probabilities based on each model and set of variables. There is a table for each country in the Annex, wherein the probabilities of policies being adopted based on oil related variables and probabilities based on gas related ones are shown, as well as the actual policy stance that was adopted based on our interpretations. Due to some missing data, some years are left blank with no predicted probabilities. Correct predictions are highlighted in green.

Our models do not predict the adoption of policies perfectly. As we can observe in the tables in Annex, relying on oil and gas variables to predict the policy stance of states has produced mixed results. For instance, while the ordinal logistic regression based on oil variables successfully predicts the adoption of unilateral rhetoric in Canada in 2011 and 2012 (65% and 70% respectively), the oil based regression fails to predict the adoption of unilateralism in Canada



from 2006 until 2010 with the exception of the year 2008. Similarly, relying on gas related variables fails to predict the shift towards unilateralism in 2006 completely, predicting rather a consistent bilateralism.

The oil based and gas based models provide more accurate results with regards to Russia. The oil based model almost perfectly predicts the adoption of unilateralism from 2000 until 2010 (at 95%+), however it has mixed results predicting bilateralism in the years prior to 1996. Similarly, the gas-based model more or less successfully predicts the shift to unilateralism post-2000, but fails to accurately predict the policy stance of Russia pre-2000. Likewise, the oil and gas models successfully predict the unilateralism of the USA from 2003 and 2004 respectively, but fail to do so for the years prior.

In general, both models are a lot more accurate and successful in predicting the adoption of multilateralism. This could be due to several reasons. Firstly, the frequency of multilateralism as a policy stance among Arctic stakeholders is the highest, meaning that it has the highest number of observations, compared to the limited number of observations for bilateralism and unilateralism. Secondly, all countries that have adopted multilateralism have no known reserves of gas or oil in the Arctic, and no undiscovered reserves with the exception of Denmark. This homogeneity might have contributed to making more accurate predictions, as opposed to trying to predict the policy stances of countries with both known and undiscovered oil and gas reserves in the Arctic.

The results displayed in Annex, where accurate predictions are highlighted in green, leads us to the conclusion that relying on oil and gas variables to predict the policy stance of states would lead to mixed results, especially when it comes to the Arctic Five.

## **6. Interpretations of the Results**

The results that we can observe lead us to a mixed conclusion. On one hand, many oil and gas related variables such as the presence of undiscovered resources and crude oil exports, are visibly linked with the choice of a unilateral foreign policy stance as many in both academia and the media have asserted. On the other hand, relying on hydrocarbon factors to explain the

adopted policy stance of states is not enough. We emphasize however that the presence of known and undiscovered hydrocarbon resources seemingly leading to the adoption of unilateral rhetoric, does not signify necessarily that the region is experiencing a race between great powers, or that it is marked by inevitable conflict. As we have stressed beforehand, our study was limited to narratives and rhetoric, and not actions. States holding unilateral rhetoric do not necessarily act on it in ways that are fundamentally different from states that have different rhetoric. Our paper is not meant to resolve the debate about whether the Arctic is a zone brewing with conflict or a region that is stable, but rather to contribute to this debate by focusing on narratives and how they are impacted by material factors.

The fact that our results are mixed and that our capacity to predict foreign policy stances based on hydrocarbon related variables is limited makes intuitive sense. In order to be able to better predict the adopted policy stances, having more comprehensive models with variables other than hydrocarbons, such as factors pertaining to geo-strategy, mineral wealth, military aspects, and domestic and party politics, would be a lot more useful. With such factors in mind, we would be able to have a stronger grasp of the reasons behind the foreign policy stance and narrative of Arctic stakeholders.

From the results that we have acquired, we can make several observations. Firstly, all states and polities situated outside the Arctic have a multilateral stance. We can surmise that countries outside of the Arctic would stand to benefit from multilateral rhetoric calling for more solid institutions and especially more universality, in order to secure their interests and push for their participation in the region's governance. The same logic can also apply to the three Arctic states that are not littoral: Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. Considering their exclusion from the Ilulissat Declaration, and their concern over the Arctic Five supplanting the Arctic council as their documents expressed, multilateralism might be a means for them to push for their participation in the circumpolar region and to ensure they are not excluded from its governance. There is however a significant difference in how this multilateral stance is taken, when comparing the 3 Arctic states with non-Arctic states / polities. The three Arctic states, especially Iceland, have been vocally critical of the Ilulissat Declaration and have been more "direct" in expressing how Arctic governance should unfold. On the other hand, China, South Korea, Japan, and the EU after 2008 have adopted a more "cautious" multilateralism, making sure to not question the

sovereignty and primacy of Arctic (littoral) states. This could be traced back to the conditions set by the Arctic Council to become a permanent observer. Indeed, claims that China would be incentivized to pursue an aggressive Arctic policy due to its gas and oil dependency are not materialized, at least not in the sphere of policy stances. Both our qualitative and quantitative results point to oil and gas dependency, as seen through the share of their rents in the GDP, do not make the chances of unilateralism being adopted greater, as other legal and political considerations are taken into account. It would be seen as illegitimate and incursive for a non-Arctic state to hold a unilateral Arctic foreign policy stance, while having no legal claims to exercise sovereignty in the area.

Another observation that we can draw is that the Arctic states holding no known reserves of hydrocarbon resources, which are Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, all have a multilateral stance. Denmark is only estimated to have undiscovered resources. Speculation can be raised that had these countries possessed more hydrocarbon resources, that they would have had the incentive to express a more unilateral stance focusing on sovereignty and national interests, as Canada, Russia, and the USA do. Our logistic and ordinal logistic models seem to point that the presence of Arctic hydrocarbon resources would make the adoption of bilateralism and especially unilateralism more probable.

Only the Arctic Five display a variety of foreign policy stances, with USA, Russia, and Canada being currently unilateral, while Norway and Denmark adopt more bilateral and multilateral narratives respectively. Prior to 2006, Canada had adopted a policy that too was more bilateral in undertone. The avoidance of multilateralism on the part of these 4 states can be explained by the fact that they are the only ones who hold significant resources in the Arctic, both known and undiscovered, as well as access to fisheries, mineral resources, and potential control over new shipping passages. Denmark on the other hand has no known petroleum reserves in the Arctic, but only estimated undiscovered reserves, unlike the rest of the Arctic Five that have more known and undiscovered resources. Policy stances that promote their claim and right to the ownership and management of these resources, to the exclusion of others, would as such be more understandable. Unilateralism, through its emphasis on national interests, security, and

sovereignty, and bilateralism through its treatment of the Arctic as a club good, would arguably be more attractive than a multilateralism that would limit their flexibility and freedom of action.

Another perspective that could be adopted in order to analyze the Arctic system is to resort to International Relations Theory, and look at systemic factors such as the balance of power. We can observe that "smaller" nations that do not possess the military power of the USA and Russia, tend to have a bilateral or multilateral stance, benefiting from and relying on international governance to push for their interests, more so than they would be able to in a scenario where unilateral force can be easily applied (Wegge, 2010). Likewise, a similar analysis can be given to countries outside of the Arctic, including the EU and China who do not possess the military capacities to project their power in the circumpolar region. The adoption of unilateralism on the part of Russia and the USA on the other hand could be facilitated by the fact that only these two countries could project a degree of military force in the region. This however would not explain Canada's position, as it does not have the military capabilities to project its power and is largely dependent on the USA for its security. As mentioned by Offerdal (2014), the argument that Arctic nationalism is being used by the Canadian government to appeal to a domestic audience is a more compelling factor to consider, especially when we see that in practical terms, the Harper government's investments in the Arctic are minimal and much less than one would expect considering the importance given to the region for Canada's interests and its very identity (Lassere, 2012). The importance of the propaganda value of the Arctic could also be applied to Russia, which is marked by a revitalized and ambitious foreign policy after the crises of the late 1990s (Simmons, 2008). Russia is now said to be seeking to re-establish itself as a great power, and the Arctic is one region among others where it can establish its influence. Russian official documents describing Russia as "the leading Arctic power" seem to support the idea that the Arctic is in part used to promote Russia's position globally. On the other hand, the economic, political, and military crises of the late 1990s could be believed to have precluded Russia from adopting an aggressive stance with regards to the Arctic, or as scholarship argue, would have been too low in the government's priority list to be vocal about it.

Denmark's multilateralism could be explained by its very unique and delicate situation with the Faroe Island and especially Greenland. Greenland is becoming more politically ambitious and

desiring to achieve more autonomy from the Danish realm, if not complete independence (Rasmussen, 2013). In such circumstances, we speculate that Denmark would be inclined to avoid unilateral rhetoric based on the importance of sovereignty, as it might be seen negatively on the part of Greenland. Whereas Norway's bilateralism could be in part explained by its proximity to Russia, and the necessity to cooperate bilaterally with its neighbor. However, it must be reminded that although this is not stressed in their official narrative, Norway is the biggest supporter of greater NATO involvement in the Arctic, which can be seen as counter-balancing Russia. It could be thus speculated that its omission from official documents and the emphasis on bilateral and regional cooperation could be a means to dispel fears and reassure Russia.

And finally, the USA has been consistently unilateral, in large part because it favors to retain flexibility of action to establish national security. This tendency can be observed in not only the Arctic, but in other regions of the world such as the Middle East. Domestic party politics can also have a big impact. Although neither the Bush nor Obama administrations can be described as having a multilateral or bilateral rhetoric, both of them urged the Senate to allow for the ratification of UNCLOS, which is still blocked. This demonstrates how internal politics and party dynamics hold a big sway, and how the importance of the concepts of sovereignty and national security, used by the senators blocking UNCLOS, remain powerful ideas in the realm of American politics. It would thus be arguably difficult for a government to adopt a less unilateral narrative and rhetoric, without facing staunch criticism domestically.

All these factors and particularities demonstrate that each state holding a stake in the Arctic is unique, and different from the other, governed by a specific set of circumstances. While the Arctic as a system is marked by common trends, tendencies, and dynamics, it cannot be understood based solely on hydrocarbon resources or its other resources. Attractive as these resources might be, internal domestic factors, as well as geo-political and geo-strategic factors, would undoubtedly shape their foreign policy stance.

## **7. Limitations and future research possibilities**

Our study has several limitations, a number of which are inherent to the subject matter and region. Firstly, we were confronted with some missing data, especially pertaining to the last 2 or 3 years. The US energy information administration, which is our primary source, does not possess all the data for all countries at every year. Secondly, we were also confronted with problems of limited observations, something which is unavoidable given the subject matter, where the number of active Arctic stakeholders is limited. This created big risks of multicollinearity, restricting our methodological approach. Thirdly, our qualitative analysis of countries' policy stance, while grounded in theory and methodology, is axiomatically limited to being a subjective interpretation, as it is arguably impossible to be able to qualify narratives in an objective manner. In addition, we were confronted with a minimal number of documents and statements pertaining to the Arctic, and were thus forced to qualify the foreign policy stance of each country broadly speaking, and not on a year-by-year basis.

The Arctic is a region rich with research opportunities. Something that our study did not take into account are economic assessments of the hydrocarbon resources present in the circumpolar region, as a generalized economic assessment has yet to take place. It would be interesting to study the economic viability of the undiscovered resources once such studies are done, and see in what ways they would impact foreign policy stances. In addition, our study was focused primarily on narratives and not on practical policy and decisions, as it sought to take a step back and use the study of narrative as a potential pillar from which further research can be done. A more comprehensive study of the Arctic as a system could also compare and contrast Arctic policies of the stakeholders, and showcase whether a relationship can be observed between practical decisions and actions, and Arctic resources. Finally, our study focused on studying the impact of hydrocarbon resources on foreign policy narratives, and it demonstrated a limited correlation that remains insufficient to perfectly predict each state's stance. An expanded study could be done to take into account other factors pertaining to both the Arctic, as well as domestic particularities of each state, such as military power or political party in power.

## 8. Conclusion

Our paper was meant not as a substitute to other studies of the Arctic, but rather as a step back to look at the fundamental ideas and narratives invoked in foreign policy statements, in order to provide a framework or lens through which we can better understand the Arctic as a system and contextualize policies within its confines. Through a qualitative analysis of every Arctic stakeholder's narrative with regards to the region in order to determine whether they adopt a unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral foreign policy stance, and subsequently a quantitative study to determine the impact of hydrocarbon resources on the adoption of particular stances, we have come to the conclusion that hydrocarbon resources do have an impact on adopted policy to a degree. Factors such as the presence of undiscovered oil and gas resources, the share of discovered resources in the total reserves of each country, and the price of oil among other factors seem to be positively correlated with higher odds of unilateralism being adopted. However, through post estimation and predicted probabilities, we observe that relying on hydrocarbon resources to predict the adoption of foreign policy stances yields mixed results, in particular vis-a-vis the Arctic Five, revealing the necessity to include other economic and non-economic factors, both external and internal to each state, in order to be able to better predict, and understand, the adoption of either unilateralism, bilateralism, or multilateralism. Our study was inspired in part by the debate that will perhaps grow more so due to recent events, about whether the Arctic will be the scene of great conflicts or stable cooperation. It does not presume to provide a holistic answer to that debate, but it does present a correlation that we can observe between the presence of hydrocarbon resources and unilateral policy stances. This however does not mean that the Arctic would necessarily be a region of conflict, especially if systemic factors such as the price of oil would make the resources in the High North economically unviable. Indeed, our study distinguishes narrative from actual practical policy even if they inform one another, and it is our belief that adding this perspective would better equip us to discern whether conflict exists in a practical sense or only in the realm of rhetoric.

## Annex

Country	Document	Institution	Date of publication
Canada	The Northern Dimension of Canada's Foreign Policy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2000
Canada	"Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic"	Prime Minister Stephen Harper, speech.	2006
Canada	Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2009
Canada	Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2010
Canada	Achievements Under Canada's Northern Strategy 2007-2011	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2011
USA	National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive	Office of the Press Secretary	2009
USA	National Strategy for the Arctic	The White House	2013
Russia	Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020	The Security Council	2001
Russia	Foundations Of The Russian Federation's State Policy In The Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond	The Security Council	2008
Russia	Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020	Ministry of Defense	2009
Denmark	Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2011
Denmark and Japan	Joint Statement on the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership for Growth and Innovation Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark	Joint statement of Danish and Japanese governments	2014
Norway	The Norwegian Government's High North Strategy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2006
Norway	New Building Blocks in the North	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2009



<b>Country</b>	<b>Document</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Date of publication</b>
Sweden	Sweden's strategy for the Arctic region	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2011
Sweden	EU's Arctic Policy: Questions and Answers	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2012
Sweden	It is important that the EU puts Arctic issues on the agenda	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2012
Finland	Strategy for the Arctic Region	Prime Minister's Office Publications	2010
Finland	Finland's Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013 Government resolution on 23 August 2013	Prime Minister's Office Publications	2013
Iceland	A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland's Arctic Policy	Parliament of Iceland	2011
Iceland	Iceland and the Arctic	Hjálmar W Hannesson , ambassador to Iceland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2012
European Union	Resolution on the EU's Northern Dimension	EEA Consultative Committee	2000
European Union	Resolution and Report on the Second Northern Dimension Action Plan	EEA Consultative Committee	2004
European Union	European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance	European Parliament. Official Journal of the European Union	2008
European Union	Resolution on Arctic Policy	Joint Parliamentary Committee. European Parliament	2013
European Union	Draft Council Conclusions on the European Union and the Arctic region	European Council	2008
European Union	Council conclusions on Arctic issues	European Council	2009
European Union	Council conclusions on Arctic issues	European Council	2014
European Union	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The European Union and the Arctic region	European Commission	2008
European Union	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council	European Commission	2012

<b>Country</b>	<b>Document</b>	<b>Institution</b>	<b>Date of publication</b>
China	Statement at the Meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers	Lan Lijun, Chinese Ambassador. Chinese ministry of Foreign Affairs	2012
Japan	Statement at meeting between the Swedish Chairmanship of the Arctic Council and Observers/Ad-hoc Observers Stockholm	Kira Shuji, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	2012
South Korea	Korea's Arctic Policy - A Korean route towards the Arctic frontier.	Byong-hyun Lee, South Korean ambassador. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	2012

Table 24. Official documents sources

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Source</b>
World Petroleum Assessment 2000	US Geological Survey
Oil and gas resources of the Arctic Alaska petroleum province 2006	US Geological Survey
Circum-Arctic Resource appraisal (CARA) 2008	US Geological Survey
International Energy Statistics	The US Energy Information Administration
British Petroleum dataset	British Petroleum
World bank database	World Bank

Table 25. Quantitative data sources

Table 26. Predicted probabilities for Canada

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Canada	0.26464	0.57798	0.1573802	0.0877034	0.453788	0.458508	1996	Bilateralism
Canada	0.298231	0.565202	0.1365662	0.095254	0.468705	0.436041	1997	Bilateralism
Canada	0.338347	0.545479	0.116174	0.1417333	0.52809	0.330177	1998	Bilateralism
Canada	0.32031	0.554863	0.1248267	0.1885425	0.552011	0.259447	1999	Bilateralism
Canada	0.460129	0.466772	0.0731001	0.1194014	0.505462	0.375137	2000	Bilateralism
Canada	0.477265	0.454163	0.0685716	0.1595981	0.540367	0.300035	2001	Bilateralism
Canada	0.476736	0.454557	0.0687073	0.2175	0.555979	0.226521	2002	Bilateralism
Canada	0.007997	0.099093	0.8929096	0.1409769	0.527467	0.331556	2003	Bilateralism
Canada	0.014348	0.163667	0.8219848	0.1646446	0.543065	0.292291	2004	Bilateralism
Canada	0.024172	0.245111	0.7307173	0.1247332	0.511172	0.363547	2005	Bilateralism
Canada	0.051121	0.393792	0.5550873	0.137398	0.524392	0.33821	2006	Unilateralism
Canada	0.224189	0.587102	0.1887086	0.2840648	0.545701	0.170235	2007	Unilateralism
Canada	0.521801	0.420174	0.0580253	0.1997135	0.554325	0.245962	2008	Unilateralism
Canada	0.18325	0.586227	0.2305229	0.3290203	0.528609	0.142371	2009	Unilateralism
Canada	0.374559	0.524529	0.1009116	0.3386826	0.524169	0.137148	2010	Unilateralism
Canada	0.658915	0.307461	0.0336243	0.3393576	0.523851	0.136792	2011	Unilateralism
Canada	0.706269	0.266537	0.0271944	0.3543283	0.516498	0.129174	2012	Unilateralism

Table 27. Predicted probabilities for Russia

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Russia	0.964178	0.033331	0.002491	0.9690608	0.028347	0.002592	1996	Bilateralism
Russia	0.974707	0.023552	0.0017412	0.9457694	0.049585	0.004646	1997	Bilateralism
Russia	0.854918	0.133804	0.0112781	0.9428593	0.052232	0.004909	1998	Bilateralism
Russia	0.480532	0.451728	0.0677404	0.0825732	0.442522	0.474905	1999	Bilateralism
Russia	0.957243	0.039764	0.0029933	0.2978839	0.541137	0.16098	2000	Unilateralism
Russia	0.961379	0.035929	0.002693	0.8480312	0.137591	0.014378	2001	Unilateralism
Russia	0.985574	0.013443	0.0009829	0.3832574	0.500921	0.115822	2002	Unilateralism
Russia	0.985431	0.013576	0.0009928	0.7920172	0.187054	0.020929	2003	Unilateralism
Russia	0.995225	0.004452	0.0003224	0.5256677	0.405906	0.068427	2004	Unilateralism
Russia	0.998424	0.00147	0.0001061	0.9178964	0.074875	0.007229	2005	Unilateralism
Russia	0.999458	0.000506	0.0000365	0.9869493	0.011976	0.001075	2006	Unilateralism
Russia	0.994847	0.004805	0.000348	0.9951645	0.00444	0.000395	2007	Unilateralism
Russia	1	6.41E-09	4.62E-10	0.9996496	0.000322	2.85E-05	2008	Unilateralism
Russia	1	1.17E-07	8.40E-09	0.999409	0.000543	4.81E-05	2009	Unilateralism
Russia	1	6.64E-08	4.78E-09	0.9996492	0.000322	2.86E-05	2010	Unilateralism
Russia				0.9998656	0.000124	1.09E-05	2011	Unilateralism

Table 28. Predicted probabilities for USA

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
USA	0.205525	0.588233	0.2062422	0.2759441	0.548055	0.176001	1996	Unilateralism
USA	0.111769	0.540049	0.348182	0.2474009	0.554121	0.198479	1997	Unilateralism
USA	0.084284	0.493657	0.4220584	0.2840283	0.545712	0.17026	1998	Unilateralism
USA	0.117815	0.547385	0.3347995	0.3124751	0.535625	0.151899	1999	Unilateralism
USA	0.157211	0.577901	0.2648878	0.2224242	0.556043	0.221532	2000	Unilateralism
USA	0.392695	0.513143	0.0941621	0.3030761	0.539253	0.157671	2001	Unilateralism
USA	0.380861	0.520634	0.0985053	0.3169772	0.533793	0.14923	2002	Unilateralism
USA	0.551857	0.396384	0.0517585	0.1803416	0.549599	0.27006	2003	Unilateralism
USA	0.741837	0.235306	0.0228569	0.5992988	0.349084	0.051618	2004	Unilateralism
USA	0.797945	0.185319	0.0167356	0.5274572	0.404573	0.06797	2005	Unilateralism
USA	0.884411	0.106881	0.0087084	0.4800434	0.43893	0.081026	2006	Unilateralism
USA	0.899684	0.092878	0.007439	0.4900529	0.431855	0.078092	2007	Unilateralism
USA	0.976733	0.021669	0.0015986	0.5107444	0.416919	0.072337	2008	Unilateralism
USA	0.887611	0.10395	0.0084391	0.5786764	0.365372	0.055951	2009	Unilateralism
USA	0.941905	0.053967	0.0041287	0.5324208	0.40086	0.066719	2010	Unilateralism
USA	0.967408	0.030333	0.0022594	0.5327091	0.400644	0.066647	2011	Unilateralism
USA	0.950342	0.046158	0.0034999	0.5155309	0.413408	0.071062	2012	Unilateralism

Table 29. Predicted probabilities for Denmark.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Denmark	0.004487	0.058351	0.9371622	0.0059205	0.062256	0.931823	1996	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.004343	0.056592	0.939065	0.0059408	0.062455	0.931604	1997	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.003562	0.046938	0.9495003	0.0061241	0.064245	0.929631	1998	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.004695	0.060876	0.9344295	0.0062123	0.065104	0.928684	1999	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.006911	0.086907	0.9061817	0.0052702	0.055838	0.938892	2000	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.005735	0.073297	0.9209681	0.0053579	0.05671	0.937932	2001	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.006156	0.078224	0.91562	0.005821	0.06128	0.932899	2002	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.008033	0.099492	0.8924753	0.005465	0.057771	0.936765	2003	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.013583	0.156443	0.8299741	0.0055053	0.058169	0.936325	2004	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.024478	0.247353	0.7281693	0.0048512	0.051651	0.943498	2005	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.036423	0.323518	0.6400601	0.0050158	0.053301	0.941683	2006	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.008272	0.10212	0.8896086	0.0128062	0.12465	0.862544	2007	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.032617	0.301432	0.6659511	0.011546	0.113943	0.874511	2008	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.005689	0.072751	0.9215606	0.0142553	0.136599	0.849146	2009	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.012826	0.149157	0.8380167	0.014363	0.137473	0.848164	2010	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.02724	0.266846	0.7059149	0.0144767	0.138392	0.847131	2011	Multilateralism
Denmark	0.025918	0.257671	0.7164111	0.0148826	0.141655	0.843462	2012	Multilateralism

Table 30. Predicted probabilities for Norway

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Norway	0.354262	0.536591	0.1091472	0.8344826	0.149628	0.015889	1996	Bilateralism
Norway	0.161042	0.579607	0.259351	0.8422834	0.142703	0.015014	1997	Bilateralism
Norway	0.358039	0.534405	0.1075555	0.7925472	0.18659	0.020863	1998	Bilateralism
Norway	0.222454	0.587301	0.1902447	0.9492458	0.046421	0.004334	1999	Bilateralism
Norway	0.08309	0.491048	0.4258621	0.8877573	0.102056	0.010187	2000	Bilateralism
Norway	0.293504	0.567232	0.1392644	0.8445908	0.140652	0.014757	2001	Bilateralism
Norway	0.307658	0.560955	0.1313873	0.9155071	0.077036	0.007457	2002	Bilateralism
Norway	0.21148	0.588123	0.2003967	0.2923759	0.543036	0.164588	2003	Bilateralism
Norway	0.222817	0.587261	0.1899223	0.3537483	0.516793	0.129459	2004	Bilateralism
Norway	0.332925	0.548381	0.1186942	0.2190045	0.556015	0.22498	2005	Bilateralism
Norway	0.502217	0.435322	0.0624615	0.0475256	0.3325	0.619975	2006	Bilateralism
Norway	0.011407	0.13511	0.8534824	0.3430783	0.522073	0.134849	2007	Bilateralism
Norway	0.016926	0.186987	0.7960876	0.2266168	0.555976	0.217407	2008	Bilateralism
Norway	0.012159	0.142615	0.8452268	0.5505342	0.387149	0.062317	2009	Bilateralism
Norway	0.018013	0.196384	0.7856029	0.6399427	0.316263	0.043794	2010	Bilateralism
Norway	0.025024	0.251308	0.7236682	0.7005736	0.265805	0.033622	2011	Bilateralism
Norway	0.029051	0.278974	0.6919746	0.7951426	0.184316	0.020541	2012	Bilateralism



Table 31. Predicted probabilities for Iceland.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Iceland	0.00017	0.002352	0.9974787	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	1996	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000156	0.002163	0.9976804	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	1997	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000111	0.001537	0.9983522	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	1998	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000146	0.002017	0.9978375	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	1999	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000268	0.003709	0.9960228	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2000	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.00021	0.00291	0.9968799	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2001	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000213	0.002942	0.9968452	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2002	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000279	0.003855	0.9958663	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2003	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.000497	0.006843	0.9926602	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2004	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.001147	0.015651	0.9832016	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2005	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.00193	0.02603	0.9720402	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2006	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.002731	0.036418	0.9608507	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2007	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.012281	0.143819	0.8439009	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2008	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.001539	0.020871	0.9775901	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2009	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.00405	0.052995	0.9429557	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2010	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.009447	0.114812	0.8757409	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2011	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.009027	0.110318	0.880655	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2012	Multilateralism
Iceland	0.011196	0.132972	0.8558322	0.0029666	0.032297	0.964737	2013	Multilateralism

Table 32. Predicted probabilities for Sweden.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Sweden	0.000184	0.002547	0.9972689	0.0029786	0.032422	0.964599	1996	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.00017	0.002347	0.9974834	0.0029784	0.032421	0.964601	1997	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.00012	0.001665	0.9982149	0.0029783	0.03242	0.964602	1998	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.000158	0.002187	0.9976554	0.0029783	0.03242	0.964602	1999	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.000294	0.004057	0.9956499	0.0029781	0.032417	0.964605	2000	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.00023	0.003174	0.9965963	0.0029792	0.032429	0.964592	2001	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.000229	0.003169	0.9966019	0.0029794	0.032431	0.964589	2002	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.0003	0.00415	0.9955491	0.0029794	0.032431	0.96459	2003	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.000536	0.007383	0.9920809	0.0029793	0.032431	0.96459	2004	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.001248	0.017002	0.9817501	0.0029787	0.032424	0.964597	2005	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.002093	0.028162	0.9697453	0.0029793	0.03243	0.964591	2006	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.002961	0.039357	0.9576818	0.0029797	0.032434	0.964586	2007	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.01335	0.154215	0.8324351	0.0029785	0.032422	0.9646	2008	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.001658	0.022459	0.9758825	0.0029823	0.032461	0.964556	2009	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.004458	0.058	0.9375424	0.0029879	0.03252	0.964492	2010	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.010265	0.12341	0.8663253	0.0029836	0.032475	0.964542	2011	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.009883	0.119416	0.8707015	0.0029813	0.032451	0.964568	2012	Multilateralism
Sweden	0.012122	0.142254	0.8456239	0.0029807	0.032445	0.964574	2013	Multilateralism

Table 33. Predicted probabilities for Finland.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Finland	0.000175	0.002425	0.9974003	0.0030144	0.032798	0.964187	1996	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000161	0.002229	0.9976099	0.0030134	0.032788	0.964199	1997	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000115	0.001594	0.9982913	0.0030204	0.032861	0.964119	1998	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000151	0.00209	0.997759	0.0030204	0.032862	0.964118	1999	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000279	0.00385	0.9958713	0.0030218	0.032876	0.964102	2000	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000218	0.003019	0.9967624	0.0030264	0.032924	0.964049	2001	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000221	0.003055	0.9967238	0.003026	0.032921	0.964054	2002	Multilateralism
Finland	0.00029	0.004006	0.9957036	0.0030326	0.032989	0.963979	2003	Multilateralism
Finland	0.000517	0.007114	0.9923691	0.0030304	0.032966	0.964004	2004	Multilateralism
Finland	0.001187	0.016189	0.9826244	0.0030246	0.032906	0.96407	2005	Multilateralism
Finland	0.002007	0.027036	0.9709572	0.0030292	0.032953	0.964018	2006	Multilateralism
Finland	0.00284	0.037813	0.9593468	0.0030267	0.032927	0.964046	2007	Multilateralism
Finland	0.012751	0.148429	0.8388202	0.0030288	0.032949	0.964022	2008	Multilateralism
Finland	0.001606	0.021766	0.9766276	0.0030226	0.032884	0.964093	2009	Multilateralism
Finland	0.004196	0.054793	0.9410114	0.0030283	0.032944	0.964027	2010	Multilateralism
Finland	0.009791	0.118447	0.8717625	0.0030206	0.032863	0.964116	2011	Multilateralism
Finland	0.009352	0.113796	0.8768526	0.0030148	0.032803	0.964182	2012	Multilateralism
Finland	0.011612	0.137173	0.851215				2013	Multilateralism

Table 34. Predicted probabilities for EU.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
EU	0.008053	0.099709	0.8922383	0.0017345	0.019164	0.979102	1996	Multilateralism
EU	0.011015	0.131134	0.8578504	0.0025787	0.028204	0.969217	1997	Multilateralism
EU	0.01848	0.200337	0.7811832	0.0059909	0.062945	0.931064	1998	Multilateralism
EU	0.021029	0.221153	0.757818	0.0092852	0.093962	0.896752	1999	Multilateralism
EU	0.020502	0.216957	0.7625411	0.0012682	0.014092	0.98464	2000	Multilateralism
EU	0.017751	0.194143	0.7881063	0.0022971	0.025209	0.972494	2001	Multilateralism
EU	0.020526	0.217146	0.7623284	0.0100614	0.100937	0.889002	2002	Multilateralism
EU	0.018004	0.196303	0.7856927	0.0050897	0.05404	0.940871	2003	Multilateralism
EU	0.023394	0.239347	0.7372597	0.0064502	0.067412	0.926138	2004	Multilateralism
EU	0.030032	0.285334	0.6846342	0.0028029	0.030574	0.966623	2005	Multilateralism
EU	0.04064	0.345947	0.6134139	0.0060126	0.063157	0.93083	2006	Multilateralism
EU	0.085954	0.49721	0.4168363	0.0136703	0.131821	0.854509	2007	Multilateralism
EU	0.228583	0.586519	0.1848972	0.0087313	0.088909	0.90236	2008	Multilateralism
EU	0.042457	0.355009	0.6025337	0.0417007	0.306652	0.651648	2009	Multilateralism
EU	0.07892	0.481465	0.4396151	0.0757517	0.425957	0.498292	2010	Multilateralism
EU				0.0635318	0.391039	0.54543	2011	Multilateralism
EU				0.1020759	0.480653	0.417271	2012	Multilateralism

Table 35. Predicted probabilities for China.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
China	0.000222	0.003075	0.9967027	0.0029165	0.03177	0.965313	1996	Multilateralism
China	0.00023	0.003185	0.9965846	0.003016	0.032815	0.964169	1997	Multilateralism
China	0.000176	0.002429	0.9973959	0.0030549	0.033223	0.963723	1998	Multilateralism
China	0.000151	0.00209	0.9977595	0.0031032	0.033729	0.963168	1999	Multilateralism
China	0.000263	0.003637	0.9961005	0.0028812	0.031399	0.96572	2000	Multilateralism
China	0.000219	0.003029	0.9967521	0.0028977	0.031572	0.96553	2001	Multilateralism
China	0.00023	0.003177	0.9965928	0.0029772	0.032408	0.964615	2002	Multilateralism
China	0.000315	0.004346	0.9953398	0.0028011	0.030555	0.966644	2003	Multilateralism
China	0.0005	0.00688	0.9926204	0.0028162	0.030715	0.966469	2004	Multilateralism
China	0.00109	0.014888	0.9840214	0.0026421	0.028876	0.968482	2005	Multilateralism
China	0.001756	0.023753	0.974491	0.0026792	0.029268	0.968053	2006	Multilateralism
China	0.002664	0.035559	0.9617771	0.0027428	0.029941	0.967317	2007	Multilateralism
China	0.011986	0.140899	0.8471152	0.0026448	0.028905	0.968451	2008	Multilateralism
China	0.002469	0.033047	0.9644839	0.0030697	0.033378	0.963552	2009	Multilateralism
China	0.006125	0.07786	0.9160156	0.0033082	0.035869	0.960823	2010	Multilateralism
China				0.003475	0.037603	0.958922	2011	Multilateralism
China				0.0037018	0.03995	0.956349	2012	Multilateralism

Table 36. Predicted probabilities for Japan.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
Japan	0.000347	0.004795	0.9948577	0.0039382	0.042383	0.953679	1996	Multilateralism
Japan	0.000327	0.004521	0.9951513	0.0039736	0.042746	0.953281	1997	Multilateralism
Japan	0.000222	0.003071	0.9967073	0.0040187	0.043208	0.952774	1998	Multilateralism
Japan	0.000288	0.003974	0.995738	0.0040775	0.04381	0.952113	1999	Multilateralism
Japan	0.00053	0.007294	0.9921759	0.004122	0.044265	0.951614	2000	Multilateralism
Japan	0.000412	0.005686	0.9939013	0.0041276	0.044322	0.951551	2001	Multilateralism
Japan	0.000405	0.00558	0.9940158	0.0041446	0.044496	0.95136	2002	Multilateralism
Japan	0.00055	0.007573	0.9918767	0.0042286	0.045353	0.950419	2003	Multilateralism
Japan	0.000963	0.013177	0.9858601	0.0042144	0.045208	0.950577	2004	Multilateralism
Japan	0.002246	0.030154	0.9676006	0.0041956	0.045016	0.950788	2005	Multilateralism
Japan	0.003742	0.049181	0.9470769	0.0043356	0.046441	0.949223	2006	Multilateralism
Japan	0.005245	0.067497	0.9272579	0.0044657	0.047762	0.947772	2007	Multilateralism
Japan	0.023492	0.240079	0.7364288	0.004448	0.047583	0.947969	2008	Multilateralism
Japan	0.002751	0.036668	0.9605817	0.0044307	0.047408	0.948162	2009	Multilateralism
Japan	0.00726	0.090864	0.9018763	0.004551	0.048625	0.946824	2010	Multilateralism
Japan	0.016576	0.183911	0.7995136	0.0049157	0.052299	0.942786	2011	Multilateralism
Japan	0.01604	0.179144	0.8048161	0.0050317	0.05346	0.941509	2012	Multilateralism

Table 37. Predicted probabilities for South Korea.

Country	Unilateralism (Oil)	Bilateralism (Oil)	Multilateralism (Oil)	Unilateralism (Gas)	Bilateralism (Gas)	Multilateralism (Gas)	Year	Policy Stance
S. Korea	0.000235	0.003247	0.9965177	0.0031339	0.03405	0.962816	1996	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000231	0.003195	0.9965739	0.0031706	0.034433	0.962396	1997	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.00016	0.002213	0.9976271	0.003152	0.034239	0.962609	1998	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000213	0.002948	0.9968389	0.003195	0.034689	0.962116	1999	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000397	0.005473	0.9941304	0.0032239	0.034991	0.961785	2000	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000307	0.004244	0.9954487	0.0032538	0.035303	0.961443	2001	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000301	0.004155	0.9955438	0.0032849	0.035627	0.961088	2002	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000395	0.005449	0.9941561	0.0033152	0.035943	0.960742	2003	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.000713	0.009787	0.9895005	0.0033672	0.036483	0.96015	2004	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.00166	0.022484	0.9758554	0.0033508	0.036313	0.960336	2005	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.002823	0.037586	0.9595911	0.0034121	0.036951	0.959637	2006	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.003992	0.052285	0.9437231	0.0034224	0.037057	0.959521	2007	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.017816	0.194701	0.7874827	0.0034801	0.037657	0.958863	2008	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.002247	0.030168	0.967585	0.0034251	0.037085	0.95949	2009	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.00599	0.076289	0.9177209	0.003582	0.038712	0.957706	2010	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.014379	0.163958	0.8216627	0.0036298	0.039207	0.957163	2011	Multilateralism
S. Korea	0.01362	0.156797	0.8295828	0.0036485	0.0394	0.956952	2012	Multilateralism

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